Writing Consciousness

The Phenomena of Critical Thinking, Heuristics, and Metacognition in Composition

What is the raw writing experience of student writers?
A Phenomenological Collection and Review

by Richard Jewell

MinnState—Minnesota State Colleges and Universities

MnWE—Minnesota Writing & English

To two Socratic-method professors:
Harry Golding, Shimer College, who showed me by example how to teach well
and Phil Keith, St. Cloud State University, who shared a multitude of new
writing pedagogies

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Introduction: The Fire of Reflective Thinking

Greek playwright Aeschylus notes at the beginning of the human race that at first, people "had eyes" but "saw to no avail" and possessed "ears, but they did not understand." Not until Prometheus brought fire to humanity were people able to "discern the rising of the stars" and "the combining of letters." Promethean fire—sunlight, flame, and inner brightness—was the gift of reflective consciousness. Without it, humans were aware, but they had no tools with which to explain the world or build implements of meaning. This is true especially in writing.

What is "Writing Consciousness"? It is your awareness that centers itself in and around writing: the corner room of your brain (the chamber with the best windows) where you define yourself as "being a writer." It also is your active, busy, and felt state of mind and body as you write—your "being into" or engaging in the act. Third, it is your structure and image of what you do in writing—your writerly "house"—that you have built through practice, memory, and imagining your future authoring possibilities.

These three states—first, "being a writer"; second, your active, physically or emotively felt state of mind; and third, your constructed writerly "home"— are your "self" or being as a writer. And the elements of this writer self are both recursive and transferable, making them a higher order of thinking that you can share with others. Thus they are developed cognitive tools that are teachable.

How do you best transfer such writerly self-knowledge to students? To start, you provide them multiple experiences and options for their own raw writing. Second, you guide them through the possibilities and opportunities of these writing events which you, as an experienced writer-self, can offer to them. Third, you share what other writer communities have discovered.

This book considers all these activities of critical thinking in writing. The seven chapters offer basic classroom methods of teaching self-reflective writing, longer-term planning using metacognition and heuristics, and, at the end, scholarly discussion of the critical-thinking strengths and limitations of twentieth-century paradigms for teaching writing. Much of the latter is viewed through the useful lens of phenomenology.

Briefly—with longer descriptions promised in the book's chapters—I offer a few definitions. "Critical thinking" is a mid- and late-twentieth century movement defined by its encouragement of more than just logical thought for solving problems, instead adding such dynamics as richer reflection, consideration of opposites, and creative and other intellectual options.

"Metacognition" is "thinking about thinking." For example, deciding a paper's organization may be a basic thinking task; however, speculating about a variety of ways one can organize a paper is metacognitive.

"Heuristics" are intellectual tools that cause new thinking. Socratic questions form one such set of instruments.

"Phenomenal" in general usage means "as or of a phenomenon" (just as "existential" in its wider sense means "basic questioning about one's existence"). However, as used in this collection, the word refers to the philosophies of phenomenology developed in the early twentieth century, especially those of the founder of the movement, Edmund Husserl. He followed close upon the previous century's existential philosophers, who worked to define the essence of the raw experience of human awareness.

Writing and Thinking in the Twentieth Century

In the 1900s, college writing as an act of something more than just crafting ordered, grammatical sentences, and especially writing as an event that embodies deep thinking, were hard-won viewpoints. Though the struggle for them may seem strange now—a forehead-slapping "duh!" in retrospect—their acceptance in teaching was slow to develop. Even as recently as the late 1990s, a "post-process" writing theory, "paralogic," made the rounds claiming that real writing is unteachable except in the most general, vague way: you can, it said, give students the opportunity to write, but either they "have it" or they don't. That viewpoint was widespread before the 1970s-80s when it was believed by a majority of faculty that good writing couldn't be taught; only the brighter students were naturally capable of it. There remain faculty (usually in nonwriting disciplines) who believe this, and even more so regarding thinking in writing: such people say that while you can, perhaps, teach someone to write better, especially regarding the mechanics, you can't show students how to think. That ability, they say, is innate, not teachable.

The modest purpose of this book is to prove them absolutely wrong. Some students need more time with many skills. (And some professors may need more lessons than others to absorb, say, how to repair an automotive engine or cook a complete Thanksgiving meal for twelve.) But everyone can learn. This includes critical thinking.

Through the '80s and '90s as I gradually developed as a composition teacher, I often found my own innocent hopes dashed by those resistant to new theories of composition and of critical thinking. My personal experiences provide a good example of the battles of teaching composition and of critical thinking throughout the United States.

My first negative experience of anti-composition and anti-thinking pedagogy started in two years of English literature in high school. My teacher was a strong practitioner of early-1900s interpretation of texts using a classic work's historical background and philology. She drilled all of us, mostly farm kids, to repeat—in our own written words—her lectures on the exact meanings of great literary works and, as we mirrored her, to use perfectly grammatical paragraphs with clear topic sentences.

Then in my first year of college in the mid-1960s, my lit prof assigned us four papers for the semester's grade.

I quickly realized my high school approach wouldn't work. We were supposed to analyze the literature using assigned readings from psychology and sociology. In my first paper, I thoroughly critiqued *Hamlet* using Sigmund Freud. I liked Freud and had studied him on my own in high school. I put my heart (and more time than most of my peers) into that paper.

When I got it back, there was just one comment (beyond a few grammatical corrections). My professor wrote, at the very end of it, "This is bullshit." He gave me a D-. Stung, I asked him after class what he meant. He told me I clearly had not read the assignments. I hesitatingly said I had, to which he replied that I must not have understood them.

Those ideas were meaningful to me (and still are). But I was seventeen and not about to disagree with a college teacher. Now, I wonder whether he even read my paper.

For my second effort, I copied the critiquing style of a friend who had received a "B" on his first paper. He had limited himself to a much narrower range of ideas, and he applied them to a smaller part of the literary reading. My grade moved up a little.

Then, midsemester, I was saved by the college's English Department. It insisted that all students receive five exemplary sample student essays. Dr. Doom (as I came to call him) didn't want to use them. He declared three of them trash and only one good. I studied that single paper for hours. And I copied its critical methods. My third paper received a better graded. And on the fourth, behold: I received an "A"! (I also earned what I now think was a look of befuddlement from him, apparently because of my seeming intellectual turnaround.)

What happened? When I began studying literary theories almost two decades later, I discovered that Dr. Doom's course—and the sample paper whose method and style I copied—had been my first experience of writing and thinking using New Criticism (1940s-70s), in particular an *explicacion de texte*. He could have taught us both the writing form and the thinking method.

Because of his failure, I could have failed the course. (For a fuller account, see "Dr. Doom" in "Stories of Becoming a Writer" in the Appendix.) He assumed I was dumb, lazy—or inherently incapable of good writing and thinking.

I had to learn freewriting and the steps of composing on my own. In those mid-1900s decades, no teacher even whispered the alien word "process." The few early national calls for a body of writing theory beyond the meaning of grammar and rhetorical style usually were met with scoffing.

In some dark corners of colleges where stubborn literature faculty controlled writing courses, anti-process and anti-writing theory lasted several more decades. At my first job at a two-year college in the late 1980s, I learned to teach Introduction to Literature I and II because that was how students there were taught to write. Nearby state universities would not accept this "composition" sequence in transfer. And when the dean and another faculty member asked me to start a writing center because of my previous experience managing one, the entire department held a special meeting to veto the idea, 10 to 2.

The other faculty member and I started the center anyway. But that branded me, and I left soon after. The department was a cemetery where writing pedagogy withered at the gate and faculty worshipped at the graves of long-dead white people, mostly males.

The same often was true in those decades of trying to teach thinking skills. Parallel to process writing, the critical thinking movement developed in the early 1970s-late 1990s. The two conjoined for a while in cognitive theories of writing.

I began immersing my writing students in critical thinking in the early '90s, from my background of earlier degrees in philosophy and in theology. I also had gained a thorough experience of parts of the burgeoning CT movement by coteaching "Problem Solving" with the leader of the state's six-year critical thinking training program, and by helping him often at its conferences twice a year. "Problem Solving" as a course attracted very good abstract thinkers, but it also drew on a large audience of future auto mechanics: the course was required by the school's Ford Certificate Program. That experience showed me that almost any college student, no matter how nonabstract or "practical minded," could learn critical thinking skills.

But convincing some faculty and administrators of this was difficult. I had started publishing and presenting about teaching thinking skills in composition. At a state conference one time, one person in my audience was the leader of the statewide K-12 teacher association. I was stunned when he announced at the beginning of the discussion period, "I believe you can't teach

thinking." Either a student can think or they can't, he said. Another participant and I debated with him at length about our positive experiences doing exactly that, but he palmed it off as accident, luck, and our misunderstanding of results.

I also found similar anti-thinking skills in literary teaching, as with Dr. Doom. In my second attempt at teaching in a community college, a longtime faculty member insisted in a meeting that I commit to saying, "A theme can never be a thesis." I tried to explain to him that traditionally, by definition, this was true, but Jacques Derrida's deconstruction sometimes changed the formula: an ordinary theme could become an unconscious thesis against which a writer could counterargue that the theme was a racist, gendered, or capitalist position.

"No," he said. "You either believe a theme is not a thesis, or it is. Choose." I chose Derrida's side and in the faculty member's eyes forever failed the cause of teaching literature.

Is it possible to teach critical thinking to students who are writing? This is the primary question in the first and second essays in this book. The third and fourth offer practical pedagogies. The fifth explains Husserl's basic phenomenology as it applies to the "writing self." The last two essays suggest how most of the major theories developed in the 1900s have elements of reflective critical thinking in them.

What Do the Chapters Offer

Of the seven essays in this book, the first four focus on practical applications of pedagogy. The final three are concerned about twentieth century writing theory and its uses and limitations.

The first two are very introductory, offering short, practical applications of critical thinking to the teaching of college composition. **"'Too Much Thinking!' What Should be Required?"** describes how my first use of critical thinking in a composition course was both a great success and excruciating failure, and how I adapted to make it work better the next time. **"Using Role Playing to Teach Critical Thinking"** shows how several teaching dilemmas in undergraduate composition and other liberal arts courses can be solved by asking students to play roles and try other methods from the critical thinking movement.

The third and fourth chapters are scholarly essays explaining the practical pedagogy of working with students using two specific elements of critical thinking. If you are a reader looking for practical applications with supporting pedagogical background, you may like these essays (and the handouts) best.

The first of the two, **"A Toolbox: Heuristics as Tools That Construct Thinking,"** describes how students easily may be taught to build their own cabinet of writing implements that manipulate a wide variety of subjects for useful enquiry in many disciplines. The second, **"The Metacognitive Writer in the Experiential Classroom"** offers a series of student experiences—and of pedagogical applications—using metacognition, heuristics, and other highly successful teaching methods in the critical thinking movement—to create knowledge in students and their readers.

The fifth essay, "**New Cartesian Writing: The Phenomenology of Composing**," builds a deep understanding of the meaning of writers' self-reflected writerly acts. If you enjoy philosophy of the ontological/existential type, or if you like transpersonal psychology, this chapter is the centerpiece of the book.

This concept, "self-reflected writerly acts," helps fill a lacuna in writing theory: it introduces Edmund Husserl's philosophy of Phenomenology as it applies to the act of composing. Husserl's five well known five *Cartesian Meditations* about human awareness are transliterated (with no other references) into the five steps of the *writing self*'s awareness—how it develops an awareness of itself and the world around it regarding writing.

This gap in the theory of composition and the teaching of it has prevented, in large part, the consideration of this major philosophical turn in the twentieth century, leaving both phenomenology and existentialism inadequately represented. Barbara Couture helped remedy this somewhat in her 2000 CCCC Outstanding Book *Toward a Phenomenological Rhetoric: Writing, Profession, and Altruism*," and others have helped. However, Couture's work was based on Martin Heidegger, who came later to the field of Phenomenology and who added several predetermined tenets to the human condition, a move with which Husserl disagreed.

The last two chapters apply this phenomenal knowledge of the writing self to the field of teaching writing and its pedagogies in the twentieth century. Both essays are heavily researched, both surveying and critiquing the field.

The first, "**Death and Rebirth: A Phenomenology of Style**," describes the rise, fall, and gradual recovery of stylistic considerations, 1950-1999. The second, "**Raw Writing: A Phenomenal Critique of Process and Post-Process Paradigms**," is the longest and perhaps strongest essay in the collection. It examines how students' raw experiences of writing sometimes have been deified, at other times erased, through positive and negative uses as the twentieth century's "paradigm battles" have been waged.

The appendix, "**Handouts**," may prove to be the most useful to you if you

are looking for ways to involve students in writerly self-reflection and in metacognitive activities. Most of the six handouts are one page each, some of them for all levels of college writers, and some for faculty and their advanced students.

My introductory students have told me that one of the most captivating handouts is four brief stories of my turning points as a writer. That is where Dr. Doom is featured.

However, the handouts most praised by my intermediate and advanced writing students are the four that clearly outline and detail the three major stages of the college writer. One describes the stages to students in general, two do so for faculty and graduate students, and a fourth helps students reflect on this knowledge at two or three points during their writing course.

(Note: These same handouts also appear as separate documents on the web page where this book is found.)

Conclusion: Where Will Writing Theory Go?

Carol Berkenkotter issued a call in 1991 for a better "ecumenical climate" of "healthy eclecticism" in writing studies ("Paradigm Debates," *CCC* 42). Similarly, Kathleen Blake Yancey sought to described the new century's theories in a positive light as a "plural commons" ("Plural Commons," *Relevance of English*, Yagelski, ed.). Pat Hutchings and Mary Taylor Huber at the Carnegie Foundation also described education in general as beginning to develop two separate locations: an "academic commons [of] disciplinary scholarship" and a "teaching commons [where] educators committed to inquiry and innovation…exchange ideas" (*Perspectives*, Oct. 2005). One would hope that additional experiential-phenomenal viewpoints aiding writerly self-reflectionmay develop.

As this collection is published online in 2023, new developments across the nation suggest that in preK-12, the "science of teaching" is becoming more important, especially after the statistically visible failures of parts of the whole language curriculum. In addition, AI--artificial intelligence—promises changes in writing as dramatic as those introduced in their time by the typewriter and then by the personal computer. As with these earlier changes, AI's introduction offers both important benefits and problems.

The intense social and cultural upheavals of the 1960s-70s caused significant new developments in theories of teaching writing and thinking. Those promise of these new pedagogies felt to many of those who pursued them to whither and sometimes die in the following decades due to overly formulaic interpretations and to challenges from older and newer ideas.

Now in the 2020s, George Floyd has been murdered; reactions to cultural change have subverted K-12 and college education in conservative areas of the country; and climate change and related population migrations and wars have begun to kill hundreds, in the next decade thousands, at a time. These changes, too, are part of the new plural commons for writing that feel—and often are—much more insistent in this new decade.

Whatever motivates the teaching of writing in the current and future generations, the raw experience of writing—and the good writing that the writerly self gradually learns to create—never will go away. AI and other changes may make some of the basics of composing easier. However, teaching students to develop their own writerly self-reflection and other critical thinking always will help them become more aware, questioning, and multitasking authors.

Chapter 1
"Too Much Thinking!"
What Should Be Required?

Richard Jewell

Abstract: This composite of several real-life students and teachers examines Janice, a single mother who has done well in practical courses, and Dr. Terrence, her professor in a critical writing and thinking course. Janice wants to withdraw because she finds the course too difficult. Dr. Terrence is concerned about whether Janice is capable of abstract thought and, if she is, what role he should play in helping her.

Possible Discussion Questions

1. Judging from the material presented in the case, would you say that Janice is qualified to be in Dr. Terrence's course? Why or why not?

2. How would you assess Dr. Terrence's approach to Janice? Would you advise him to change his approach in any way? If so, how?

3. Dr. Terrence receives Janice's oral permission to talk with a previous teacher. Is this—or what the teacher says—appropriate? In order to develop a more nuanced understanding, should Dr. Terrence also have asked Janice for permission to talk with the registrar?

4. Have you encountered students with the problems Janice presents? How have you worked with them? What advice do you have for Dr. Terrence as the clock ticks toward the withdrawal deadline in just a few hours?

Too Much Thinking

As soon as Janice appeared unannounced at Dr. Terrence's office door at midterm, he realized she was troubled. Her face was rigid with that blank expression students wear when they are controlling negative emotions, and her voice was soft and hesitant as she greeted him. She hovered just inside the door.

His first thought was that a problem had occurred at home: Janice had mentioned previously that she was a single mother with three kids, worked full time at Target, and attended school half time. Her goal was to earn a four-year college degree in the health sciences. Perhaps, he thought, one of her kids

had an ear infection, and Janice needed to skp a class to go to the doctor.

"Come on in and sit down," he told her.

She remained standing. "I have to withdraw. I brought the form with me. Here."

"Withdraw from school?" he asked, bewildered.

"Just your class." She was in his Composition II required course, which offered research, writing, reading, and critical thinking. "I'm kind of in a hurry," she said.

"Here," he said, pulling up a chair. "I'll be glad to sign it, but it would help me to hear your reasons why."

Reluctantly she sat, her old wool coat smelling slightly from the damp outside. She held on tightly to her inexpensive but clean canvas backpack.

"What's the problem?" he asked.

"I don't know." She shrugged. "I guess it's all this experimental stuff. I'm more used to traditional lectures."

"What is it you don't like?" he asked. "The group work? The writing games?"

"That's part of it," she said.

"You know you don't have to attend every single class," he reminded her, "as long as you replace the missed time with extra writing."

"That would be *worse*," she exclaimed, "especially if I have to write any more of those critical thinking papers!"

Ah, he thought. The writing class in their department required students not just to research but also to think. The course met the system's requirements for critical thinking competencies. Their school taught students how to read arguments and be able to summarize them, react to them logically, evaluate their quality, and create a researchable thesis. He always explained this in critical thinking terms to his students. His own system for teaching the course was to assign four papers: a summary, a response, an evaluation, and a final paper with a variety of sources.

"You received a high C on the first paper, the summary," he reminded her. "That was not an easy paper."

"Yes," she answered. Then she averted her eyes. "And I got an F on the response paper. I've never gotten an F on a paper before." And she started to cry.

He pulled out his box of Kleenex tissues that he kept for such occasions and offered them to her. She took one tissue and wiped her eyes. He was not a

tough grader in his department, only average, or at least he was so once the students had used the opportunities he offered for revising their first grades. However, when someone cried he still felt guilty.

"I'll be glad to give you pointers for revising it," he suggested. "You can raise the grade to a C."

"I'm just so sick and tired of trying to think," she said quickly, dabbing her eyes again. "In the first writing course, all you had to do was write about things that happened to you and why they're important. Now I'm supposed to see a bunch of sides and go outside my own thoughts and see other people's feelings, but how can anybody go into other people's head or emotions?"

"Do you have your reaction paper with you?" he asked.

"Yes." She pulled it out, handed it to him, and blew her nose as he looked at the paper.

"You did well with your use of quotations. I also like the examples you added from your own experiences," he said. "You spell well, too."

"Thanks." Her voice trembled. "I use spellcheck."

"Good," he said gently. "You do have some problems with grammar usage and punctuation, but I or a tutor can help you with those. Your main problem is that you summarized your subject instead of reacting to it. You wrote a factual report, but what you need is to argue."

"See what I mean?" she exclaimed, throwing one hand up. "And the net assignment is that stupid evaluation thing, and I don't even understand it! It's just too much thinking." Her tears began flowing again.

Even without seeing her tears, he felt unable to reach a decision. "Tell you what," he suggested. "Why don't you wait one more day and come back tomorrow. If you still think you have to withdraw and I can't talk you out of it then, I'll sign the form."

She nodded and dabbed at her eyes again.

"May I ask for advice from your Comp I teacher?"

She nodded and gave him a name. "I'm sorry!" she said.

Once she was gone, he picked up his phone. He had always felt that one of the pleasures of working in a relatively small department was that its faculty members were better acquainted with students and could take the time to help them. When Janice's former teacher answered, Dr. Terrence told him about Janice no2 being in Comp II. "She said I could talk with you," Dr. Terrence told him. "Do you have any advice for me?"

"I remember her," the other teacher told him. "A low-income single

mother. I carried her unofficially for the first three weeks of class until her student loan came through. She didn't do that well in the class. I gave her a C. Let me find her records. Here they are. She wrote an excellent paper from her personal experience and a very good paper giving directions for a process, but she couldn't seem to understand the assignment when the class examined a nonfiction story. Her analysis was poor. She seemed to have difficulty understanding how to pick a theme and argue about whether it was well represented. I'm worried, in fact, that I may have helped her a little too much in finding a theme. But she's very practical. She wrote down every detail of my lectures, made extensive notes in here textbook and reader—I saw them when she visited me—and memorized terms well. I thought she deserved at least a C. Oh, and I think she told me she had to take our pre-college writing and reading courses before moving up to Comp I, if that helps."

Dr. Terrence thanked her. He sat back in his chair and sighed. What, he asked himself, could he tell Janice? She was attentive and studious, but clearly she had trouble with abstract thought. Was she, he wondered, even capable of getting a degree? On the other hand, if she were indeed able to learn better thinking skills, whose responsibility was it? Was it his because the research writing course was one of the few official critical thinking courses on campus? Or did she need more help than he could give her? And of course there was the possibility that she might have to drop college entirely if she was not being careful of the rules about course withdrawals, or she even could lose a student loan, as did many students who failed to finish too many courses.

Just then he heard a knock on his door. He looked up, and there was Jance staning n his doorway, grasping her canvas backpack.

"Im sorry to be such a pain, Dr. Tererence," she said. "But I just found out the last date to take a passing withdrawl is today." Her eyes began to fill.

She held the form out. "Could you," she asked, "sign it for me now?"

Afterword—What's Next?

Several answers to this question are offered in the next two essays, "Role Playing To Teach Critical Thinking" and "A Toolbox: Heuristics as Devices That Construct Critical Thinking." Together, they suggest that students already have learned many critical thinking methods in their nonacademic lives; therefore, teaching them to think and write critically is a matter of transfer and adaption.

Chapter 2
Using Role Playing To
Teach Critical Thinking

Richard Jewell

My interest in teaching critical thinking was piqued when I was the junior member of a three-person team teaching an interdisciplinary critical-thinking course entitled "Problem Solving." By its conclusion, I was excited about teaching thinking in my composition courses. I decided to begin with Composition I and focused on critical thinking as found in the rhetorical modes: comparison-contrast, analysis, argument etc. I described critical thinking in lavish, exciting terms; and I helped students individually, in small groups, and in class as they performed a variety of thinking tasks.

The students and I quickly discovered that all this new thinking was hard work. I polled them informally almost every week and discovered that though they were completing the same number of homework hours as previous students in the course, they also perceived the work was much harder, that my course was their most difficult, and that the workload bordered on being unf.tir. Though they expressed great respect for critical thinking as the course progressed, they could not understand how the class could help them in other courses or in future professions. These evaluations continued despite my frequent explanations and examples in lecture and in writing of how the thinking skills could be used academically and professionally.

The students and I ended the quarter exhausted, as if together we had survived a battle. What, I wondered, had gone wrong?

Practical, Imaginative Group Roles

My usual method of teaching composition had proven successful with students through the years, so gradually I began to look for comparisons between what and how I normally taught and the "Problem Solving" team had taught.

I found that in composition, I engaged my students in practical writing about applied-thinking situations. When I taught composition students to argue or to read literature critically, for example, I gave them practice exercises such as the writing of business proposals (as arguments) or movie reviews (as

responses to literature). Similarly, the Problem Solving course emphasized practical concerns---e.g., learning to solve someone's emotional problems (in a case study) by using a four-, five-, or six- step method. Students in both courses enjoyed the exercises and performed well on tests.

And, students in both courses tended to respond best when the practical situations were imaginative. When my composition students practiced writing a business proposal, for example, they would work better and learn more if they imagined their own companies—or imaginatively explored their own real-work situations—rather than working with a circumstance I imposed. By comparison, in "Problem Solving," students in groups had a contest to create the best cantilever hanging from the classroom wall using nothing more than newspaper and tape (a popular problem-solving exercise in engineering departments) or using the steps of a problem-solving paradigm to examine their own individual personal or professional situations.

And, both courses often used group work. I had used groups for years. However, "Problem Solving," on occasion, took my usual method one step further. In composition, each student in a group was assigned a task: e.g., one as coordinator of the group, another as writer, another as reader to the class. However, "Problem Solving" occasionally experimented with more: sometimes students performed specific roles related to the imaginary activity. For example, in an exercise designed to teach students how cultures clash, one student in each group was required to be completely silent, one could only listen and respond with hand signals, and one could only talk without listening.

Dramatic Thinking

I began utilizing these three successful elements—practical exercises, imaginative input from students, and group role-playing—slowly, but increasingly, in my composition courses. In a news writing exercise, I asked students to interview each other like journalists and report on each other's lives, using the 5 Ws of journalism. For a business report, I asked each small group to make up a business name and product, then pretend they are managers or executives in their company and create a proposal, a TV ad, or a progress report on the development of the product. In a World Religions course, I asked each group to make up their own religion, sometimes imagining that they as a group were the founders of a religion that would gain worldwide acceptance, and sometimes imagining roles for each of themselves such as mystic, minister, business leader, or town conservative.

My most sophisticated role-playing exercise occurred in a research-

writing course in which I was teaching students how to use the thinking skills of description, simple analysis, argument, and evaluation. The exercise was called "Having a Baby": a teenager either is pregnant, or has made someone else pregnant, and one of the two is from an impoverished part of town. The students in each group first chose individual roles as members of the teenager's family, and created and analyzed the problem; then they received the analysis of another group, chose roles as friends of this other "family," and presented arguments concerning the other family's problems; third, they became a panel of mental health professionals of their choice and evaluated yet another group's family problems; finally, they evaluated their own work as a group.

"Having a Baby" would take two to four class hours. Students later wrote an argumentative and evaluative research paper, and they reported that the paper was much easier to write because of this introductory exercise.

I now use role-playing exercises to introduce new papers and new concepts almost every week. I have not had to change the content I teach, just some of the methods. In addition, my courses now have a critical-thinking orientation that I can describe and that students can more easily transfer: they have learned to "think about thinking" or think "metacognitively" by knowing how to apply different analytical strategies. By the end of a course, students can list a number of thinking tools ("heuristics") they have acquired. Student evaluations of my courses and their critical thinking contents have risen to higher levels, even as these same evaluations describe my courses as among the most difficult but rewarding courses they have taken in college.

Guidelines for Developing Role-Playing

• Isolate the thinking pattern or skill you want to teach. What kind of thinking do students need to perform in order to learn successfully what you want of them? For example, if you are requiring a paper in history or psychology that involves analysis, separate the kind of analysis you expect into a teachable exercise.

• If the thinking skill appears complex to students, break it down further into steps, parts, or separate functions. For example, students who may not grasp the complexities of a lawsuit may need it broken down into the viewpoints and separate thinking and feeling processes of lawyers and their clients.

• Decide if the skill can be practiced best by individuals working

alone or by small groups, in class or out. Role-playing in groups often works best, though having students work at home sometimes may be more appropriate. I often assign major papers that require individual students to develop or create business or social situations to which they can apply thinking patterns.

• Imagine enjoyable, challenging, dramatic roles for students to try. Set clear parameters. Create dynamic, difficult-to-solve problems to which students can react strongly. In the exercise described earlier, for example, the cantilever had to be self-supporting, could not touch the ground, could not contain any "illegal" substances such as student pens or rulers, could not depend on the ceiling for suspension, and had to stand on its own for at least one full minute at measurement time. Most teachers develop their parameters gradually as their students try out their exercises.

• Collect brief, handwritten, or oral evaluations within the same day or week. Role-playing can create dramatic changes in how students perceive the contents of a course section. And, what works well for some does not for others.

Discovering Student Perceptions

These methods teach critical thinking in two forms. Using metacognition, students think about what thinking strategies to apply. Applying heuristics, they have a new toolbox of practical intellectual tools.

If we can discover students' perceptions of their own potential roles and abilities in their current and future lives, we can use these awarenesses perceptions to develop efficient, enjoyable exercises that teach critical thinking. We will discover, of course, that some student perceptions are shallow and intemperate; however, they also carry beliefs and understandings that are both ennobling and practical. It is from these hopes and abilities that we can fashion roles for them—exercises that match both their needs and their dreams.

Afterword—What's Next?

Role playing is just one of a variety of methods for teaching critical thinking skills. Many such methods apply specifically to writing. The next essay, "A Toolbox: Heuristics as Devices That Construct Critical Thinking," is a formal scholarly essay demonstrating practical classrooms methods that easily accomplish this.

<center>**Chapter 3**</center>

A Toolbox: Heuristics as Devices That Construct Critical Thinking

<center>Richard Jewell</center>

A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Conference on College Composition and Communication in San Diego in 1993 as "Critical Thinking in Composition: Heuristics as Tools for Exploratory Discourse." Short sections of this essay also appear in "Theory" in the online textbook www.WritingforCollege.org.)

Aeschylus tells us that the first humans "had eyes" but "saw to no avail" and "ears, but they did not understand" until Prometheus brought fire, which helped them "discern the rising of the stars" and "the combining of letters...with which to hold all things in memory" (pars. 2-3). Promethean fire was heuristic: a tool—in this case symbolic and abstract—that caused learning. Many intellectual objects are heuristic if we perceive them not just as static abstracts but also as exploratory tools. This is true especially of exploratory discourse.

The Problem

When Prometheus brought fire to humans, no doubt it singed many as they learned its use. This also often happens to composition instructors and students trying out critical thinking. Their difficulties are evidenced in part, at least, by the contraction of critical thinking in composition textbooks from the 1980s and 1990s, when perhaps a dozen composition textbooks were completely devoted to critical thinking, to the current situation in which, though many textbooks now refer to critical thinking, they usually do so for only one chapter or, more commonly, in a brief subsection in each chapter.

My own first attempt in 1992 to add critical thinking to composition, unscripted by a textbook, was something of a disaster. The spring before— though my field is composition—I experimented with team teaching a philosophy course in problem solving with someone who thereafter became a six-year co-coordinator of a statewide, college-and-university Critical Thinking Initiative. My experience with the course was very positive. Moreover, in addition to my composition background, I once earned two philosophy degrees. I decided to read extensively during the summer and, in the fall, to convert my first-year, WAC-oriented composition course to a critical thinking focus. For my FYC section, I chose the rhetorical modes as a structure, using them as taxonomically ascending forms of critical enquiry, with

argument at the end.

However, teaching critical thinking terms and methods was much harder than I expected. I was able to convince my students of the importance of our work, but when I asked them every other week how they were doing, they often described how worn out they felt from "too much thinking." (For a similar classroom situation, see Jewell, "Too Much"). I quickly found that writing comments on their papers seemed to take twice as long as normal, too. By the end of the term, the students and I were exhausted. I polled them and discovered contradictory effects. First, though very impressed with what they had learned, they had no idea how to apply it. Second, they perceived their workload as being, on average, twice that of any other course they'd taken; however, in separate, week-by-week polling, the actual number of their workload hours was no higher than that of my other composition students during the previous two years.

Clearly, for these students, learning critical thinking was like starting fire with a bow and a stick instead of turning on the microwave. There also were the problems of transfer of learning and the extra time I was spending on papers. I decided to dump my new system, go back to my old one, and gradually find less obvious—and more organic—methods of introducing critical thinking.

Too many systems of teaching critical thinking in composition have made similar mistakes, both in textbooks and pedagogy. It is difficult to categorize all systems and their combinations, but a simple summary suggests that two methodologies have dominated the pedagogy of critical thinking as it exists in composition in recent decades: (1) logical argument and fallacies, and (2) problem solving, either alone or as a response to case studies. I have come to believe that while critical thinking certainly involves both of these, it is a mistake to limit critical thinking pedagogy to these methods alone.

Current composition textbooks are problematic, too. Most create what Xin Liu Gale calls a "discouragement of [the] critical thinking" (201) that is "one of the most important goals of freshman composition" (191). She uses the 1997 *St. Martin's Guide to Writing* as an example, calling the advice in such textbooks simplistic, reductive, conformist, traditional, and static; and she paraphrases Lester Faigley's contention that the *Guide* and like textbooks work, in Gale's words, "to reduce students to commodities and docile bodies" (202). While this criticism may seem rather harsh—and some textbook publishers recognize the holistic and process elements of critical thinking—still there is a tendency to turn critical thinking elements into static objects. What publishers—and instructors—need to recognize is the dynamic core of critical thinking: its explorative and metacognitive aspects and resulting heuristic nature.

Definitions

It may be helpful to define "critical thinking," "heuristic," and "exploratory discourse." Chet Meyers points out that critical thinking is neither simply formal argument nor problem solving, nor is it merely the study of logic, though all of these elements certainly can be part of it. Like the word "process" when applied to writing, the phrase "critical thinking" means something different in its details to each person who uses it. Some define it by Benjamin Bloom's well-known taxonomy in which each element includes all others below it:

<div align="center">

Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills

</div>

- Evaluation
- Synthesis
- Analysis
- Application
- Comprehension
- Recall

This is not unlike David Bartholomae's largely taxonomic elements of writing skills in "Inventing the University." He does not simply list them, so I have attempted to summarize them here with the highest element first:

Bartholomae's "awareness of the codes...within a discourse" (521)

- a very advanced writer who "can both define a position of privilege...against 'common' discourse, and...work self-consciously, critically, against not only the 'common' code but his own" (521)

- an advanced writer "consistently and dramatically conscious of herself forming something to say" (521)

- a somewhat advanced writer developing "an 'objective' analysis or a 'close' reading" (519)

- an early advanced writer who, as "Shaughnessy says,...can hear the 'melody of formal English'" (523)

- a basic writer imagining "the privilege of being [an] 'insider'" (516) who can begin to "establish authority" (523) using "the voice of the [academic or technical] community" (521)

- a basic writer offering "a Lesson on Life" (513) with "the articulation of the commonplace" (519)

Bartholomae also paraphrases Linda Flower's argument that "the difficulty inexperienced writers have [is] negotiating the transition between writer-based [self-centered] and reader-based [audience-centered] prose" (514).

Robert Ennis of the Illinois Critical Thinking Project adds, "Critical thinking...includes most or all of the directly practical higher order thinking skills [as in Bloom's Taxonomy]"; however, "critical thinking is not equivalent to the higher order thinking skills." Rather, it is (also) "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do." In fact, says Ennis, "critical thinking includes dispositions" (10).

Several common parameters do exist. The critical thinking movement of the past several decades gradually has developed a paradigm for good critical thinking. Such thinking is, he says,

(1) Broadly defined: Multiple definitions and interpretations of the subject are possible.

(2) Process oriented: It works best—and can be generally described—in stages or steps.

(3) Logical and expressive: Factual, emotive, and intuitive thinking all should be valued.

(4) Recursive: The best thinking often repeats some steps to examine a problem.

(5) Transferable: Most critical thinking patterns can be applied in other disciplines.

(6) Reflexive: Good critical thinking is self-aware of both its processes and public sources.

(7) Discursive: The best thinking often develops from a mix of private and public discussion.

A second term is "heuristic." Philosophy and the field of education often use the term to refer to systems or methods that cause learning. "Heuristic" means "to discover or find," and heuristics sometimes are referred to as educational tools—intellectual devices that help discovery. For example, the structure of learning to write a thesis with supports is heuristic, as is the common IMRaD method of organizing and reporting on a scientific experiment. In short, heuristics are methods for finding, discovering, or learning something.

Another term is the phrase "exploratory discourse." Exploratory discourse is, simply, discourse that explores a subject. James Kinneavy identifies exploratory discourse as "dialectical—probable (Aristotle and Aquinas)," "valuative (Morris)," and "questioning—interrogative (Russell)" (65); as an

"opinion (Plato)" and a "way of invention (Cicero)"; and as involving "discovery (Bacon,... Descartes)," "proposing (Pierce)," and "inquiry (Dewey)" (98). Even "emotion is not entirely excluded…e.g. Plato's dialogues" (68). As Nathan Crick says, exploratory discourse also is active as in Dewey's concept "that 'mind is primarily a verb',... an action, not an entity" (268).

Thus we can define heuristics as active tools for exploratory discourse—methods of using discovery to probe for something more than what we know now. I like to use a metaphor suggested to me by Joel Peterson, Director of the MnSCU Critical Thinking Project: using heuristics is like having a toolbox. This is not the common "toolbox" of the *St. Martin's Guide*, which according to Gale mostly contains tools for polishing, copying, and positioning. Instead, a heuristic toolbox contains tools that dismantle things, dig inside them, and enable users to build structures hitherto inconceivable to them.

Critical Thinking in the "Social Turn"

Unfortunately, some people believe critical thinking cannot be taught. One time I presented a short discussion of critical thinking at an English educators' state conference, and the keynote speaker of the conference was the president of a national English education group. He attended my session and, at one point, said (I paraphrase him), "I can agree with those who say that students can, indeed, be taught to write well, but I still don't believe students can be taught to think." I was dumbfounded. I thought that contemporary education recognized precisely that students can indeed learn to think; I had come to the conference to speak to the converted and offer new tools. Fortunately, others in my audience responded—some, I was glad to find, with the same level of discomfort as mine—and a lively discussion ensued.

I wish now that I had asked the speaker about his theoretical position. Given his level of importance, he must have been conversant with then-emerging 1980s-'90s paradigms. His statement is reminiscent of Thomas Kent's "paralogic" project in the early 1990s to show that composition is unteachable in composition courses, though the speaker seemed to apply that logic to thinking, not writing. On the other hand, he may have considered critical thinking part of an older, overly scientific paradigm in teaching. It is difficult in a few paragraphs to define writing pedagogies old and new that are still in use. However, with that difficulty in mind, a brief review of what they are and how critical thinking fits into them may be helpful.

Egon Guba, Professor Emeritus of Education at Indiana University, defines the two most common old paradigms still used in academic education as "positivism" and "postpositivism." The older group of the two, positivists (loosely defined as logical positivists, behaviorists, and empiricists),

dominated the teaching of college writing through the early to mid-1970s (and, of course, in some places much later). According to Guba, they believe everyone must use science and logic exclusively to interpret what is an entirely objective reality. This positivist paradigm in writing studies was what then became called, in the late 1900s, "current-traditionalism," which Joseph Petraglia describes as a "focus on the individual writer and how [to] shape discourse to gain the audience's assent" (40). It often led to the exclusive teaching of the rhetorical modes, grammatical usage, and editing—or to the belief that writing to literature provided sufficient training in writing, along with a handbook—such as Strunk and White's *The Elements of Style*—on making a point efficiently and editing well.

The limitations of positivist writing pedagogy helped foster the 1960s-'70s changes known as process, expressivism, and cognitive theory. These movements were part of what Guba defines as "postpositivism"—subjective additions to positivism. In writing pedagogy, they added internal, subjective procedures to the teaching of writing: internalized writing steps, self-expression and freewriting, and descriptions of writers' cognitive stages. However, Petraglia's "focus on the individual writer" producing "discourse to gain the audience's assent" remained. In addition, Carol Berkenkotter's criticism that the overall cognitive paradigm in psychology at that time was "exceedingly mechanistic" (153) can be applied to the many prescriptive systems of writing steps that arose, along with their often equally prescriptive demand that all writing must start with self-expression.

In the 1980s and '90s, writing studies took the oft-named "social turn," what Patricia Sullivan calls in a 1995 *College English* review "the default theory of the nineties" (950). Guba usefully divides it in two: "critical theory" and "constructivism." "Critical theory," he says, "is ideologically oriented inquiry"—"neo-Marxism, Freireism, participatory inquiry," et al. (23). Critical theorists believe we are part of the power systems in which we have been raised, and we need to become aware of their dynamics. Writing studies often has focused in particular on Paulo Freire's dialogic "critical consciousness" and the related "democratic pedagogy" of Ira Shor, James Berlin, and others.

Constructivists go a step further. Guba, who counts himself among them, says they "feel that the positivist (and postpositivist) paradigms are badly flawed and must be entirely replaced" (25). In writing studies, Petraglia says that constructivists (also called "social constructionists" and "social epistemists") believe "social forces...shape the writer's perception of reality" (51), "all reality is mediated through language" (45), and "knowledge [exists] through an individual's interaction with [a] 'discourse community'" and "resides in consensus,..." (38). That is, words create and shape all intelligent

perception, and each social group's words determine both its knowledge and its blindnesses. As Patricia Bizzell comments on her first year as a constructivist, "I believed that 'everything' was constituted by discourse" (8). In the classroom, some constructivists rely on deconstruction alone: a process of making students aware of the limits of their constructed social realities. Other constructivists help students learn to work with several realities or viewpoints. Still others guide students to learn and negotiate academic and professional realities.

More recently, a truce exists in the writing paradigm wars. Some say it is a pause for reassessment that may engender the "ecumenical climate" of "healthy eclecticism" Berkenkotter called for in 1991 (159). Kathleen Blake Yancey, CCCC Chair in 2005 and NCTE President in 2007, refers to our present climate as a "plural commons." Similarly, Pat Hutchings and Mary Taylor Huber of the Carnegie Foundation describe education theory in general as meeting in two such "commons": the traditional "academic commons" of "disciplinary scholarship" and a newer "teaching commons" where "educators committed to inquiry and innovation [can] exchange ideas...." They are speaking of the teaching and learning movement, a loosely knit set of organizations and cross-curricular practices found especially in faculty development programs. Some practices include critical thinking, "brain" studies, and writing and thinking across the curriculum, thus making the question even more relevant of whether critical thinking can be taught with and in writing.

Does critical thinking fit into Guba's positivist and postpositivist paradigms? Current-traditionalists—the positivists of writing studies—borrowed emphases on logical argumentation and the logical fallacies from critical thinking. Later, process, expressivist, and cognitive instructors—the postpositivists of writing—used critical thinking to help describe the cognitive states of the composing process; to support self-expression by describing it also as intuition, emotion, and nonverbal forms; and to add case studies and problem solving to writing. Similarly, the critical thinking movement adopted process, expressivist, and cognitive methods in writing studies. It did so by emphasizing writing as a way to think more clearly, recursive steps as a method of problem solving, self-expression as a first step in problem solving, and cognitive states as forms of thinking.

However, possibly because of critical thinking's easy adaptation to positivist and postpositivist paradigms, some social turn theorists may have too easily considered it part of the individualist, mechanized past theory they so disliked. Fortunately, in more recent years, a number of theorists have recognized that the deeper explorative elements of postpositivist theories can

fit well in social turn practices—e.g., Berkenkotter, Crick, Flower (*Construction*), Petraglia, Sullivan, and Yagelski, to name a few. In particular, though critical thinking and cognitive science are clearly different, still they have long been related because of their mutual concern with mental events; and a particularly fertile reassessment has been Linda Flower's project to unite older cognitive writing studies with social turn methods. She argues for a "social-cognitive" theory of "cognitive rhetoric" in which individual private acts of mental cognition are perceived as taking place within social contexts, and vice versa. As Sullivan says, "the cognitive and the social...interact in the construction of meaning...as both a private and a communal act" (954). While Sullivan argues Flower places too much emphasis on the private cognitive element, Berkenkotter suggests the problem lies more in the perceptions of two different types or schools of research, and she makes her own recommendation for more "sociocognitive research" (159). As Petraglia point out, contemporary cognitivists are no longer postpositivists; rather, they "concur that meaning is constructed both subjectively and socially [in] a constant interaction between...mind and...outside world" (46). Both Flower and Berkenkotter's theories translate to the classroom as an effort to help students better learn sociocognitive phenomena—both the internal and external events that affect them as writers. And this, in turn, requires critical thinking's heuristic discovery and metacognition.

Second, writing theory has used the phrase "critical thinking" with varied meanings: sometimes as a synonym for the social turn's "critical theory" and "critical discourse" (e.g., see "The Berlinean Movement" string in the 2002 WPA-L archives); for Freire's "critical consciousness" and Shor's "critical pedagogy" and "critical teaching"; and sometimes as a generic term referring simply to deeper or more thoughtful thinking. While critical thinking certainly can include all of these, the overall critical thinking movement—and the phrase—are like current writing studies: a "plural commons" of multiple ideas that adapt themselves to practices in many disciplines and theories. Critical thinking never was, as philosopher Derek Turner says, "simply about poking holes in other people's arguments" (5). For example, the 2004 NCTE position paper on teaching writing offers an entire separate category about writing as "a tool for thinking." It also adds that writing "involves thinking...about what strategies writers might employ to produce...texts," and examining those texts requires "the development of reflective abilities and meta-awareness about writing." In fact, the active core—the beating heart, so to speak—of critical thinking is not logic but rather heuristic and metacognitive activities. Both of these happen to be profoundly important in social turn pedagogy.

Paolo Freire's "critical consciousness" is an important example. He initially

developed it as a process for teaching peasants. He avoided offering them traditional rote learning, instead encouraging them—through questioning and dialogue—to detach themselves from their social order so they could stand clear of it mentally and see their true relationship to their oppressive regime. Some theorists have said critical consciousness is not relevant in a democracy because democracy already fosters it. However, even if this were true, "critical consciousness" and "critical thinking" are not synonymous: the former may be defined as a single type of practice or event in one type of teaching, but the latter describes an entire movement and activity with much broader applications. Other practitioners of Freire's method such as Bizzell are now "dissatisfied with 'critical consciousness' as a...goal of my teaching" (3) because teaching academic discourse does not seem to lead automatically to critical consciousness, and any teaching with a "morally neutral tool" (287) is impossible. However, Freirean critical consciousness is not just an awareness of social ills; rather, like Thomas Dewey's "mind," it is a verb—an ongoing act of discovering truth. As Anthony Petruzzi argues in disagreement with Bizzell, critical consciousness is "not an object" but rather "the event of affective self-finding"—"truth is a verb," a process of finding new possibilities for existing (317). In critical thinking terms, it is a deep metacognitive disposition that, when in action, is heuristic—full of exploration and discovery.

Another important social turn concept, "democratic pedagogy," also involves critical thinking. Practitioners of democratic pedagogy use deep questioning and open-ended dialogue among students. In addition, say James Berlin, Bizzell, and others, teachers should be part of that dialogue by explaining their own political and cultural biases to their students, and how these biases will help the class reach democratic outcomes. Ira Shor, an early interpreter of Freire and one of the strongest advocates of democratic pedagogy, goes a step further in democratizing the classroom by offering students more power to determine their learning—and by breaking the pattern students fall into so easily of sitting back, not speaking, and not caring. All such instruction can create what Cynthia Lewis calls "exchanges in which positions [are] not fixed, but rather tentative, exploratory, and interdiscursive" (377). She refers specifically to a specific method, critical discourse analysis, but her comment applies to other forms of democratic pedagogy used by both students and instructors. Such conversation is open-ended and laden with discovery: heuristic and metacognitive.

Much as a result of social turn pedagogies, one of the most powerful critical thinking changes that has happened in writing classrooms in recent years is the replacement of traditional thesis papers in part or whole with assignments involving deeper analysis and dialogue. These deeper

assignments, whether short or long and in rough or finished drafts, are transforming the teaching of writing from a persuasive individualist model to an exploratory social one. The better forms of such analysis are dialogic, whether directly or indirectly so, in their pursuit of differing viewpoints. Some classrooms even encourage dialogic papers—papers that discuss two or more opposing or differing viewpoints. The thinking expected for such papers requires students to go outside their normal frames of reference and to explore difference.

In fact, there is a very real sense in which critical thinking defines the difference between good and bad social turn instruction. Exploratory discourse creates a classroom community's expansion of knowledge, while teaching methods that avoid explorative thinking cause a classroom community to limit itself, to remain in stasis. What Charles Bazerman calls the "social reconstruction of knowledge" (as quoted in Sullivan 956) is a series of heuristic conversations with texts, other students, and communities. Students should move from being passive reproducers of knowledge to active negotiators of it. As Berkenkotter says, social turn instruction should help students "conduct multimodal inquiry": to "be epistemologically ecumenical, that is, to become conversant with more than one model of inquiry" (166). Though she writes this about graduate students, it also applies to undergraduates. This is exactly what explorative critical thinking hopes for, too: students capable of discussing different ways of seeing, thinking, being, and generating meaning.

Why Heuristics Work

Explorative discourse, as I mentioned above, can be viewed as a large toolbox with many heuristic tools. One proof of this in actual practice is how explorative tools work with basic college students—those once labeled "dumb" or, in more recent decades, "remedial." Such students often have different cultural references, languages, customs, or methods of thinking (including dyslexia), and many simply need to be shown the tricks of our trade—the methods we use for academic and professional discussion in this country—that happen also to be heuristic.

Mike Rose situates this problem well in *Lives on the Boundary* in his story of Millie, "whose test scores placed her...very low just about anywhere..." (218). Rose tried to show Millie how to handle a set of multiple-choice test questions. Each of these test questions asked Millie to give the meaning of the underlined prefix of a word: for example, for "<u>un</u>happy," her multiple-choice options were "*very, glad, sad, not*" (217). Many students in Millie's class, like Millie herself, had already failed this set of questions. Rose explained to Millie in every way he could how to see the underlined prefix, and still she made her choices based

on the entire word. Finally, in frustration and almost as an afterthought, Rose did "something the publishers of the test tell you not to do": he circled the underlined prefix of one of the words in the questions. Millie immediately chose the correct answer (218-19). Then, just as Rose was ready to stop his session with her, Millie circled the next underlined prefix on her own. She then answered the question correctly. She proceeded, next, to circle several more prefixes and to choose the correct answers, and on the last question, she did so without needing to make a circle physically: she now could "see" what she was supposed to. Rose concludes, "Cognitive psychologists talk about task representation, the way a particular problem is depicted or reproduced in the mind. Something shifted in Millie's conception of her task, and it had a powerful effect on her performance" (220). In the terms of critical thinking, Rose gave Millie a heuristic, simple in conception yet explosive in its small locus of impact. He taught Millie to think like an academic.

More recently, Rose shows in *The Mind at Work* how post-secondary vocational instructors weave critical thinking into their classes. In an interview by Michael Eisenberg, Rose says that students in such classes learn "acuity in perception and observation," "skill in planning and prioritizing," "use...of symbols," "planning, troubleshooting, and problem solving," the ability to "reflect on their own actions and modify them to improve task performance," and "aesthetic and craft values" (Eisenberg 296). As Wayne Nelson says, "To design is to solve problems" (par. 1-3).

Rose reminds us of Jerome Bruner's famous statement in *The Process of Education*: "Any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development" (quoted in Rose 142). Scientists now tell us that genetically modern human beings developed as long ago as 200,000 years (Wong). This means that if we could take a newborn from then and raise it—and if all else were equal medically—we would have a normally functioning human being, student, and thinking professional. If we should be able to do this with someone from the dawn of human existence, we should be able to do so with the majority of students today—and with most of those who enter college. My mother, an elementary school teacher for a number of years and then the founder and department chair of early childhood education at Carl Sandberg Community College in Illinois, claimed she could teach third graders thesis paper writing. She showed me her simple but effective method, which taught a basic argument structure. It used personal experience heuristically for proofs. I was surprised and wondered why more students were not receiving such basic instruction in their early years. Most instruction that is effective teaches heuristics; one can argue, in fact, that the primary difference between the traditional paradigm of learning by rote memory and

more recent ones of learning to think—to analyze, compare and contrast, and synthesize—is a difference of heuristics.

In my own thinking and teaching, I imagine myself having a wide variety of heuristics—of tools in my intellectual toolbox. Some tools let me take apart the machinery of systems to see what makes things tick. Some are gardeners' tools with which I can go rooting about in the fertile dirt of ideas new and old, digging, planting, and examining roots and rocks. Some tools are simple, others marvelously complex; in any given task I am free to pull out several tools and see which help me the most in discovery.

I have four especially important sections in my own toolbox, and it is these four sections or elements that I have learned to address as I teach exploratory discourse to my students not only in composition but also in literature and the humanities. One element is that we can teach questioning. Second, we can harness freewriting, one of the most powerful tools available—but only if we use it heuristically. A third is to fill students' toolboxes with many tools by teaching them categories: forms, patterns, or structures. Fourth, we can help students become metacognitive about tool making: to make their own tools.

Asking Questions

The first of these four elements is questioning, a heuristic attitude basic to the critical thinking movement. So important is it that the authors of some composition and critical-thinking textbooks form their tables of contents by emphasizing questions (e.g., Anselmo, Bernstein, and Schoen; Mayfield; Winterowd and Winterowd). Consciously asking questions means, simply, that instead of giving students commands, we speak interrogatively: for example, instead of commanding, "Define love," we ask students, "What is love?" Instead of commanding, "Exemplify perfection," we ask, "What are some good examples of perfection?" Such questioning empowers or emboldens students to respond more creatively and energetically, and the questioning form also may model real academic, professional, and personal situations more accurately than do command statements. In addition, both teacher and student tend to see the process of thinking and writing as open ended rather than closed: as discovery rather than repetition of photographically impressed knowledge.

At the simplest level, heuristic questioning leads to freewriting. In fact, as Thomas Hilgers points out regularly, it is reasonable to rename prewriting and freewriting "pre-thinking" and "freethinking," for that is exactly what such activities foster. We know now that writing is thinking. We also need to remember that just as good writing often uses freewriting, good thinking often uses freethinking. Freethinking in a questioning mode is heuristic: it asks for

discovery. It encourages opening up, not narrowing or limiting, expansion rather than contraction, and tentativeness rather than assurance. Peter Elbow defines such thinking as "first-order thinking" in *Embracing Contraries* and suggests that all generating is a form of thinking (55). Tom Anselmo, a leading expert in the field of critical thinking and writing, has described "much of the best thinking" as generative. He says, with Leonard Bernstein and Carol Schoen in their textbook, *Thinking and Writing in College*, that it consists of "non-logical, free-associational, and intuitive leaps of the mind" (vi). And Edward de Bono, whose work initially helped define the contemporary field of critical thinking, more recently calls critical thinking "generative thinking": "practical, creative, and constructive...messy, imperfect, impure and perhaps difficult to teach" (16).

In the classroom, this means encouraging the kind of "freethinking" that leads students to open-ended exploration and new possibilities instead of mere confirmation of what they already think, know, or feel. While the latter—confirmation—may help, neither student nor teacher should learn to consider it the end; instead, heuristically, what is already known is at best a beginning, something that necessarily should lead to other possibilities, questions, and positions.

A form of asking questions called "Socratic questioning" is especially popular in critical thinking. In Socratic questioning, the discussion leader most often leads by asking questions rather than making statements. Richard Paul, a leader in the field of critical thinking, and A.J.A. Binker describe the Socratic method as being "at the heart of critical teaching" (360). They suggest flexibility so it can occur in many ways—"from the teacher or from students,...in a large group discussion, in small groups, one-to-one, or even with oneself"—such that the questions "can have different purposes" (361). Shirley Shiever recommends varying the types of questions: recall, inference, and implication (80).

Another issue is reading. Questioning makes it heuristic. Nancy Sommers and Laura Salz found in their study of Harvard writing students that students who participated in deep, ongoing research—often on just one or two specific topics in a course—believed they learned more about writing and research than did other students. Part of the value of such research is the deeper reading; another value is increased interest among students in what they are reading. Both are more heuristic in that they create more questioning. Heuristic reading also can be achieved by choosing challenging readings. Joseph Harris describes, for example, how he paired contrasting readings—e.g., Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* and Martin's <u>Mary Reilly</u> (which speaks from the viewpoint of Dr. Jekyll's servant)—in a class for at-risk students. He then

encouraged students to examine the differing points of view in order to have them "focus as directly as we can on the unstable workings of writing itself..." (582).

Similarly, Mariolina Salvatori suggests we ask students to "perform...introspective reading" (446) that "engage[s] texts responsibly and critically" by making "readers articulate a reflexive critique" of the textual arguments and their own responding ones (444). She offers exercises and activities that force students to question both their texts and their own readings of them using methods like Ann Berthoff's "close reading" technique, which encourages constant heuristic questioning at both simple and metacognitive levels.

In my own first-year Composition II course, I assign Bergner's *In the Land of Magic Soldiers*, a literate and deeply disturbing account of the 1990s civil war in Sierra Leone, West Africa, and a related book of each student's choice. In class discussions, I speak mostly by posing questions, sometimes stopping to provide background facts, and I ask everyone to participate at some point. I also state several times, "If you have more questions after we are done talking than before, this is a sign of progress."

Turner offers two interesting methods of responding to formal student papers using questioning. "Instead of asking students to revise their papers," he says, "why not ask them to write replies to [five or six of your own] questions about their arguments" (6)? He suggests doing so "virtually eliminates" plagiarism because students do not want "to write replies to questions about somebody else's paper," and the practice "does not take much more time than writing marginal comments." He recommends "tailor[ing] the questions to each student's needs and abilities." He adds, "Instead of asking students to edit each other's papers, why not have them swap papers and raise questions about each other's arguments" after they first write "a brief summary of the other person's main argument" (7)?

Stephen Brookfield and Stephen Preskill state that "the heart of sustaining an emerging discussion are the skills of questioning, listening, and responding.... Of the three learning to question takes the most practice and skill...." Indeed, as Barbara Palmer has noted, how we ask questions can make the difference between a discussion that goes nowhere and one that turns into a "complex communal dialogue that bounces all around the room." Brookfield and Preskill list several types of questions and recommend "skillfully mixing" them:

Questions That Ask for More Evidence

Questions That Ask for Clarification

Open Questions

Linking or Extension Questions

Hypothetical Questions

Cause-and-Effect Questions

Summary and Synthesis Questions

The goal of such questioning always is to encourage students to extend and expand their thinking, to perceive in new ways, and to develop a heuristic attitude of questioning. This develops the habit in students of not presuming that their writing—and their thought—is completed.

Freewriting Heuristically

Freewriting is a second heuristic tool, one that the critical thinking movement has adopted wholeheartedly, in part because freewriting is by definition supposed to be exploratory. I say "supposed to," however, because it also can become a disappointingly limiting structure. In the 1970s and 1980s, students often welcomed the new experience of freewriting and the parallel expressivism it offered. However, by the 1990s, our culture of education and even, arguably, TV and music, had come to value creative self-expression. In addition, many secondary and even primary schools taught freewriting. I began to find my own students groaning when asked to use it. Part of the problem was that many had practiced it so much that they had come to think of it as simply producing summaries of their thoughts or feelings. Others, sufficiently experienced in the "liberation" of self-expression, wanted more sophisticated and concrete purpose or method for their writing—what Bazerman calls "a persona, a public face" that is appropriate to the author, audience, and situation (25).

How, indeed, can we reinvigorate freewriting? Simply, it needs to be heuristic: to become or be reinvigorated as discovery.

There are several specific ways to encourage exploratory freewriting. First, students can use freewriting as a form of answering or even asking questions as briefly mentioned above in "Questioning." However, as the above makes clear, the questions must be truly open-ended, not only by encouraging students to think of subjects in new ways but also by giving them sufficient direction or structure—which can be accomplished by offering students a variety of possible questions.

More specifically, in the classroom a structured heuristic approach to freewriting avoids overall generic directions and commands—such as "Write about your favorite experience this week"—and instead asks more specifically and with a variety of question options, "Answer one or more of these questions:

'What was your best experience this week, your worst, your most intense, or your most memorable, why, and/or how?'" "Instead of stating, generically, "Write what you know about abortion," a heuristic approach asks specifically and with more options, "What experiences have you or your friends had with abortion—as a man or woman, a friend or enemy, a relative or a boyfriend/girlfriend? How would you feel and respond (and why) if you found out one of your parents had considered aborting you? What should a pregnant fifteen-year-old runaway who uses drugs do if offered an abortion, and how or why?"

In other ways, too, freewriting should be heuristic and reflective—discovery-oriented—rather than forced, summative, laden with a feeling of purposelessness, or used only to stake out an irrevocable individual position. In other words, we should help students learn to turn freewriting into the art of being tentative. Elbow himself, the publication of whose *Writing without Teachers* in 1973 was the flashpoint for the freewriting movement, has always argued for openness. In *Writing*'s chapter "The Teacherless Writing Class," he strongly encourages interest in as many reasonable viewpoints as possible, along with a tolerance for many diverging viewpoints. Robert Yagelski points out in a recent review reevaluating "The Writing Process Movement after the Hurricanes" that Elbow, like many social turn theorists who came later, "is advocating a kind of epistemology in which knowledge is a function of reflection on one's own experience" (537). That is, though Elbow's "experience" is of a more personal and broader nature, still Elbow is suggesting a kind of learning that Diana George identifies as good social construction teaching: "the ability...to appreciate complexity and difference, a tolerance for ambiguity, or an understanding of conflicting ways of interpretation" (2). Of course, the prompts that encourage freewriting must be pertinent, as Meyers suggests (48). More important, though, is the emphasis on asking students to think with an open stance before making final decisions (29). Because what students are saying is tentative—and especially if the prompts are both difficult and interesting—students learn to allow themselves the openness to say much more, explore more, and perceive an expanded field of inquiry.

I have found, however, that when encouraging tentative freewriting and discussion, I must require two preconditions in my classroom, both of them constructivist and democratic. First, I make it clear to my students that their own beliefs are acceptable if supportable with rational proofs, and I make clear what "rational" means to me. (And I exclude such topics as the drinking age or abortion—unless the writer has had one—and simplistic methods of support such as a standard dictionary or scripture.) Second, I expect my students to tentatively experiment with the stance that knowing differing positions is

useful: at the least, for being better able to disprove an opposing argument; in the longer view, for improving one's own intelligence, fairness, and civic virtue; and, in short or long run, for being able to change one's mind.

Explaining this kind of stance to students may seem like teaching the obvious, but it is, in itself, a metaheuristic skill—the ability to maintain a position intellectually open to a variety of possibilities—a skill needing separation and development. This tool itself can be taught as one of the most important skills learned in a college education, and it allows students to feel they are in an environment that is safe enough for them to try exploring opposites.

The next step is to ask students to harness freewriting heuristically to understand differing positions. If students know nothing about a subject, they may first need exposure to it through reading, practice, or other methods. Once they have had exposure, they may next need to explore their own understanding, feelings, or beliefs before they can explore others' or—if they are capable of doing so comfortably and fairly—of exploring together through discussion. Freewriting used as a tentative art with heuristic questioning can help them establish baselines for their thoughts.

How can students comfortably explore opposites? One method is to have them freewrite an opposite. For example, I often ask students to describe the kind of person who, they think, believes the opposite, and then to try to describe as rationally and fairly as possible why this person might take that position. Again, many open-ended questions can help. In addition, free speaking often is helpful: asking students to work in discussion groups to discuss opposites, with freewriting coming before, after, or both. Student groups and oral discussions need to be carefully structured and monitored to insure fairness, balance, and exploration. Some groups—and some subjects—may be so strongly positioned that oral discussion may not be possible until later in the term.

Another method is to situate students in a reading or case study, or a role-playing or service-learning activity—one that will create obvious intellectual or emotional tension. The role of emotional tension in particular is often too easily discounted. Rather, we should consider, as Petraglia points out, that "emotion shapes knowing...." He categorizes this shaping of knowledge by emotion into "perception," "avoidance," and "memory" (48). All three are important in contributing to positive (or negative) tension in learning and discovery.

Role play can be especially powerful, too, when it is used to ask students to assume experts' roles and give the students opportunities and methods to use experts' thinking tools (see Jewell, "Role Playing"; Palmer). One such

method is to provide organizational thinking tools, such as scientists' IMRaD (introduction, methods, results and discussion) or police work's MMO—means, method, and opportunity—and a situation in which students can apply it as a class, in small groups, and individually.

Another is to provide students with an imaginary situation. For example, to teach a taxonomy of thinking skills, I often have created on paper a family with a young teenager in trouble and then have asked students to write the discourse individual family members would use, their replies to each other, how friends of the family might present differing arguments, how expert outsiders might judge the situation, and how the family members might then evaluate it. This exercise is but one example of a case study: a carefully controlled form of role play, real or imaginary, that provides a situation or event with built-in intellectual (and sometimes emotional) tensions that students are asked to study and discuss. Case studies are highly popular in legal studies and the criminal justice field, and some proponents of critical thinking have encouraged their use in all fields. It is possible to choose or create a case study to challenge introductory or advanced students, and those in general courses or specific disciplinary activities.

Yet another form of role play for introductory or advanced situations is storytelling. It requires detailed application; more importantly, it is a natural form of critical problem solving because of its classic narrative pattern of person, problem, and solution. While all such forms of role play can exist at many stages of the discourse process, they tend—when they challenge students—to create heuristic freethinking, free talking, and freewriting.

What other freewriting forms can be heuristic? Some are nonlinear and even initially nonverbal. The freewriting movement in its many guises—in post-secondary, secondary, and primary pedagogy, both within English/composition and in other fields that have adopted its techniques—has given birth to many of these. A few examples are clustering, using idea trees, and mapping; use of automatic writing, feelings, pictographic storytelling, and intuition; writing with the help of music, food, drink, and ambient noise; listening to music, touching art, and watching body language and responding by writing; et al.). On the one hand, such techniques may, as mentioned above, remain as overly closed or repetitive as more academic/verbal ones. Students who are told for the twentieth time, for example, that they must "listen carefully to this song and state what emotions it contains" may feel bored, frustrated, or stubbornly unsure of what they should feel. However, the same freewriting assignment may become much more heuristic if students are asked (not told) to imagine or explore (not state), "What kind of person might listen to this music, when, and why; what might it help you imagine or do (and how,

when, and why); or what do you imagine the people who play or dance to this music are like (and how, when, and why)?"

In short, freewriting is never "free" unless it is liberating. Often heuristic freewriting also is—or feels—difficult. Cognitive scientists now understand that when new thinking occurs, brains literally grow as neurons stretch toward each other to connect. This would explain why my first class of students to learn critical thinking in composition felt it was working so very hard when in actuality the students were committing no more time to homework than in an average composition class. They were literally—physically—experiencing more rapid than usual brain growth. Freewriting is an especially useful way to "grow brains" because most students consider exploratory discourse pleasurable if the subject challenges and interests them.

Structuring Heuristically

The third element in my teaching toolbox is the use of tools or structures. Such use assumes that questioning does not stop after freethinking is completed. Rather, questioning extends into the early stages of revision and becomes an application of form, pattern, or structure. David Perkins, who teaches thinking skills at Harvard's Graduate School of Education, calls such thinking "design." He says, "Understanding any piece of knowledge or any product of human intellect involves viewing it as a design, a structure shaped to a purpose" (64). Heuristics are structures "shaped to a purpose," organizational or design forms that act as tools of discovery, and it is this understanding—intellectual design structures can be used to develop knowledge—that students need to learn.

Some of us in the field of writing are uncomfortable with using forms or patterns for our rhetoric. We have this discomfort in common with many people in the field of thinking. As de Bono notes, "in the field of thinking there is an instinctive dislike of structure and jargon." However, he says, "We can distinguish between *restricting* structures and *liberating* structures" (135; emphasis mine). "Tools," says de Bono, "are liberating structures. With the proper tools, students will surprise themselves "with ideas they had not had before" (136). Elbow also emphasizes the importance of using structures, forms, or patterns. He defines this kind of thinking and writing as "second-order thinking" (*Embracing* 55), and he argues that for learning to exist, there must be categories. He calls this "Learning as the Acquisition of Categories": "You only teach someone if you affect the way he files his data, processes his information, or makes his inferences. Teaching or learning involves introducing categories" (11). In other words, the very nature of learning—and therefore of critical thinking—is the use of patterns, designs, or structures.

Thinking assumes not only a content but also a structure by which we view the content. As Kant, Hume, and social theorists alike might argue, we see the world through a colored lens and shape our world accordingly: our experience, expectations, and discourse communities give shape and form to how we perceive, and with these shapes we then order our world. The particular shapes—the designs that we use—are heuristic: we use them not only to order our world, but also to discover, explore, and make sense of it.

What kinds of structures should we introduce? One of the most popular in the critical thinking movement, whether among communications or other instructors, is problem solving. Problem solving is a method of asking questions: its very nature is heuristic and open-ended. A typical problem-solving structure often involves a process as follows (to which I have added writing steps that are similar):

(1) Exploring all aspects of the problem (freewriting)

(2) Developing a goal, a list of solution paths, and a description of each path (organizing)

(3) Choosing the best path(s) and evaluating possible outcomes (revising).

Like good writing, good problem solving is recursive. Problem solving is especially a practical application of critical thinking, and teachers in many disciplines and in interdisciplinary instruction have developed problem-solving courses and units at colleges and universities throughout the nation. Many writing instructors in particular have modified their teaching by adding problem-solving and case-history elements; others present social differences as multidimensional problems that students may first think can be "solved" but later learn may yield only to several sometimes dissimilar "solutions."

Such instruction, when it teaches specific structures for pursuing solutions, allows students to perceive thinking in a purer form even as its practical uses also become more obvious. Flower in <u>Problem-Solving</u> explains, for example, that she tells her students that "problem solvers are characterized by two things: a great deal of knowledge about their topic and a large repertory of powerful strategies for attacking their problems. Good writers share these qualities.... In the long run, this sort of knowledge about why things work is the best knowledge, because it lets you continue to teach yourself" (3).

There are many other structural forms commonly used in writing classes, from traditional rhetorical patterns to the 5 W's, and from the inverted pyramid of journalism (and upside-down triangle of the paragraph) to heuristic patterns of questioning used by researchers. In a sense, any time we require organizational structure of our students, we are introducing categories, even if on the simplest level. In fact, often it is the introduction of such

categories that many writing teachers most quickly identify as having something to do with thinking skills in writing, especially, for example, in expecting students in research-writing courses to demonstrate higher-order thinking. Such higher-order thinking is exemplified most commonly, perhaps, in the critical-discourse techniques of the social turn;, more traditionally, in Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills (see above), the three highest of which are analysis, synthesis, and evaluation; and also in the traditional rhetorical modes (with argument often considered the highest mode because it requires the use of the others).

However, we must be very careful to separate the concept of structure from the concept of heuristics. What is structured is not always what is heuristic. In other words, it is quite possible to use structure without it involving the heuristic process of search and discovery. As de Bono says, "We often mistake fluency and argumentation for thinking skill.... Error-free thinking is not necessarily good thinking" (15). We should not forget de Bono's distinction between liberating and restricting structures (135). Often, the difference is one of method rather than content. For example, instead of asking students to use the rhetorical device "definition" restrictively—to define the meaning of something already well known—we can use the device in a liberating manner in a quest for students to discover the defining parameters of some hitherto unexamined idea, perception, feeling, or experience. Again— as with freewriting and freethinking—much of the heuristic use of structures depends on questioning. If we conduct discovery by the use of questioning, the structures often become liberating. This is, for example, the method Anselmo, Bernstein, and Schoen use in their critical thinking and composition textbook. They started the book by looking for what they call the "controlling question":

> The strategy we concentrate on is a carefully controlled questioning process.... To discover what questions would be most useful for this purpose, we read exam questions and term-paper assignments from professors in a wide range of disciplines.... We noticed that four patterns seemed to predominate—definition, process, comparison/ contrast, and cause/effect.... To probe more deeply...a second level of questioning [uses] the four basic patterns combined with other sorts of questions they suggest. (vi)

Much of the best thinking is generative, they write: "[T]o produce clear, coherent writing is equally vital and this process grows organically from the questioning strategies" (vi).

Heuristic structures take many forms in the classroom. In my composition classrooms, for example, they may be socially based, asking students to

dialogue, step back from their beliefs, and step back from their stepping back. However, they also may as easily be rhetorical mode based or more loosely based on cumulative thinking skills such as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Sometimes, instead, they may be discipline based, using such genre-oriented discovery patterns as experiment, client observation, aesthetic analysis, event analysis, or storytelling. I try many structures in a variety of situations but try to teach all heuristically.

One of the most important keys to making such structures heuristic rather than restrictive has been to require students to use critical thinking on subjects they have never considered. In other words, I encourage students to work with subjects for which they do not yet have clear working definitions and classifications. I ask them to avoid objects and work instead with their lesser-explored feelings, beliefs, people, or events. Then we apply questions. For example, one time I asked a group of first-term college composition students to compare and contrast an idea, belief, feeling, or person to three similar subjects. One of my students wrote about her relationship with her boyfriend, comparing and contrasting it to relationships with her parents, her dog, and her best friend. She suggested that all four relationships "involve care, trust, compassion, and most of all, love." She had several interesting insights: for example, at one point she commented that she and her dog play by barking at each other and, on occasion, her boyfriend and she "also...will get in a little tiff and bark at each other." She finally concluded in a discussion section that each relationship "involve[s] a different kind of love" which is "well suited for the relationship." These ideas were, for an eighteen-year-old freshman learning to think about her life, far more than formulaic writing. The thinking and writing for her was at the heart of the discovery process.

Developing Metaheuristics

The fourth element of my teaching toolbox is to show students how to build their own tools. Giving them heuristic tools is not enough. In other words, students may learn structural patterns of questioning from us; however, in other courses and in life, they will find situations in which the structures do not fit. Our goal in teaching metaheuristics is, as Edith Weinstein says, to make "critical thinking [become] its own reservoir of learning that students draw upon not only to measure rigorously the logic of ideas in all disciplines but also to scrutinize constantly their own thinking" (287). Thus students should learn how to create structure itself, rather than just specific structures. That is, we want them to learn tools for making their own tools—in short, to learn metaheuristics.

One metaheuristic involves questioning and establishing relationships

between questions. We need to teach students to identify the basic questions being asked in an academic, professional, or personal situation. One way to teach them how to do this is to train them to list or diagram (e.g., as in clustering) all the questions they believe an assignment or situation demands. Next, they should try to identify the main question and organize other questions into groups. Sometimes this process of identifying questions should be preceded by freewriting or followed by it; sometimes there needs to be a recursive process of writing, questioning, writing, and revising the questioning. Once they have grouped the questions, students can then decide which heuristics to use to seek answers to the questions—and what clarifying questions they may need to ask of others. However, the overall structure they have created—their choice of a main question and their organization of groups of other questions—will have been metaheuristically determined.

A second metaheuristic is structuring by analogy. This means that students can decide what kind of structure to use in one situation by looking at similar situations in their past and examining what structures to use in those other situations. If, for example, we ask a student to write creatively about a tree, the student should analogize to past situations in which teachers have asked for creative expression and past situations in which teachers have asked for writing about trees, and then assume that a non-botanical, non-mechanical description is appropriate. This seems simple; however, students miscue frequently enough to suggest that specific training in analogy is appropriate. In general, a majority of students have difficulty transferring what they have learned about how to write (Beaufort, McCarthy, Sommers and Salz, Tebeaux). This seems especially true when we describe such transfer as an analogical task: students might know, for example, how to analyze conflict between Hamlet and Ophelia, but they still might easily fail to transfer this analogically to a conflict at work or in their personal lives. We also need to teach students to analogize from personal or professional situations to academic ones. Analogical thinking can work in two opposite directions to help students develop critical thinking skills, but for this to occur, we must isolate and teach analogy as a specific meta-tool.

One particularly useful concept in teaching students to analogize is the idea of the hierarchical taxonomy. A taxonomy is a classification or division of something into parts, and a hierarchical taxonomy has its parts classified in order, from lower to higher (or the reverse) with each higher part including or assuming all of those that are lower. A well-known hierarchical taxonomy in writing is process: generation, organization, and revision. Similarly, a simple, three-part hierarchical taxonomy of process in thinking skills includes observation, deductive and inductive thinking, and evaluation. One used in

critical reviews is summary, arguments/interpretations, and judgments. A well-known hierarchical taxonomy in the field of thinking is Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills (see above). How can hierarchical taxonomies be useful to students? Most people use them—often unconsciously or in rough and halting conscious ways—to solve problems. Solving problems starts with recalling an experience, moves on to analyzing data about it and relating it to past experiences, and concludes with proposing tentative decisions. We can teach students to identify the process itself and thereby to control it metaheuristically for more accurate retrieval of data, better analogizing, and more careful evaluation. This process, in fact, is quite similar to the process of writing, including recursive work. Here are some questions to offer students that teach them hierarchical and taxonomic thinking:

(1) What is your problem or question? Please write/talk about it.

(2) What are some previous problems you handled well?

(3) What steps did you use to solve one? What steps were common to more than one problem?

(4) How would you name and describe—as in a recipe—each step?

(5) How can you order them so that each one requires the others that come before it?

(6) How would these steps work in your present problem or question?

One of the elements of such a process is that it is reflexive: it requires students to think about their thinking. This is metacognitive thinking, what Robert Marzano defines as "being aware of our thinking as we perform specific tasks and then using this awareness to control what we are doing" (9), or Robert Sternberg as "executive processes...used to plan, monitor, and evaluate one's thinking" (252). When students become increasingly reflexive—increasingly metacognitive—they begin to take over their critical thinking and make patterns belong to them. There also is recent evidence that reflexivity is a tool typically used by good communicators. According to Nance Van Winckel, "Pausing, or the act of reflection during writing, is one step in the composing process that many protocol analysts now agree helps distinguish good writers from poor writers." This agrees with anecdotal information I collected from hundreds of upper-division writing students at a Level 1 research university at which I taught for five years regarding their writing steps. The better these beginning-expert students were at writing, the more likely they were to include in their writing steps a waiting period, pause, or rest between drafts that, they believed, enhanced their unconscious processing.

A third metaheuristic is metaphor. Metaphor often has been considered one of the most important of the Greek figures. The power of metaphor, it also

has been suggested, comes from its multi-modal nature: that is, in the brain, metaphor partakes of two very different ways of thinking, the perceptual/holistic and the verbal/logical: it gives image to abstract concept. As Ross Winterowd asks, "Does bi-hemisphericity explain the power of metaphor, which, Longinus tells us, simply sweeps us away and thus is the most rhetorically cogent of the figures" (167)? According to Hildy Miller, "Metaphor...enables us to acquire new knowledge, since the unknown is information for which we as yet have no context.... [M]any psychologists working with the role of metaphor in cognitive development theorize that it is this basic metaphorical capacity [that] enables children to learn at all" (15). My own experience in teaching the use of metaphor is that young children in my week-long residencies in arts-in-the-schools programs naturally and intelligently use metaphor more easily than do college students: the younger, the more so.

Teaching metaphor is simple, especially if we present it instead as simile. The formula for a simple but fully realized simile might begin like this: "[Concept/event] is like a [thing/animal]: both are _____, _____, and _____." This is a fresh, creative, and interesting method of having students use the creative elements of their critical thinking skills (see also Miller). MacArthur Foundation Fellow Patricia Hampl argues that the best kinds of metaphors are those that are active: they involve verbs, the less participial, the better. Thus, for example, instead of saying that heuristics as tools are like fire, we could state—more strongly—that heuristics are fire, or even that heuristics flame at the center of good thinking. Creating active similes and metaphors develops in students a sense of activity and of process in their understanding, in addition to the visual picture or other sensory image also created.

Elbow calls creative thinking such as that developed in metaphor an inductive "aha!" or "nonverbal experience" rising from the mind's "capacity to construct new experience from symbols" (*Embracing* 16-18). Metaphoric "aha!" experiences are simple analogies, yet in creating them, people often use a wild or unplanned element that leads them to leap beyond their normal analogical processes. Once they make the initial leap, they can bring more mundane discovery tools to bear to explain it in more detail—to discover why and how the analogy came to mind and how well it fits. Metaphor also can be used reflexively by students to describe their own thinking and acting processes. De Bono uses metaphor metacognitively in his own work when he gives names to specific thinking processes: for example, "north-south," "bird-watching," and "apple-boxing" (142-9). Here is a description of the process he calls "bird-watching":

> Bird-watchers learn to recognize the characteristics of the

different species so that they can spot them at once. This recognition process involves making a deliberate attempt to look for certain features. In learning to think we need to recognize certain "species" of thought: some of these species are well established but others have to be created deliberately.... [For example] pupils are given practice in spotting "facts" and "opinions." (145)

Similarly, we might want to describe our own thinking patterns to students, using metaphors of searching, sorting, natural elements, actions of animals, etc. Having given students several examples, we can then ask them to create their own metaphors for some of their thinking and problem solving, positive and negative. We then can ask them to project these metaphors to the exploration of a present or future problem or need. Finally, we can ask each student to create a more analytic tool from his or her metaphor: a tool that describes in her own language how she structures her conscious discovery.

Conclusion: Four Types of Fire

In conclusion, this paper offers four methods of using heuristics: questioning, heuristic freewriting, heuristic structuring, and the development of metaheuristics. These activities form major parts of the core of teaching writing using critical thinking. It is worth emphasizing that the use of critical thinking in teaching writing, when defined as driven by heuristics, exists in most present systems of teaching composition. Whether a course uses expressivism, writing to literature, social-epistemic or critical-response learning, or even primarily the rhetorical modes, eventually what most teachers desire about thinking is that students learn not only to think well in a variety of ways, but also to transfer what they have learned to other situations—to own the lessons themselves. Elbow says of this that two abilities exist in real learning: "the ability to apply already-learned concepts" and "the ability to construct new concepts...when a person comes upon data that can't be processed with the concepts he has" (*Embracing* 14). These abilities are not just the result of good teaching of thinking and of writing, but of their combination.

Zeus punished Prometheus for stealing fire and sharing it by having him bound to a rock in the Caucasian Mountains where daily an eagle pecked out his liver—a fate, one hopes, no other instructors have suffered. It was too late, however, for Zeus to recover the fire and its cultural results. In critical thinking and exploratory discourse, once students know how to think about their thinking, write about their thinking, and think about their writing, they are on an irreversible path of heuristic power to mastery and transference.

Addendum: A Table of Thinking and Writing Taxonomies

The following are taxonomic lists of thinking and writing that are roughly comparable to Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills (on the left). I certainly do not intend it to be strictly accurate: for example, instead of the below pattern, I could just as easily have represented Bloom's six Thinking Skills as occurring recursively in each individual stage of the writing process. However, the lists may be useful for consideration of writing and thinking patterns.

Table of Thinking and Writing Taxonomies

Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills	Three mental activities and their questions	Related thinking skills	Rhetorical skills	Writing process (rhetorical intent/need)	Metacognitive dialogic/textual (socially constructive) questions
recall comprehension application	Seeing: What do you observe?	Observation, intuition, sensation	Description, summary, narration, directions	Expressing, freewriting, thinking (purpose)	What are your/ the text's viewpoints and those of others?
analysis synthesis	Determining patterns: What are new parts and wholes?	Deduction, induction, oppositions, similarities	Classification, analysis, comp./contrast, definition, cause-effect	Macro-organizing/ revising (audience)	How do these viewpoints contrast, compare, operate, and/or interact?
evaluation	Judging: What are evaluations of the possible proof sets?	Negotiation, balance, resolution	Argument, pros/cons, dialectic/ dialogue	Macro- & micro-organizing/ revising, editing (style)	What are compromises and higher resolutions, and why?

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Afterword—What's Next?

The next essay, "The Metacognitive Writer in the Experiential Classroom," takes a broader stance than just the use of heuristics. It explains where, when, and how metacognition—thinking about thinking—which is another important element in the critical thinking movement, has been used in writing theory. though the concept sounds abstract and hard to teach easily, like heuristics it is not. Comp theory has been offering practical methods for doing so for over fifty years. This is explained through the lens of the philosophy of Phenomenology's "writer self" and students' raw writing experiences in teaching writing in college.

Chapter 4

The Metacognitive Writer in
the Experiential Classroom

Richard Jewell

Parts of this essay were developed from "Thinking as the Text of Composition," Midwest Modern Language Association (MMLA) Conference, Minneapolis, 1996; and "Inductive Writing: From Classroom to Workplace," Modern Language Association (MLA) Conference, San Diego, 2003.

In ancient Greece, Metis was the first goddess of wisdom, who also had a reputation for cunning and magic. According to Hesiod, the ocean, Tethys, "brought forth…a race apart of daughters, one of the first of which was Metis, "and she knew more than all the gods or mortal people" and gave birth to "the goddess, gray-eyed Athene" (346 and 886 ff). Most Greeks considered this mother of Athena the personification of Athens' spirit of balanced intellect—intelligence and mystery combined.

"Metis" as a goddess was the ancient symbolic stand-in for what we now call metacognition. A communication that appears to its writer or speaker a carefully developed piece of rhetoric often may seem to its readers or listeners a magically delivered result. A serious and continuing question in composition courses is how to help students develop and emulate such good, strong writing. Teaching them metacognition is a powerful answer. However, it works best only in the experiential classroom.

What is the experiential classroom? It is a writing experience that privileges real transferability.

Recently, I asked several former writing students now in the work world what they learned in my composition courses that helped them in school and their professions. Three responded: Nicki Cook, a registrar and counselor at the University of Minnesota's Carlson School of Business; Peggy Sorrell, a professional editor for a company that works with outsourced legal writing; and Rebecca St. Martin, a professional web developer who counts 3M among past clients. In their responses, all three mention transferable basics such as "learning good research skills" (Sorrell), "support[ing] my ideas" (St. Martin), and "look[ing] over my writing" so "it is clear and concise" with "no glaring grammatical errors" (Cook).

However, and far more important, they also speak of greater strategies, the type that beginning composition students rarely mention. Sorrell, for example, writes of the value of "paper structure" in the form of "solid opening and closing paragraphs" and of "expanding thoroughly on topic sentences,"

concerns that demonstrate—especially in her work as a professional editor--a metacognitive understanding of writing needs and processes in multiple formats. As St. Martin says in mentioning outlining and transitions, "Because of comp, I am able to think consciously about these devices." She adds that "good writing depends upon context. I felt that comp prepared me for all kinds of different writing situations: discursive, argumentative, marketing, article, creative, etc."

Cook states even more specifically, "A key skill...was to consider the audience I was writing for.... I believe that as writers, we can have different voices.... This class helped me, in particular, to develop my professional voice." She goes one step further: "I was better able to develop a signature style of writing—a style that said something about...who I am." This combination—writing for a particular context and audience in a professional voice with a "signature style" of writing—speaks of powerful metacognitive strategies gained in college writing courses.

These strategies represent the very best of what an English teacher hopes students will learn. However, as suggested by the cautionary story in the "Introduction"—about the university English major, hired at graduation to be a professional writer, who did not know how to write well—such strategies are difficult for many students to learn. Moreover, it is even harder for students to retain and transfer these skills to other courses and to jobs.

Just what is to be done for our English majors? As a first step, there needs to be a universal recognition that the learning of writing is developmental. While most composition and writing specialists now recognize this, it often is something to which other programs in English departments give lip service but few curricular or programmatic changes. In addition, there is a continuing belief among many non-English departments and administrative units, not to mention the general public, that college writing means a quick, one-time fix in the first year. However, studies and anecdotal evidence increasingly are indicating the opposite.

For example, Lee Ann Carroll argues for a developmental model of writing in her recent book *Rehearsing New Roles—How College Students Develop as Writers*, a research project funded in part by the National Council of Teachers of English. Carroll's longitudinal study is one of very few research projects ever developed to examine student writing in the disciplines over a period of time. Carroll followed twenty students from several disciplines through four undergraduate years of writing. According to Carroll, after her students' first-year composition sequence was finished,

it is clear that the next major transitions in their development as writers took place as they struggled to integrate the content knowledge, concepts, and

research and writing conventions in...disciplines. This is the "teachable moment".... We found that the research and writing courses that some of our study students took...for example, in psychology and history, were quite effective in making explicit the often tacit expectations of the field and could be usefully instituted in other disciplines. (124-5)

Notably, American post-secondary English departments seem to have perceived writing as a developmental series of events in the past more so than today. The evidence for this was developed by Susan Miller, whose "print ethnography" of seventy-five catalogs from fifteen geographically separate research universities, 1920-1960 (as mentioned in the "Introduction"), shows that most of the schools offered many more writing and rhetoric courses (and fewer literature courses) than they do now. In addition, writing and rhetoric courses spanned the undergraduate years. To cite just one of Miller's many examples, the University of Wisconsin-Madison offered, in 1920-21, three different freshman composition courses, Sophomore Composition, Argumentation, Argumentative Addresses, beginning and advanced Commercial Correspondence, Junior Composition, Advanced Composition, Technical Composition, and a graduate level rhetoric course. By 1960-61, says Miller, the catalog listed only four composition/rhetoric courses, one of which was noncredit (69).

Some might argue that writing has spread (instead) to other departments and disciplines. However, the counter for this is that many schools have cut writing because its smaller class sizes make it expensive to teach.

And even when writing is taught frequently at some schools, it may not be programmed coherently: i.e., with a program overseeing and joining the individual developmental events in a coherent whole during a student's journey through college. As Nancy Sommers, Sosland Director of Writing at Harvard, and Laura Saltz, her research colleague, conclude from following over 400 college students through four years of writing experiences, "Writing does not shape a student's education in one course or one year. It is the cumulative practice and sustained instruction—the gaining of expertise—that gives students opportunities to participate in the world of ideas, first as novices and later as experts. The story of the freshman year, then, is [just] the story of students' first steps... (147)." As Sommers and Saltz indicate, a thorough understanding of the developmental nature of writing is a necessary beginning step in recognizing transferable writing: when students claim—as many do—that in each course they must begin anew to learn writing, then something is wrong with the developmental process. One of the ways to make it right is to examine the specific nature of how writing is learned in each step.

The Experiential Classroom

Often, the way that good beginners learn suggests what other students should be doing. Among my three former students' responses, an important commonality—a subtext of their comments—is how they made discoveries through experience. They needed both practice and discovery—repetition and experiment—to realize both the basic skills and the metacognitive strategies they attained. Experience is the ground of their learning.

Diane Hacker, author of *A Writer's Reference* and *The Bedford Handbook*, points to experience when she says, "Most learning [about writing] occurs during...writing" (298). The point seems obvious but is the elephant in the classroom. Writers don't learn primarily from lecture, reading, or observation. They learn primarily (though not solely) from writing experience. Thus teaching writing means offering developmental experience. Even the most metacognitive understandings and skills writing students should gain come more from doing than hearing. Barbara Couture argues, for example, in her award-winning *Toward a Phenomenological Rhetoric*, that the deepest learning occurs in discoveries that students make for themselves. Says Couture, "All essences or truths are located in subjective experience..." (4). Similarly, Kurt Spellmeyer, writing in a 1996 *College English*, labels such experience a paradigm, one of "ordinary sensuous life, which is ...the ground of thought itself..." ("After" 893-4). Jerome Bruner, famous for his educational reforms in the 1960s, also argued for education as a process of "discovery"—through students' own experiences. Likewise, WAC, WID, process writing, and similar movements in recent decades stake at least part of their claim to success in the experience of writing. Couture, Spellmeyer, Bruner, and others are simply saying that for students, the "essences or truths" that really count for them in their core selves are what they have discovered through their own experiences.

Little else lasts: not much sticks. And for most students, that means a diminishing memory of skills is transferable.

This popular insistence on subjective experience as a paradigm for student learning leads to an interesting conclusion: the need for the experiential classroom. What is the experiential classroom? It is one in which there is more than simple immersion in experience. In addition, students learn to respect their subjective experience and that of other writers, student or professional. Such experience is not only a grounding that most students appreciate but also the only one from which many of them can make progress. The experiential classroom also is concerned, sometimes even self-consciously so, about writing as a developmental event—and, therefore, about how to effect transferable practices.

I remember a moment of surprise I experienced as a young writer in my

last year of high school in the 1960s, long before concepts of process, audience, and the like had come to my prairie community. We students had a very brave, innovative English teacher, fresh from college, who asked us to write and to develop several types of speeches. In one, we were required to author and then present to the class a humorous speech to be graded partly by class response. I approached the assignment with confidence and interest: I always received A's for writing and even had won a county award for a history paper. However, as I tried to write, I discovered to my horror that though I could write well for a teacher or even an adult judge, I had no idea how to write for my classmates. This was, of course, my first transferable metacognitive discovery of audience. I solved my problem (by writing a report based on the humor in _Mad_ magazine).

I never forgot that moment: needing to shape an assignment to an audience. It was a lesson learned primarily because I was required to engage in discovery through practice. Almost every experienced writer has a similar story.

It is these kinds of stories that are discussed, shared, and written in the experiential classroom. As Art Young says in his December 2002 CCC review of Anne Beaufort's _Writing in the Real World_, if the workplace writers in Beaufort's study "had learned to create...abstractions and their attending conceptual language [in college], especially regarding discourse communities and genres, [they] might have constructed a metacognitive framework for problem solving to aid their development from novice to expert writers…" (314). In other words, in the experiential classroom, just having experiences is insufficient; students also need to learn about their learning by constructing their own "metacognitive framework" of each learning event.

Beaufort herself points out in _Writing_ that simple experience of writing is insufficient. As her workplace writers discovered, "Immersion in the discourse community in which a genre was used did not immediately or automatically give a writer an understanding of or control over its production" (136). Instead, Beaufort argues, instructors should teach students metacognitive awareness of the writing process, teach a variety of genres, and help students learn to examine the communication modes of each audience's discourse community ("Transferring"). Metacognition or "mindfulness," she says—citing Flower, Flower and Hayes, Perkins and Salomon, and Salomon and Globerson—is a "critical feature of expert performance…a sort of executive monitoring function of the mind watching itself work and deciding: What am I doing now? Is it getting me anywhere? What else could I be doing instead" ("Transferring" 186). Beaufort reports such behavior in her four workplace subjects when they successfully learned new writing strategies (187-8).

In the average classroom, even when a student is working on a specific type of paper—for example, on an interpretive literary thesis—she does not perceive herself as a writer who happens to be using one particular mode or genre of writing. Rather, she imagines her writing self at that moment in time as only, or primarily, a student of literature who is thinking about literature.

This is typical of how the average beginning or intermediate student writer sees herself in any classroom focusing on content, and as far as it goes, this paradigm of learning is fine. However, she also—if she is to make her writing skills transferable—needs to see herself as a writer working in one of many existing genres or modes; thinking of her strengths and weaknesses as a write; and consciously making decisions about what she can transfer from other modes, what she cannot, and what she must learn from other writers—student or teacher—to complete her writing assignment. In the experiential classroom, such metacognitive considerations are supported and encouraged.

Phenomenology: Writing Self, Community, and Structures

There are, I believe, several ways to help students develop a metacognitive framework. One with which I have recently experimented was developed as a general mode of thinking by an early twentieth century philosopher, Edmund Husserl. He called his method and philosophy "Phenomenology." This was a word used before Husserl by Kant, Hegel, and others. As a general term it means "of or pertaining to phenomena." Husserl developed a particular application that many philosophers and language theorists have used since then to develop more contemporary applications: e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Whitehead, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Derrida, and others. The American philosophical and linguistic mainstream prefers these more recent theorists (though Husserl's popularity continues among some European continental theorists). However, Husserl himself argued that Phenomenology is not just a philosophy, but also a method of inquiry applicable in any experience-based learning and teaching situation. I would like, here, to dispense with his philosophy to instead consider his phenomenology purely as a methodology that can be applied to writing.

I would like to extract three specific ideas from Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* and apply them to making writing more transferable. Using them helps students "in facilitating transfer of learning," as Anne Beaufort says it, by allowing "students to see how abstract concepts—discourse community, genre, and rhetorical context, for example—can be applied across a variety of writing situations and to let students test out the usefulness of those concepts in different task environments inside and outside academic settings" ("Transferring" 195).

Husserl's three phenomenological elements are self, community, and structures:

(1) a basic, existential (experienceable) self

(2) the primal, experienceable structures of life

(3) a community of such selves

In terms of writing, the first is what I call the "writing self." The second is a community of writing selves, whether directly experienced among student writers or experienced secondhand by reading accounts by professional writers. The third is the basic structures of writing that writers experience as they write. Let me next briefly define these three—writing self, writing community, and the structures of writing—by interpreting Husserl's method.

The Writing Self: First is one's own writerly person. It is the most basic, immanent self or awareness each person has, both in general and in writing.

Husserl argues that in order to perceive fully and accurately, people must be full of awareness, able to perceive their own experiences as what they are in themselves, rather than immediately labeling the experiences. He calls this state or predisposition of awareness the fundamental "*ego cogito*"—the "I-Knowing"—which he considers "the ultimate...basis for judgments" (31). This ego or self, he says, is "prior in the order of knowledge to all Objective being" (27). Each student has this fundamental awareness, which in writing experiences may be termed a *writing self.* The linguistic or social theory counterarguments that each person is, instead, simply a biological unit reflecting language and/or society may have validity in another context. However, in constructing an experience-based method that assists with transfer of real writing skills from real academic writing situations to real workplace experiences, it is useful at the least, and perhaps necessary, to work with the universal working myth of an independent, individual self. As Michael Polanyi says in Personal Knowledge, "As human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a center lying within ourselves.... Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity" (quoted in Murphy 72) or, one might say, uselessness—at least in terms of the workplace.

Writing Structures: The second element is the forms and shapes of writing. They are the repetitive experiential patterns that people use to organize their writing—the organizing structures and events of authorial expression.

They are what Husserl calls "universal...forms" (28). For example, process writing is identifiable in what Husserl calls the "universal...immanent temporal form," and freewriting is identifiable as Husserl's "stream of subjective processes."

Other Phenomenological structures include the rhetorical modes (in Husserl's "pairing," "synthesis," "analogy," and "identification") and, more broadly, any standard, experienceable writing structure or event that is commonly recognizable. For example, Kinneavy's communication triangle (with writing equivalents in parentheses) of "encoder" (writer), "decoder" (reader), "reality" (that to which the message refers"), and "signal" (language) is one (19). Others are the elements of rhetoric such as style, voice, tone, and audience. Methods also are structures: for example, Ann Berthoff's "close reading."

According to Mari Haneda and Gordon Wells, research consistently shows that "[w]riting is first and foremost concerned with developing a structure of meaning..." (432), what Shirley Brice Heath calls "learning as internal strategy-building" which is an activity "at the heart of...lifelong learning" (viii). Noteworthy is Haneda and Wells' use of the word "developing": in a phenomenological methodology, structures cannot be mere abstractions. They must be experience-based to students, who need to discover them in an experiential context. They cannot remain unspoken and unstudied. They should not be merely transparent or intuited. And they cannot be merely discussed without practice. They must be clear, obvious, repeatable, and practicable sufficient for students to see them clearly, learn them, and be aware on some level of them always operating in the background. In short, the structures must be heuristic realities—tools that students learn from their own experience or that they learn from others and then apply on their own continually. There must also be a metacognitive perception of using them—a perception that behind the contents of their papers, their structures are operating like quiet background machines to smooth the process and, indeed, to make the delivery of the contents work well.

Such structures are what Derrida found in Husserl as the background and primal substance of a series of unveilings and reconstructions. Essentially, using Husserl's methodology, you want students to unveil old writing assumptions and (re)construct new writing experiences, new writing selves, and new writing communities from very real structures.

Beaufort describes this process as follows: "A second element in facilitating transfer of learning is to allow students to see how abstract concepts—discourse community, genre, and rhetorical context, for example—can be applied across a variety of writing situation and to let students test out the usefulness of those concepts in different ask environments inside and outside academic settings" ("Transferring" 195). She adds, however, paraphrasing Connors, Smagorinsky, and Haswell in *Research in the Teaching of English*, "The consensus on the use of models seems to be that using real texts

(not the phony genres created for the purposes of teaching composition), with additional instructional support in analyzing the model and in procedural issues of composing, may help writers learn to write in new genres" (<u>Writing</u> 211). She also cautions that some structures may be too abstract for student use, such as the rhetorical modes or basic genres. Beaufort argues, for example, "Teaching formal characteristics of genres alone or 'principles of business writing' will not give writers the full tool kit they need for handling multiple writing situations" ("Transferring" 196).

How should such structures be taught? Katherine K. Gottschalk provides an excellent set of examples of such concepts in a recent *ADE Bulletin*.

She says that in general writing classes we should "view our students as novice practitioners in a field [academic discourse]...who will need plenty of time and practice" and, for this reason, "we must restrain our flood of commentary, and our emotions, when we respond to their attempts," for "less may be more" (54). Gottschalk offers as an example a short selection from a reflective essay by a student named David (whose essay originally appeared in Straub and Lundsford's *Twelve Readers Reading*). In response to David's paper, she says, we could bear in mind features of the reflective essay as a genre. We could ask him to explore what ecology of writing influenced the present form of his essay (the high school five-paragraph essay?). We could suggest that he compare his linear structure with organizations used by writers such as Annie Dillard or with structures of columns in a college newspaper.... He could compare the information and detail in his essay with those in essays written on similar topics. We could surely ask why college students would be interested in his topic and what his purpose is in writing on this topic for them. What generates his own interest in the topic? What deeper knowledge can he draw on? In other words, we would try to raise David to greater mindfulness about the genre.... (53)

Writing Communities: Third in Husserl's Phenomenology is the community of writing selves. The individual writing self has its parallels in others physically or psychically nearby.

There is, says Husserl, "an *intersubjective* world..." (91): a community of what he calls "monads," such community being a "harmony of the monads" that coexist as a simple, basic "fact of the experiential world..." (107-8). In writing experience, there is, then—by Husserl's terms—a community of writers composed of individual writing selves. This is, emphatically, a community of *experience*: of differing experience-based writing events experienced by differing individuals.

There are several levels or layers of closeness in this community that exist in interwoven concentric circles. The closest for student or workplace writers

often is each other, working in groups or as a class, sharing actual writing experiences and stories of their writing with each other. This also includes any instructor who participates in class, group, or course writing equally with her students.

At second remove is the instructor who tells stories about her past writing experiences, and guests or speakers in the classroom who tell their own stories about writing and demonstrate their own practices while the class observes. This works well for some students, less so for others.

At third remove are testimonials, explanations, and stories from such sources as textbooks, videos, and general public speeches about writing. Many students, perhaps most, ignore or quickly review such materials, thinking that simple understanding of the words means absorption of the lessons. However, without application, they will forget most or all such materials.

Generally, in terms of a writer community, the most immediate one for which students show their work, whether their teacher, peers, or workplace colleagues, generally tends to create the strongest retention of writing skills for this audience. However, all three of the circles are important to developing writing community. Often, it is better to explain this community to students just as it has been above: as a central community—the specific class or workplace—that really is composed of multiple extensions or multiple communities. This community has a much more important place in writers' development than sometimes is recognized. It often is their positive experiences of community with their instructors, peers, and/or work colleagues that college graduates report were among the most formative in their development as writers. Beaufort tells us in her ethnographic study of four workplace writers that one of two "positive occasions for writing in school that the participants reported...involved...a positive mentoring relationship and/or positive peer relations" (*Writing* 190).

"Community" also has another meaning: that of the community that uses a given set of writing structures. In other words, what are the structures—especially the genres—of a particular discourse community?

Beaufort says, "Separating discussions of genre from discussions of discourse community is a bit like the chicken and egg problem: Can you have the one without the other? ...[B]ecause discourse communities shape genres, mastering a genre requires an understanding of the genre's function within the discourse community" (105). Thus studying the structures of a particular genre, whether it is academic or professional, must necessarily unveil and reconstruct the purpose, audience, and other qualities of that genre's natural setting. "Community of writing" thus also means the unveiling and reconstruction of existing communities whose writing one is studying.

Writer Experience, Thinking, and Sharing

How, then, does one use these three elements—writing self, the structures of writing, and a community of writers—to develop students' experience-based involvements in writing? A few key methods exist that have been helpful to me: repetition within diversity, metacognition, and collaboration. These might be renamed (1) writer experience, (2) writer thinking, and (3) writer sharing.

Writer Experience: The first, repetition within diversity, or writer experience, means simply that I ask students to write a variety of types of papers, and on a variety of subjects. In the ensuing activities of both many experiences and varied ones, a sense of the constancy of a writing self arises.

For example, in literature classes, I usually require students to write a simple, weekly, rough-draft analysis of what they have read, using the elements of literature, and one or more interpretive positions they could take. In addition, I require several formal drafts of both analysis and interpretive thesis, and of critical reviews. Students also must write rough drafts of their personal reactions to their readings, and rough drafts of opposing ideas or arguments represented by their readings. Sometimes the students and I also discuss how their thinking and writing skills might be applicable to workplace writing. And in class, sometimes, I will introduce the structure, purpose, and audience of a different type of writing, such as a newspaper article, a business proposal, or a process report, and ask them to apply this type of writing in groups as an experiment in how to think differently about their readings.

In the ensuing repetitions, variety, and comparisons, especially in conjunction with the lessons below, students develop a sense of basic existential patterns—the writing self and primal structures of writing—that form a central hub to all this writing. This writing self weaves in and out of the writings, sometimes above them, sometimes below or beside them, quietly (or sometimes loudly or insistently) directing the writing. This "schizophrenia" about their writing—being aware of both the writer and the content of the writing at the same time—is something I strongly encourage.

Writer Thinking: The second key method, metacognition, involves asking students throughout the course to develop a sense of their writing selves—or what I sometimes call "writer thinking." I ask students to forget about their preconceptions of writing and to simply open themselves to their actual experiences of writing, past and present, positive and negative, and then develop their own new writer thinking from these experiential moments. This is what Husserl calls a "bracketing" of previous beliefs and an "epoche"—an

experimental break from or temporary suspension of previous beliefs.

Writer thinking includes how a student's writing self has operated in the past, how it does so now, and how, ideally, it might do so in the future. I also talk about some of the basic organizational structures inherent in the types of writing and in the types of thinking I wish them to complete. That is, I reveal or deconstruct the underlying writing and thinking patterns appropriate to the course and then ask my students to make use of these structural patterns as they write (and, sometimes, to subvert them using other patterns such as emotional writing, humor, dialogue, et al.). Writer thinking also can be developed from the experiences of other writers in students' community of writers.

In particular, I find it useful to ask students to write short, rough-draft responses to metacognitive or "writer thinking" questions. Here are some I have used:

1. What are your writing history and hopes?

2. What are some of your best and worst writing experiences, and why?

3. What are your main problems and strengths with writing?

4. How do you learn to focus better on your writing?

5. How would you teach writing?

6. How is writing in this class working for you? What do you believe you are doing well in writing, what poorly, and what would you like to change (and how)?

7. What are your most workable stages, steps, or layers of developing your writing? What stages, steps, or layers do you think would be useful to learn in the future?

8. What is your visual map of writing (e.g., start with a circle at the center labeled "writing self" and then draw a map of writing elements or experiences, such as "idea mountain," "drafting river," etc.). (useful at both the beginning and end of a course)

9. What questions do you have about the requirements for the next graded paper, about the course, and/or about writing? (each paper)

10. How did your [most recent] writing assignment work for you, and why?

11. What are two or three metaphors of your own writing? (useful at both the beginning and end of a course)

It is by asking such questions that students develop a sense of their writing self and add to their writer-thinking vocabularies. By repeated questioning and

response, the sense of this self, this thinking, and this writer language embeds itself. It then provides a metacognitive background to which students can refer in disciplinary courses and in their workplace experiences.

When Anne Beaufort developed her ethnographic study of four workplace writers, she asked them what they thought had transferred from their college writing lessons. One said, "I learned how to think structurally about writing...presenting an argument in a logical fashion" (*Writing* 182). Another added that she had transferred "skills like being able to summarize something, or write an opinion about agreeing or disagreeing with something." A third said, "You're writing for an audience...[a]nd you want something from that audience.... I had so much fun taking my little cards and writing my ideas and putting them in order, and connecting them, and making my thesis.... The critical thinking thing did help me bring ideas together." And the fourth reported, "The more you...learn how to organize your thoughts in different contexts, you can pretty much apply that to anything.... The purpose of some of these papers is you try to come up with a real strong idea, and then you convey it and support it. If you can do that, I think you can pretty much write anything" (183).

Writer Sharing: The third method, collaboration or writer sharing, involves developing a sense of a shared writer community. The most obvious community is the immediate one created by asking students to work in small groups and to discuss writing as a class. Of course, one immediate benefit of collaborative work is that it prepares students for similar collaboration in the workplace. However, peer interaction delivers more interesting and believable concepts to many students than does reading or lecture, often because such work occurs in the power and immediacy of concrete experience. In this context, sharing their writing experiences and developing papers—rough draft or finished—together helps them discover the metacognitive frameworks and experiences necessary for developing their writer selves and their writer thinking.

Writer sharing also provides an immediate, experiential-existential audience. Many students arrive in college—indeed, may finish it—with little sense of audience other than a generalized academic teacher or, sometimes, individual teachers. Writing *around* each other and then *with* each other can lead students more easily to the experiences and structures of writing *for* each other. There are numerous ways to accomplish this: e.g., group writing, group reviewing of individuals' papers, group role-playing, and group and class discussion.

In addition, the power of collaboration also helps students perceive differences: in their own perceived and real writing, among each other, and

between their group perceptions and those of the professional world (the instructor, the textbook, professional authors, etc.). The tensions inherent in exploring such difference cause students not only to pay attention but to learn by placing themselves in the midst of a dialectic.

Paolo Freire asserts, for example, not only that argument is central to developing authentic meaning, but also that a specific kind of argument—community dialogue—must occur for authentic meaning to develop. "Dialogue," he says, "as the encounter among men to 'name' the world, is a fundamental precondition for their true humanization" (137). "Antidialogue" is "conquest" (138), "oppressive action" (141), "manipulation" (147), and "cultural invasion" (152). He defines "authentic," using the theological phenomenology of Martin Buber, as a "dialogical I...thou" with authentic "Subjects" who meet to name the world in order to transform it" (167). Buber's theology describes a difference between real communication among people who treat others as equal, conscious, "I-thou" subjects on the one hand, and, on the other, false or manipulative communication in an "I-it" relationship occurring when people treat each other primarily as objects.

As Gottschalk suggests of student David's reflective essay mentioned above, David and other students could learn to discover such an essay as a genre in a discourse community:

Students can read theoretical essays about the genre as a guide to their own practice. They can study models...form local sources such as their school newspaper as well as from collections.... They can become writers trying to reach actual readers, submitting their essay for publication to a college newspaper or magazine, and their work can appear in desktop publications of essays from the class. (52)

Freire's assertion fits well in an experiential classroom: a person's writing self and writer thinking can develop authentically only when there also is writer sharing or collaboration. For one, it allows reintegration of what Spellmeyer calls "celebrations of resistance and revolt" (above), even as his "ordinary sensuous experience" remains the central focus. Second, it can help student writers internalize the concept of audience, first as the immediate "thou" of other students and later, by extension, the "thou" of an imagined audience. Third, students who share their writer selves (and the contents of an assignment, as well) using a Freirista approach also internalize dialectic thinking. They thus become able to represent and practice—within their own writer selves and writer thinking—the dialectics of opposing beliefs and methods. As a result, they also become exemplars in their future workplaces of the highly democratic process of dialogue.

Conclusion: What "pay" do students receive?

In conclusion, I recall a recent encounter with a former student who had learned to write in one of my classes in the early 1990s. He reintroduced himself and thanked me for helping him. "We had to write so much," he said, in those or similar words, "and so many different papers. You really gave me an understanding of how to organize. I write on the job a lot, now. I couldn't have done it without you." He had taken a course from me in writing about literature.

However, the story I remember best of all about workplace writing is my experiences with a magazine editor for whom I was freelancing. He would phone me long distance at my job and give me rapid-fire instructions for twenty minutes on global and specific organizational changes for my most recent article I'd sent. He also would return the article by mail, awash in a sea of red marks that amply realized any student's worst nightmare of getting a paper back from a red-pen-crazy prof. And he usually told me to cut my precious manuscript by a third. I loved and hated that man or, more precisely, the work that he gave me. It was very detailed and time consuming. However, I knew I was learning quite a bit. And I knew that when I finished, he would pay me very well.

What is the "pay" that students receive? In the experiential classroom, most students really are prepared to work hard if they perceive a useful reason for doing so.

I shamelessly bribe my students by telling them how much writing there is in the workplace, how much my course can improve their writing grades in future courses, and how much more money they are likely to make over the length of their careers by becoming better writers. I do this in writing and literature classes alike, as it inclines them to pay a bit more attention to their talk and mine about writing. Then I make them write a lot, and think about their writing, and write about their writing, alone and together. "Experience is original consciousness" (108), says Husserl, meaning that experience and consciousness are intertwined as one, both alone and in community. And that experience establishes metacognitive touch points upon which students can rely and—if you train them for it—can consciously use to develop strategies by self-reflective memory.

Just as Metis was the first goddess of wisdom and mother of the warrior goddess Athena, so "meta-" combined with "cognition" makes it the highest form of wisdom in action. This becomes clear in the experiential classroom.

The more immediate and thorough the experience, the more likely students are to remember it. And greater self-awareness of their guided

writing experience creates within them a better continuing consciousness of their writing. This self-reflective, experiential knowledge is what makes their own writing abilities feel more personally available to them, helps them use these skills in multiple situations, and thus develops their heuristic toolbox as a set of transferable skills.

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Afterword—What's Next?

The final three essays in this collection turn to theory. The next chapter, "New Cartesian Writing: The Phenomenology of Composition," is a pure translation—with no sources other than his own *Cartesian Meditations* of Husserl's famous five steps of how the aware self comes to know itself and the world. Similarly, the writing self learns to recognize its "writing self" and the writing world in and around it.

Chapter 5

New Cartesian Writing:
The Phenomenology of Composition

Richard Jewell

A shorter version of this paper, "Observing Action: Stories of What Works," was presented at the Modern Language Association (MLA) Conference, Chicago, 1999.

Note: This essay does no more than transliterate Husserl's seminal Cartesian Meditations *into the phenomenon of writing. It has no other sources than his* Meditations. *For scholarly discussion of how the* Meditations *work the pedagogy of composition and writing, see the chapters before and after.*

As composition theorists enquiring into the meaning of phenomenology, we may begin by following the instruction Edmund Husserl offered in his five lectures or "meditations" to students at the Sorbonne, *Cartesian Meditations*. They are named after Renee Descartes' *Meditations* and his famous dictum, "*Cogito, ergo sum*"—"I think, therefore I am." In Husserl's version, this saying would be stated instead as "I am aware, therefore I am."

Husserl's basic phenomenological technique of breaking from normal intellectual *cogito* is applicable at any instant of our waking lives, and we can apply it equally well to an instant of considering the nature of our most fundamental being, the nature of an external or internal object, or the nature of an event or concept such as writing. His *Cartesian Meditations*—his basic instruction—begins with the individual's awareness, and of being aware of that consciousness. This essay examines how that self-reflective "seeing" or "knowing" works in the activity of writing.

To accomplish this, I will apply Husserl's introductory steps of discovery, step by step from his five meditations, to a human's writerly experience. I also will explain this phenomenal point of view can improve the teaching and learning of writing.

The first step in Husserl's investigative method, as we shall see, is to break away from preconceptions and to establish a pure awareness of phenomena. This may at first seem simplistic, reductive. However, this beginning yields hidden fruits: later it will become clear that Husserl's plan of self-reflection offers us a new way of understanding pedagogy and works metacognitively at any given moment in the composing process.

First Meditation: Bracketing Our Beliefs about Writing

Husserl begins his first meditation by describing his era as one we might

consider similar to our current one in composition, a time when "there are so many philosophers and almost equally many philosophies" (5). As a result, asks Husserl, should not we, as did "Descartes in his youth, [find] this a fitting time to renew his radicalness, the radicalness of the beginning philosopher: to subject to a Cartesian overthrow" all such theories and "to begin with [the] new" (5)? In this radical beginning, says Husserl, we should neither completely reject nor completely accept past theories; rather, we should simply bracket our beliefs about writing—place them on hold—while we make our philosophical enquiries.

In order to enquire adequately as beginning phenomenologists, we may pretend that we are as infants once again in our perceptions. Husserl says to us that "in infancy we had to learn to see physical things, and that such modes of consciousness of them had to precede all others..." (79). So radical is this break from normal consciousness, this return to a pre-thought awareness, that we cannot yet even determine what it is that we perceive, but only that we do perceive. "In 'early infancy,' then," says Husserl, "the field of perception that gives beforehand does not as yet contain anything that, in a mere look, might be explicated as a physical thing."

Imagine, then, if you will, that we have just been born. We have a fundamental raw awareness of our surroundings. In addition—for our present purpose of phenomenological investigation—let us assume that we have been reborn—born a second time, but this time—in an entirely separate part of our minds—with everything we already know. In this way—with this bifurcation of our consciousness into that of the newly arrived infant and that of our present state of knowledge and experience, let our investigation begin.

Such an investigation must start, according to Husserl, by suspending or "bracketing" our beliefs and theories. According to Husserl, "anyone who seriously intends to become a philosopher must 'once in [their] life' withdraw into [themselves] and attempt, within…, to overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, [s/he] has been accepting" (2). To do so, says Husserl, we must "begin in absolute poverty, with an absolute lack of knowledge" (2). This is done "by excluding everything that leaves open any possibility of doubt" such that "the meditator keeps only himself, qua pure ego of [their] *cogitationes*, as having an absolutely indubitable existence"—that is, each of us must keep only our basic "I" or aware self and the field of experience of which we are aware (3). We do this bracketing, this suspension of all we might believe or disbelieve, says Husserl, "not to adopt [Descartes' meditations], but...to renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their spirit...to make that radicalness true for the first time by enhancing it to the last degree" (6). To "begin radically," we "shall put out of action all the convictions we have been

accepting up to now" (7). Relating this to writing, we still accept the **experience** of writing, but we temporarily suspend—or place in a separate sector of our thoughts—all judgments, beliefs, and theories about it.

The underpinning of such bracketing of our beliefs about writing is an existential turn to—an experiential new beginning of—our own cognitive experience of writing. To start from this radical new beginning, says Husserl, we need to realize that "[e]verything that makes a philosophical beginning possible we must first acquire by ourselves" (13).

Hence, he says, "a *first methodological principle*" is that "I...must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific *that I have not derived from evidence*, from 'experiences'...present to me" (13). "Evidence is, in an *extremely broad sense*, an '*experiencing*' of something that is[:] it is precisely a mental seeing of something itself" (12). Such "mental seeing" also accepts that an existential process is happening: a series of events in time. As Husserl says, there is evident "an *order of cognition, proceeding from intrinsically earlier to intrinsically later cognitions...a beginning and a line of advance* that are...'in the nature of things themselves'" (12).

Thus as we try to make radical, phenomenological observation of writing, we must start with our own most basic cognitions of the writing experience and the time and space through which these writing events occur. These are the natural terrain of our initial phenomenal attitude toward writing.

Writing Experience, the Writing Self, and the Phenomenal Stance

A person following this investigative self-reflection is attempting to use phenomena to understand the very nature of writing. But what constitutes "evidence"? I use quotation marks (in effect, bracketing the word) because we cannot yet lay claim to any objective belief that there is an objective world or even that what we are doing as we write is not some kind of dream or illusion.

However, there is a type of evidence that Husserl calls "apodictive"—that is, "with full certainty of its being, a certainty that accordingly excludes every doubt" (15). This certainty is, simply, that we are experiencing something, the nature of which we do not yet label but, unquestioningly, we know as some kind of experience. This "experience" is a certainty, whatever the nature of this consciousness and its experience might ultimately turn out to be.

We cannot yet jump to the conclusion, which remains at this point merely a conjecture, that the objective world exists: says Husserl, "[T]he experienced world...must also be deprived of its naïve acceptance" (18), nor can we mistakenly allow, says Husserl, for "scholasticism [that] lies hidden, as unclarified prejudice" and "principles innate in the ego" as in Descartes'

original *Meditations* (24). According to Husserl, Descartes' "evidence—the evidence of the proposition, *ego cogito, ego sum*—remained barren because Descartes neglected not only to clarify the pure sense of the method of [phenomenological enquiry], but also to direct his attention to the fact that the ego can explicate himself *ad infinitum* and systematically" as a constantly recurring pure awareness "and therefore lies ready as a possible *field of work*" (31).

Rather, says Husserl, "the *ego cogito* [is] the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded." He adds, "In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is" (19). The *ego cogito*—the "I" that is "mind-aware"—has a field of awareness: "this life is continually there *for me*. Continually, in respect of a field of the present, it is given to consciousness perceptually, with the most originary originality, as it itself."

To understand writing phenomenologically, we must observe it in this way, even amid of the act of writing. This may be a particularly difficult bracketing or break from our normal way of perceiving our writing, especially because writing is an intellectual and imaginative activity and thus causes us to fall immediately into parallel intellectualism and imagination whenever we draw back enough to think about what we are doing when we write. However, Husserl's radical break from normal consciousness (which is normal, worldly consciousness: awareness that is submerged in and even subverted by our normal perceptions of objects and subjects, and of predictable patterns) is necessary.

Husserl calls this fundamental break with normal, daily consciousness, an "epoche" or temporary suspension of any belief, judgement, or action resulting from such. We place in "parentheses," for the moment of epoche, any belief so that only our awareness is paramount. Husserl says of this moment that it is a

> universal depriving of acceptance, [an] "inhibiting" or "putting out of play" of all positions taken toward the already-given Objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, probable, etc.).... [This act is a] "phenomenological epoche" and "parenthesizing" of the Objective world…, the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective world exists [as phenomena] for me and is precisely as it is for me…with the pure stream of my *cogitationes*. (20-1)

Husserl sets this Ego, this "I," apart from anything in or of the objective

world in the sense that it precedes them—in our bracketing, we must remember, we cannot yet even determine whether there is an objective world. The most we can say at this beginning of our investigation is that there is, by the evidence of our own most intimate and deepest experience, some kind of Ego or awareness and some kind of contents of awareness or "*cogitationes*." Husserl refers to our setting apart of this most fundamental awareness and its pure contents as "*transcendence*," the Ego as the "*transcendental Ego*," and the contents of awareness as "*transcendental-phenomenological self-experience*" (26). These are the basic constituents of the first steps of Husserl's phenomenology. In writing, they also constitute three elements (which I have placed in reverse order for clarity): (1) our *cogitationes*--our transcendental-phenomenological self-experience of writing, (2) the transcendental Ego or awareness that is observing the experience of writing, and (3) the setting apart of these two, or transcendence, as a fundamental beginning step to understand them. In simpler language—which I will use below—we have the following:

1. Our *writing experiences*,
2. Our pure *writing self* (the self that is purely aware of the raw, unevaluated writing experiences), and
3. the phenomenal stance or "transcendence"—the setting apart of "1" and "2" as a beginning step—which I will call, because it is the first and most fundamental metacognitive thought, phenomenal metacognition of writing, or, more simply, *metacognition of writing*.

Second Meditation: Our Phenomenal Field of Writing

What is the nature of this pure writing self? At the beginning of his second meditation, Husserl states that in whatever activity this pure self is engaged, this "transcendental ego philosophically...is...prior in the order of knowledge to all Objective being: In a certain sense [it] is the underlying basis on which all Objective cognition takes place" (27).

If we as phenomenological meditators and writers simply start with this new beginning, we can, suggests Husserl, perceive an entirely new and purer view of our writing experience, which is "*an infinite realm of being of a new kind*, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience." In fact, by observation using pure phenomenological awareness of our experiences, we will discover that our writing self has certain characteristics or "structures": "The bare identity of the 'I am,'" says Husserl, "is not the only thing given as indubitable.... Rather there [is] a *universal apodictically experienceable structure* of the Ego (for example, the immanent temporal form belonging to the stream of subjective processes)" (28).

To this, we might add a sense of space, of three-dimensional existence, for

we are fundamentally aware of a "unitary *universe*, which...goes on 'appearing' unitarily,...the world-whole...of spatiotemporal endlessness" (37). Husserl does argue, on the one hand, that a sense of temporality is the most basic or "lowest basis," an "original time-consciousness," of "the flowing life that constitutes itself in and for itself" (64). However, he considers space apodictic, almost as basic as time.

I would argue that space and time together are the most fundamental experience of which the phenomenal self (and the writing self) can be aware. This is because Husserl's phenomenal epoche—our break from all normal consciousness, to become as a child in awareness again—requires us to examine our life as it is constituted in a body and always with a body. If this is so, then we must assume that all consciousness is an awareness in and through the senses: hence sensing of a temporal flow only can be achieved by the knowing of a series of events in time occurring to sensory objects: and objects always exist in some kind of space, however that space may be conceived—visual, auditory, or kinesthetic.

In other words, two of our most basic parts of our writerly self—perhaps the two that come before all others—are temporal flow and a sense of space. This difference in Husserl's explication and mine may seem a small detail that only philosophers might wish to argue. However, I do so here in order later to be able to give a preeminent position in a theory of writing not just to time, but to space as well: in other words, not just to writing as a process, but also to authoring sentences in a spatial field.

Husserl tells us that there are other characteristics, other modes, that we will discover as apodictic—as givens—by continued phenomenological investigation. Several examples he offers are "perception, recollection, retention," "differences in clarity and distinctness," "being, possibly or presumably being," and "being past, present, or future" (36). These modes, in their turn, may also eventually affect how we establish a theory and pedagogy of writing. (We even will be able to explain the phenomenological basis of "process" —in all due time.)

Our field of phenomenological writing also must include a distinction between normal reflection—natural, day-to-day reflection on or through writing—on the one hand, and phenomenological-transcendental reflection, or what we might call phenomenological metacognition, on the other. As Husserl says, we must separate normal reflective "grasping, perceiving, remembering, predicating, valuing, purposing, etc., from the *reflections* [that are] a new level.... Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection do we '*direct*' ourselves to the perceiving itself" (33). Likewise, as we write about *a house*, our writing is nothing more

than the experience of writing about a house, with all the reflective memories that that entails. However, our redirected perceptions—of *how* we write about the house, *how* we use memory to do so, and *how* we form the structure for others—all are phenomenological reflections or metacognitions.

In addition, we can discover or intend a higher or phenomenological meaning—a metacognitive level of perception—for every writing experience, if we wish to make use of it in that way. As Husserl says, "every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness *of* such and such," and "each conscious process...'*means' something or other*.... The house-perception means a house...in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion peculiar to phantasy...." Thus our writing can be, with self-reflection, thinking *about* writing—or writing about writing.

Accordingly, in writing as in life, as Husserl says, our "reflection makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process" (34). In other words, we can simply have writing experiences, or we additionally can have metacognitions about them. The writing self thus is not only the one experiencing the writing, but also can become the one who, through metacognition, looks on at the experiences as they happen and considers them through its own metacognitive perception of what writing is. It also does so purely: "the phenomenological Ego," says Husserl, "establishes himself as '*disinterested onlooker*'" participating in a "*criticism of consciousness*...which, for its part, by abstention from all positions that already give anything existent, must first create for itself a *universe of absolute freedom from prejudice*" (35).

The Cohesion of the Writing Self and Its Writing Experiences

Both our writing selves and our writing experiences are cohesive. The cohesion of our writing selves lies in our awakened phenomenal goal of uncovering, by pure observation, the contents of our pure writing experiences.

Husserl says, "I, the meditating phenomenologist, set myself the all-embracing task of *uncovering myself*, in my full concreteness.... [T]he *parallel* to this transcendental uncovering is the psychological uncovering of myself, i.e., my purely psychic being and, first of all, my psychic life, apperceived in the natural manner, namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality …" (38). My writing self has a cohesion that is "not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to one another externally), but *a connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness*" (41). It is important that students understand this because they may see themselves as playing different roles with different selves—or we may encourage them, even, in role-playing, to imagine different roles as writers; however, there is a

phenomenal writing self that lies transcendent—above all other roles—consistent and consistently conscious from moment to moment in each experience of writing.

The cohesion of our writing experiences lies in the synthesis of various events that we observe gradually over a period of time. We build synthesis upon synthesis as we gain more experience and observe its meaning, moving from simple syntheses to complex ones. An example of a simple synthesis, says Husserl, occurs "if I take the perceiving of [a printer's] die[:] I see in pure reflection that 'this' die is given continuously as an objective unity...of manners of appearing.... These [manners of appearing], in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis... (39). Likewise, each experience we have of writing has a unity to it, from the simple and most basic awareness of a flow of a series of events from one instant to the next—"the *fundamental form of synthesis*—namely *identification*...in the form of the *continuous consciousness of internal time*" (41)—to the more complex unities or syntheses of the different forms of flow, of how and where the flow stops, etc., of "changing sides, perspectives, and so forth" (40). Husserl adds, "Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of 'syntheses'[:]...the *whole of conscious life is unified synthetically*" (42).

In fact, as we continue our phenomenal investigations as writers, we will gradually discover that within ourselves individually, we will find a set of syntheses which tend to be true for us most or all of the time, insofar as our present experience informs us. (These syntheses may or may not be true for other writers, as well; however, we have yet to establish in this essay, using phenomenal investigation, that other writers truly exist.) The "multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness," says Husserl, "is divided into a number of sharply differentiated *particular types*[:] [f]or example, possible perception, retention, recollection, expectation, intending as something symbolized, intuitive representation by analogy…" (50).

As we develop our knowledge of syntheses and become aware of increasingly more and larger categories, we discover as writers that our writing seems to follow, make use of, or fall into the pattern of certain principles or structures. In fact, as we become more adept at viewing our natural writing experiences, we will discover, as Husserl says, that "*any object whatever* (even an immanent one) points to *a structure, within the transcendental ego, that is governed by a rule*..." (53). Thus we can build syntheses "infinitely" by "an incessant uncovering of horizons" (54), of possibilities as writers.

This revealing of horizons is, as we ultimately shall see, the responsibility of the student's writing self and the teacher's writing self together. Arguably, the classic and contemporary rhetorical modes represent such syntheses. For

example, Husserl says, "Pairing is a *primal form of that passive synthesis* which we designate as '*association,*'...*a unity of similarity*" (112), hence a form of comparison. Contrast would be a variant of this. As part of pairing, there is "an analogizing apprehension," hence analogy itself as a form of synthesis. Identification (definition), summary of experience, and other modes fit Husserl's meaning of modes of consciousness and synthesis. Rhetorical modes are not, of course, the only basic modalities in writing that are representative of phenomenology; however, their obvious presence is but one indicator of how the "modes of consciousness" are—or are closely related to—the modes of the writing self, its metacognitive writing structures, and its writing experience.

Third Meditation: Metacognition's Logic, Reason, Evidence, and the World

One of the early objections that some writing instructors may make to the phenomenological break or "epoche" and the consequent emphasis on awareness of pure experience is that this leads to excessive emphasis on self-reflective matters and too little on using writing to reason logically, let alone for socio-cultural transformations. However, this need not be so.

Phenomenological writing leads rather quickly—especially with the help of experienced instruction—to an awareness that there are not only clear forms and syntheses of forms in our writing experience, but also that reasoning is one of these basic forms. As Husserl says, "*Reason is not an accidental de facto ability*" but, instead, a "necessary structural form" (57). In fact, so thoroughgoing is the existence of reason that not only are there "*principles and fundamental concepts of formal logic*" but also "a *universal uniformity to laws of structure on the part of conscious life*" (59).

This holds true in writing as well: i.e., if students write enough, and if they examine that writing experience sufficiently, they will find certain "universal uniformity to laws of structure," for example, that there is, indeed, a time flow in writing (though we as yet cannot indicate anything more than that); there also is a sense of structural unity to sentences; a need exists, as well, for structural unity to paragraphs simply so they can be easily understood; etc.

As a result, as compositionists, we can thus assert that not only does phenomenology lead to the use of logic, reasoning, and evidence as part of the realm of awareness of the writing self, but also that sufficient and varied writing experience should, in and of itself, lead to an understanding of this basic fact. However, it is important that each student discover this for themselves, as they must make their own epoche from all that they have been told about writing—only so that they, themselves, may discover their writing self in the concrete experiences, themselves, of writing, as purely as possible.

In this way they can always return to evidence that they, themselves, have gained through phenomenal enquiry—i.e., through their own existential experience. As Husserl says, "Every evidence 'sets up' or 'institutes' for me an *abiding possession*. I can 'always return' to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence" (60). The importance of this cannot be underestimated: without the student's epoche, gaining of her own experience and metacognitive recognition of writing structures—without their consequent synthesis of these writerly factors within the student's own phenomenal understanding—they cannot "return" in any way to evidence that, for them, does not exist.

Led by an instructor who asserts that their own knowledge of writing and that of the textbooks they use are developed from concrete phenomenal experiences of writing—and given that they can offer students additional evidence that the instructors' knowledge is useful by offering new modes of experience that further validate students' own syntheses and help them created new ones—students then can gradually begin to provisionally trust the evidence about writing that is given to them from others. The students can never know absolutely that what others say will always work for them or, indeed, for anyone other than the person informing them of this knowledge: "an absolute evidence is," says Husserl, only "an idea" (63). Yet it is one worth pursuing, as logic and reason open any of us as writers to possibilities and, indeed, to the entire world of writing, "*a world itself* [as] *an infinite idea*" (62). It is through such syntheses and the use of evidence and the projection of possibilities that we as writers gain "reasonable" or provisional acceptance of a writing world and indeed, in phenomenology, the entire world itself.

Just as a student must build their own evidences through phenomenological epoche and discovery, so must we as instructors. Our wider writing experience gives us a stronger base from which to synthesize such experience and our metacognition of it, of course.

However, like the beginning student, we must continually refer our experience and our syntheses back to the phenomenological stance of epoche and careful observation of our methodology, never letting preformed ideas or beliefs interrupt our pure meditation upon the writing experience itself. Husserl says,

There is a need of a [*constituting*] *theory*...of physical Nature,...of man, of human community, of culture, and so forth. Each title...points to a vast discipline with different lines of investigation, corresponding to the naive ontological component concept (such as real space, real time, real...property, and so forth. Naturally it is everywhere a matter of uncovering the [consciousness] implicit in the experience itself,…a matter of explicating

systematically the...horizons by a conversion into possible fulfilling evidence.... (64)

What does this mean in teaching and learning? Of such methods can a writing pedagogy be formed.

Fourth Meditation: What the Writing Self Can Know

How does the writing self come to know itself through writing? Husserl begins his fourth meditation by stating, "The transcendental ego [is] inseparable from the processes making up [its] life" (65). This means, simply, that our basic awareness is inseparable from the contents of our awareness.

Husserl states that we cannot posit a separate objective universe, only the one we perceive through our sensory experience and the possibilities we imagine from them: "The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence...is nonsensical" (84). He intends "nonsensical" in both its abstract and literal meaning. This does not mean that we cannot posit or assume, eventually—through phenomenological investigation— something we may call an "objective world"; it simply means, rather, that all we know really can only be based on our experiences of consciousness, and all else is imaginary at best. This means that any "[g]enuine theory of knowledge is accordingly possible...only as...systematic clarification of the knowledge performance" (85). In other words, any theory of knowledge—and here we may include, by Husserl's terms, a theory of understanding and learning writing—really can only work accurately if it is based upon experiences and the various syntheses developed from them.

The result of such careful building of a knowledge base is "a universal phenomenology, as a self-explication of the ego, carried out with continuous evidence and at the same time with concreteness. Stated more precisely: First, a self-explication...showing systematically how the ego constitutes himself...as existent in himself and for himself; then, secondly, a self-explication...to show how...the ego likewise constitutes in himself...something 'objective'...."

We might translate this loosely as Husserl's dictum that first our conscious self must "Know thyself"; secondly, it must then constitute what is outside or beyond this self. Said differently, the conscious self must learn, in all its flux of experience, the identity pole or group of syntheses that help it define itself as separate from what appears to be objectively beyond it.

What does this mean in writing? It means, first, that the writing self is inseparable from its experiences of writing: the writing self only exists, in reality, as a writing self when it is actually engaged in writing or writing-

related activities such as experiencing memories of writing, imagining writing, reading writing, and metacognitively reflecting about writing. In fact, in phenomenal terms, the further away that the writing self may be from the actual experience of writing, the more careful we must be to interrogate its beliefs about writing and proofs thereof. We need, as above, "continuous evidence and at the same time…concreteness"—a phrase that becomes a sort of ultimate phenomenological refrain in our world of writing.

To wit, the need for keeping our writing self and our writing experience inexorably intertwined leaves us as writers with the intense and important responsibility of perceiving ourselves as writers only by the evidence we have at hand. Any beliefs, impressions, feelings, and other cognitions we have of ourselves as writers that have come from outside our own actual experience are suspect: we must either validate or deny them through our own experience.

As *teachers* of writing, this responsibility becomes even greater, and it is two-fold: we must not only teach what we know from our own experience, but also—and even more important—we must be sure that we really know it from our own experience or from the reliable experience of reliable writers. There is no room for vague, abstract, or experimental theory here: phenomenological writing demands our highest attention to "continuous evidence and…concreteness." If we can establish as instructors that we have experienced as writers that which we teach, and so have a significant number of other writers, instructors, student writers, etc., then we are beginning to meet the phenomenological responsibility of helping real writing selves engage in real writing experiences, and of having met that distinction in our own writing.

As theorists of writing, this responsibility becomes monumental. It is our responsibility to establish "[g]enuine theory of knowledge," what Husserl calls "the highest imaginable form of rationality," using "continuous evidence and…concreteness."

There is a second meaning for writing in Husserl's statement, above, that we establish what is real only by explicating what constitutes our own ego and then what constitutes "objects" outside of it. Each person's writing self must define itself as a writer and then what "objects"—possibilities and probabilities—exist in the writing world beyond it.

As the writing self first constitutes itself—comes to know itself--what are some of the basic elements about itself that it will discover? It has, of course, the most basic elements we have already described (e.g., it experiences writing as a spatiotemporal flow, it is intertwined with writing experiences, it is capable of metacognitive thinking about those experiences, it develops varied syntheses about writing, etc.). It also develops a sense of its own history.

According to Husserl, "The ego constitutes himself for himself in…the unity of a 'history'" (75). For this reason, as both writers and instructors we should be aware of our writing history and those of our students, and we constitute these histories. Another element the writing self constitutes is a sense of the passive writing self (in and during the experience of writing) and the active writing self. Husserl says that "a hammer, a table, an aesthetic creation" is "the synthesis of a passive experience" while "reason" and "the higher forms of *products* of reason" are "activities" (78).

This distinction is, again, productive to us as writing selves: in what mode is our writing self when it experiences writing passively, almost as an onlooker, metacognitively—either in the present or in reflecting on past writing experience—and in what mode is it when it is active? What discoveries and growth can it make in the passive mode, and what in the active? Other elements of self-constitution—of self-identity—occur, too, as the writing self gradually defines itself. Some of these will be negative, some positive, some useful fantasy, some useless, and some nonsensical.

As the writing self turns, secondly, to constituting "objects" in writing— what is not itself—it gradually builds a developing sense of the acts of writing, or the writing experience itself. It objectifies, classifies, and synthesizes various writing experiences by reflection—memory and thought—in various kinds of metacognitive acts, some of low order (simple) and some of high order (complex).

One of the most important objectifications, however, that the writing self can make of writing experience is of possibilities: of projected skills, events, opportunities, experiences, etc. And perhaps the most important possibility of all is that if other writing selves exist (other consciousnesses) and have similar experiences, then perhaps it can learn from them. The writing self objectifies itself sufficiently to identify itself as a single self: "[t]he ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as *I*" (66). This, in turn, indicates to the writing self the real possibility that other writing selves—like it—may exist.

Husserl says, "Even in our fleeting glance at what is constituted in us…we naturally could not avoid being mindful of 'others' and their constitutings" (87). This is the subject of Husserl's fifth and final mediation.

Fifth Meditation: The Existence of Other Writing Selves and Their Experiences

The question of whether others exist is not just a vague or abstract philosophical problem: in the world of writing, it is fraught with consequences for many writers, especially those at a beginning stage of the commonality of experience student writers share. And this also is true in teaching writing for

socio-cultural transformation.

The steps Husserl takes to verify the existence of others are simple: "In changeable harmonious multiplicities of experience I experience others as actually existing...not as mere physical things [but] as 'psychophysical...(91). They are "*subjects*...experiencing it (this same world that I experience) and, in so doing, experiencing me too, even as I experience the world and others in it."

Thus for Husserl a reality exists of "an *intersubjective* world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to everyone."   Further, continued observation leads to the conclusion that there is "*an essential structure, which is part of the all-embracing constitution* in which the transcendental ego...lives [its] life" (93). In our normal lives, we take this statement on faith—we intuitively accept it as a given—when we operate in the normal world. However, in reconstructing our writing world, we need to be aware—and be sure that our students are aware—that they do not stand alone as operating selves: other writing selves do exist, and the constitution of a writing self is "an essential structure," one common to all who engage in learning to write. Furthermore, each "other is a 'mirroring' of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper..." (94): each writing self mirrors others, yet each has its own particular set of basic experiences and awarenesses.

Because there are other selves who are aware, and because their awarenesses not only are separate from each other but also can differ, we can infer that there is a common "real" or objective world. Husserl says, "The fact of experience of something alien (something that is not I), is present as experience of an Objective world and others in it.... The Objective world is constantly there before me as already finished,...an actual existent with an explicatable essence of *its* own, which is not *my* own essence...(106). In this way we can state that writing selves view an objective world of writing—in both the subjects about which they write and the acts of writing themselves—where real differences exist with "explicatable essences" of their own.

In other words, writers can form a realistically objective community of writing selves to help each other. And they can—to the extent that sharing is presented as real writing experiences—trust others (e.g., professional writers, textbooks, and instructors) to provide them with verifiable information about similar experiences. This "*community of monads*" (107) "*involves a 'harmony of the monads*" which is "not meant, however, as a 'metaphysical' hypothesizing....On the contrary, it is...the fact of the experiential world that exists for us...in integral connexion with all Objective experience,..." (108). Our establishment of a community of writing selves is not an idealistic statement, nor one meant to be used as a springboard for developing an abstract philosophy for what we can do with these writers. Rather, there is a real nexus or web of writing selves

composed of all those who have worked at learning to write, and there are sub groupings of these selves—e.g., student writers, teacher writers, professional writers; student writers in one school, student and teacher writers using the same textbook; etc.

Their community of experience as writing selves is valid only to the extent that it reflects real experience, not abstract wishes, hopes, rules, or requirements. "Experience is original consciousness," says Husserl (108). And, in fact, the "first thing constituted in the form of community...is the *commonness of Nature*, along with that of the *Other's organism and [that person's] psychophysical Ego*, as paired with *my own psychophysical Ego*" (120). In writing experience, our first constitution of a writing community is our common experience with the biological mechanisms of writing, along with your writing self and mine. [Buberian I-Thou from that one article.]

In this pairing lies the potential for growth. According to Husserl, "every successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful for new associations."

This means we have a community of writing selves, a community of writers, a "*functional community of one perception*" (122). It is one in which "*[i]n the...other ego* the synthetic systems are *the same*, with all their modes...except that the *actual* perceptions...and also in part the objects actually perceived, are *not the same*...(123): "the appearance-systems are by no means always absolutely identical and...whole strata (though not all strata) can differ" (125). Even so, "[t]he Objective world has existence by virtue of a harmonious confirmation of the apperceptive constitution" (125), and "the two [egos] are comprised in the unity of one psychophysical reality" (124). A wider community of writers exists in our sense of an infinitely extended horizon: "Openly endless Nature itself then becomes a Nature that includes an open plurality of [Others]...distributed one knows not how in infinite space as subjects of possible intercommunion" (130).

We can define this community in terms of a concretion of individuals, but we also can define it in terms of its own social acts and in its response to the social acts of the wider community of which each writing self also is a member. Husserl says that the "*acts of the Ego that reach into the other Ego*...have the character of *social acts*, by means of which all human personal communication is established.... With communalization proper, *social communalization*, there become constituted with the Objective world...the various types of social communities,..." (132). An individual in this community "must first produce

for himself, step by step, the possibilities of further understanding.... Constitution of 'worlds' of any kind whatever, beginning with one's own stream of subjective processes, with its openly endless multiplicities...is subject to...the primordial [as] the central member" (133-4).

In this writing world, and indeed in all the world around us, each person has "a *cultural world* in [their] individual and communalized living and doing" (133). This cultural world is something we experience primordially as well, something constituted primarily in our own experience with those in our culture. As Husserl says, "Here I and my culture are primordial, over against every alien culture. To me and to those who share in my culture, an alien culture is accessible only by a kind of 'experience of someone else,' a kind of 'empathy,' by which we project ourselves into the alien cultural community and its culture" (134-5).

In this sense of the world—the world as established by the existence of other selves—we should continue to operate from the phenomenal epoche: "[E]very such predicate of the world," says Husserl, "accrues from a *temporal* genesis and, indeed, one that is rooted in human undergoing and doing...(135). In writing, this understanding of a phenomenological community has consequences for both the writing experiences of individual writing selves and the writing and learning experiences of writing selves in communal groups. It also has consequences for writing selves in the manner in which they use communication to perceive and establish their communities, even if the most fundamental, "primordial" experiences of each other in the Husserlian phenomenological mode are based on—or begin with—pre-lingual or proto-lingual experiences.

Conclusion: Thinking Phenomenally

The result of the analysis of our awareness in the world, says Husserl, is a "phenomenological explication [that is] neither overtly nor covertly a theorizing with adopted presuppositions or helpful thoughts drawn from the historical metaphysical tradition. It stands in sharpest contrast to all that, because it proceeds within the limits of pure 'intuition,' or rather of pure sense-explication..." (150).

It is an understanding or direct knowing that is based at its inception in one's own most fundamental awareness. "I must first explicate," says Husserl, "*my own [primordial sphere] as such, in order to understand that, within my own, what is not my own likewise receives existential sense....*"

Phenomenology is more fundamental than any philosophy presupposing anything: "phenomenological explication," says Husserl, "does nothing but *explicate the sense this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing...*(151). In

short, he says that "[t]here is only one *radical* self-investigation, and it is phenomenological" (153). It is "*the beginning of a radical clarification of the sense and origin...of the concepts: world, Nature, space, time, psychophysical being, [hu]man, psyche, animate organism, social community, culture*, and so forth" (154).

Writing is another form of thinking. Viewing it phenomenally gives birth to experiencing oneself as a writer, and to metacognitively remembering acts of writing. Such memories create transferability of writing skills and experiential sharing in writerly communities.

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Afterword—What's Next?

The next two essays examine a phenomenology of raw, authentic writing from similar standpoints. This first of the two is a consideration of a missing piece in writing studies: style and all that it entails in the real writing experience. The other, which concludes the essays in this book, is a somewhat different examination of process and social-epistemic paradigms as viewed by Husserl's raw experience.

The next chapter, "Death and Rebirth: A Phenomenology of Style," uses phenomenology, the "writer self," and the raw experience of writing to explain why both process and social-epistemic theories of teaching writing have some very fine moments, but why style also should be returned to the canon. All three of these related theories can form a strong "plural commons" that has been developing in the late 1900s and early 2000s.

Chapter 6

Death and Rebirth: A Phenomenology of Style

Richard Jewell

All three of the most powerful paradigms in composition pedagogy in the last half of the twentieth century were misused to denigrate style. Phenomenologically, style is neither an artifice of pedagogy as some have claimed, nor a whim of social language constructs as others imply or state: style is not an inessential and peripheral method of teaching. Nor is it dependent for its meanings on larger social-epistemic forces in culture. Rather, phenomenology suggests that style is deeply rooted in human experiences such that it is, in the human landscape, infinite and eternal.

Composition as product/analysis of literature (pre-1970), as process (1970s-80s), and as social-epistemic construction (1990s-present) have misunderstood, disrespected, and even, at times, seemingly attempted style's assassination. However, to slightly misquote what Mark Twain reputedly said, "The rumors of [its] demise have been greatly exaggerated." It is reborn, phoenix-like, precisely at each moment in history when one movement or another thinks it has finally died, self-immolating in flame. Each rebirth occurs precisely because within style are some of humanity's most basic experiential structures of writing. Phenomenology explains not only the attempts to kill style in recent decades, but also the elements of it that are deeply rooted in human experience. And in this manner, an understanding of the phenomena of style also can suggest classroom applications to make it come alive.

Definitions

First, "Phenomenology" as a proper noun refers to the philosophy of Phenomenology first developed by Edmund Husserl in the early 1900s. Phenomenology as a general concept (small "p") is used in older philosophical literature (e.g., Kant and Hegel); and, after Husserl, Heidegger and others developed variants. However, the term itself is more often associated with Husserl's philosophy (and sometimes Heidegger's). This essay, though dependent on Husserl's thoughts, uses the term as a general concept.

What is phenomenology? It is a system and practice of awareness. Husserl developed it as a response to most philosophy, new and old, that included a priori beliefs imposed from external sources on pure human awareness, whether beliefs about divinity, logic, will, love, objective science, or other forces beyond pure consciousness. "Philosophers," he said, "are all too fond of offering criticism from on high instead of studying and understanding things

from within" ("Pure," par. 44). Husserl wished, instead, to create a "science of consciousness" (par. 16) or "science of pure phenomena" (par. 5), a science of subjectivity, by looking only to human consciousness and its contents.

In a sense, he wished to create a pure psychology—an abstract, nonobjective, non-a priori psychology of consciousness—one exhibiting its own innate rules, just as a pure, abstract mathematics and physics have been developed. If it were possible, phenomenology would have its fullest successes if it could, like a camera, take internal "consciousness" videos of every instant of awareness and every form of it inside a baby from the moment it first becomes sentient. This video capture would continue by focusing on all the babies in the world, recording their conscious awarenesses. More especially, it would record their consciousness of their consciousness—or rather, how their consciousness develops a sense of self. It also would capture all the syntheses people make of their primary moments of awareness that aid them in understanding how their own internal and external world experiences unite. These primary syntheses of awareness would include not only their awarenesses within and for themselves, but also of, with, and in concert with others.

Second, phenomenology is an *existential* concept, as mentioned above: the word is used here in the broad, general sense. Simply meant, phenomenology is existential because it involves the actually existent realities experienced: it is experiential, and it is consciousness of the import of the experiential. In speaking of this existential/experiential quality of phenomenology, it becomes appropriate to use several other key words. One is *consciousness*, which is always, to Husserl, consciousness *of* something: there is no appeal to anything beyond the senses in Husserl's philosophy. Another is *authentic*, a word in this essay that simply refers to the need or experience of real, concrete experience, not just abstractions or expectations: all existential/experiential realities experienceable by a person are authentic experiences. (The word does not here refer to the more narrowly defined authentic-writing movement in the discipline of education, nor to schools of thought that apply it to free/creative writing, however much related.)

With these definitions in hand, it is helpful to examine phenomenologically—that is, through the eye of authentic experience—the relatively recent fall of style. The story begins in the product-writing era.

Style as King

There was a time in pre-World War II America when style was the central glory of composition. Although composition was a backwater of English, style flourished through the study of rhetoric, grammars, and related concepts. As

such, it was a practical science. It prided itself on working with the real experiences of writers and speakers in the real world of the professions and of politics, and of the structures used to create and develop those experiences—structures of organization, voice, grammar, audience, etc., much of it modeled, in pre-War days, on modern developments of Graeco-Roman and medieval forms.

The post-War period saw one of the greatest expansions in history of college education to the masses. The newly developing sciences especially needed college-trained workers. After World War II especially, with the GI Bill and professional jobs dictating that more people than ever gain a college education, increasingly colleges required that every student must have some kind of first-year experience with writing.

Often the responsibility for such programs was given to English departments, which then used the product method to give assignments in literary analysis: students were expected to create a product through some combination of intuition and mystery, and those who could not do it were considered lacking or worse.

However, in a relatively small number of departments, experts in the field of classical rhetoric developed writing programs using principles of rhetoric—of the modes and of stylistic considerations. Such programs often were considered experimental or remedial, the 1930s-1960s Amherst program being the best example of both considerations. However, such programs proved themselves useful by actually creating a larger number of proficient writers. They also had a sheen of interdisciplinarity sufficient to attract support across the curriculum; in addition, administrators soon discovered that such courses were easily and cheaply taught by a burgeoning population of graduate students and by adjuncts who would settle for less pay than tenure-line professors.

This situation created unusual opportunities, however, for rhetoricians. They were relatively free to design composition-rhetoric programs for the dramatically increasing numbers of composition students.

Thus it was that in most colleges and universities where rhetoric programs met the burden of teaching first-year writing, style and the modes were the royalty of this minor kingdom. They also were the centerpiece of early composition theory and, for many decades, the only extant method of genuine instruction in composition.

Style and the modes often were taught by combining classical rhetoric with modern analysis of the effects of these conventions upon readers. The relatively new linguistic applications of the sciences of psychology, sociology,

and biology were explored. Some of the best theoretical study and research in style still comes, in fact, from the early and middle decades of the twentieth century—for example, Vygotsky's clarifications of how language develops and is used, a movement developed from Chomsky's transactional grammar called "sentence combining" (see Connors), and applications of the then new movement of behavioral psychology to writing. This all happened before process gained ascendancy.

Unfortunately, as Vande Kopple says, "In the last twenty or fifty years, research on language has gone from an area that specialists in composition and rhetoric took quite seriously to one that specialists now pay little attention to" (4). Scientific study of the psychology of writing continued a bit longer in what came to be known as cognitive theory; however, interest in it, too, died out in the mid- to late 1980s.

In short, most forms of scientific study of writing—of the experiential practice of authentic forms of writing—were overthrown by other theories. How did this change come about?

Style and Process Theory

One could argue that style, which gave birth to the process movement, began dying as its new child came forth. The story of process is well documented: e.g., in Bartholomae, Berlin, Gleason, North, Russell, and Winterowd]. It is process's treatment of style that is especially noteworthy here.

The process movement was born as an antithesis in many ways to the public perception of the ponderous scholarship of rhetoric and style. The process movement started in the 1960s, along with other countercultural movements and initiatives: Elbow himself, for example, credits countercultural psychologist Carl Rogers as having a signal influence on his own development of process theory (*Writing* xxix). Process was widely adopted in the 1970s-1980s, quickly becoming what Barbara Gleason calls the "widely acknowledged...intellectual springboard for our modern field of Composition" (par. 7).

Phenomenologically, the greatest contribution of process theory to the activity of writing was to lay open to examination the question of how writers work in time. A majority of writers develop some kind of process that they use in the majority of their writing tasks—when they are not engaged in rote writing with rote contents. Fundamentally, the process paradigm thus is founded on the experiential, phenomenological reality of the temporal progress of writing. Husserl calls temporality the "lowest [most primal] basis" in awareness: an "original time-consciousness," of a "flowing life that

constitutes itself in and for itself" (*Cartesian* 64). Time is, thus, one of the most important constituents of the most fundamental, ongoing human consciousness, and likewise it is one of the most basic elements of a person's writing consciousness. Time—or one's awareness of it—is so essential in writing pedagogy that it is difficult now to imagine describing how to write without it. In this element, the process paradigm has been helpful.

Another fundamental element of process is freewriting, and it also is an existentially basic element of consciousness. In addition to flowing like the temporality of consciousness itself, freewriting is a form of what Husserl calls "bracketing. To "begin radically," Husserl says, we "shall put out of action all the convictions we have been accepting up to now" (7) so that one's life is "given to consciousness perceptually, with the most originary originality, as it itself" (19). One must, according to Husserl, bracket or lay aside their own beliefs about their experience in order to be conscious of them authentically.

In writing, this means that one must lay aside preconceptions not only about writing itself, but also about everything else, in order to be conscious of—to authentically experience—the reality of writing. Freewriting accomplishes this in respect to the permission it gives a person to release their written thoughts onto paper or screen without preconceived structure (or even, sometimes, preconceived conclusions). Freewriting is an act that Peter Elbow has taught is antiauthoritarian (*Writing*): it demands are that one simply let go and see what happens. In this it is both a phenomenological bracketing and, structurally, a reflection and duplication of the flow of consciousness itself.

Style, however much it was deposed, still at first remained within the kingdom of composition-rhetoric, somewhat as an aging king is unofficially retired to his former dukedom, where he may continue to exercise a small amount of control, or like a retired pope to the grounds of the Vatican.

On the one hand, freewriting enthusiasts such as Macrorie, aptly named expressivists, dominated the pedagogy of the early process movement. On the other, the need of the academy for finished papers remained important, and the tension between the poles of expression and final product was a productive dialectic for the early process movement. While some theorists (notably Macrorie) edged the academy toward accepting more academic papers in narrative and descriptive form, most theorists tried to help students bridge the gap between the new method and the traditional product using elements of style. Even Elbow was willing to say, "Editing is usually necessary if we want to end up with something satisfactory"; and "it is usually important to get your final draft to conform to the conventions of SWE [Standard Written English]" (*Writing* 5). Such interest was not limited to final drafting: many theorists such as Britton, Emig, Flower, Moffett, Shaughnessy, and others were open to a host

of possibilities—and locations of stylistic concerns—in their explorations of this new theory (e.g., see Ede and Lunsford's 1984 summaries of audience).

Emig, for example, as summarized by Walvoord and Smith, argued that good writing is as flexible, powerful, and ever changing as good learning: both good writing and good learning are "multifaceted," use "self-provided feedback," serve "an analytical and connective function," and are "engaged, committed, and self-rhythmed" (5-6). The early process movement considered an awareness of audience, voice, tone, and mechanical function necessary in some way or another to performing the functions summarized by Emig.

The Death of Style

However, the two important phenomenological elements of process—the temporal steps and the bracketing and flow of freewriting—began to take over in popular practice. Part of the problem was that process as a theory became more complex, making popular absorption of it more difficult: in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the theory gained two additional and very important elements. First was the recognition of its recursive nature (Flower & Hayes, Perl, Sommers). Second was the recognition of the stages of maturation students complete to become good writers. [See Bridwell-Bowles' holistically-scored sorting of levels of students at the University of Minnesota; and Walvoord and Smith's table "Behavioral Differences Between Skilled and Unskilled Writers," developed from "research by Emig (1971), Flower (1981), Flower and Hayes (1980), Odell (1982), Perl (1980), Pianko (1979), Sommers (1980), and Stallard (1974)" (6).]

As these two elements of theory were added, the diagrams of how to complete the "steps" of the writing process became more complex: some had arrows circling back upon themselves, and others showed differing steps or options for those in higher or lower stages of authorial maturation. The steps were very popular precisely because they worked so powerfully; however, their complexity was enough to keep poorer instructors and students from paying attention to much else.

In addition, freewriting and its concomitant free expression became very popular in K-12 education. As freewriting and the steps of writing gained emphasis, no great, simple, and equally compelling explanation of how to locate style in the steps (other than at the very end, in editing) were developed. By the early 1990s, process was the preferred pedagogy in a majority of college and university writing programs. And in a large number of K-12 schools, freewriting was an established practice, where the steps of writing began to be taught in often rigid patterns students were required to complete and master, step by step—the opposite of much of the original idea and purpose   of

freewriting.

Among real writers of all shades, of course, style did not die, nor was the temporal structure of writing "discovered": both always exist hand in hand among those who truly practice writing.

Be that as it may, in the field of teaching writing, the new process paradigm increasingly lumped style with "grammar" and declared that everything associated with this latter element of writing was not only passé but detrimental to "real" writing. The process movement also tended to lump together all former methods of teaching writing as "product," which made for easier vilification of a wide range of former rhetorical methods—the existential experiences and structures of the older rhetorical pedagogies became referenced collectively as the "current-traditional" method. In addition, rhetoric, style, and the rhetorical modes—in part, perhaps, because of their sometimes-mistaken interchangeability with grammar and editing and, perhaps, because of their seemingly (see below) non-spontaneous nature— were identified as secondary concerns. As a result, the process paradigm cut itself off from style and many other experiential realities of thinking and writing.

However gradual it was, the death of style—and all its raw experiences and structures of writing—was dramatic as intellectual movements go. The decades of this rise to power of process often saw tense battles in English studies.

In the beginning of this war, rhetoricians and process theorists at first joined hands. Gradually, however, many process-paradigm practitioners rejected rhetoric's more comprehensive and complex subtleties, slowly replacing them with their own. Style, once the larger umbrella, became lumped inextricably in the mind of the educated public and among many composition instructors as "grammar"—an ungainly combination of often disparate elements of writing. (See Hartwell for five distinct meanings of grammar and how instruction in it stayed in small pockets, even at the height of the process movement.)

This large and vastly oversimplified "grammar" often included or implied everything from simple mechanics such as grammatical usage, spelling, and punctuation to the richer, more complex concerns of audience, tone, purpose, persona, devices, et al. Elbow, for example, declared in 1973 in his widely read *Writing without Teachers*, "The habit of compulsive, premature editing…makes writing dead. Your voice is damped out by all the interruptions, changes, and hesitations" (6). Mike Rose said in 1984 that editing "too early in the writing process" is a cause of writer's block (*Writer's* 4). And the NCTE proclaimed in a 1963 research report that "the teaching of formal grammar has a negligible

or, because it usually displaces some instruction and practice in actual composition, even a harmful effect on the improvement of writing" (Braddock, Lloyd Jones, and Schoer 38). According to Janet Emig in 1971,

> [m]uch of the teaching of composition in American high schools is essentially a neurotic activity. There is little evidence, for example, that the persistent pointing out of specific errors in student themes leads to the elimination of these errors.... Even the student who, because of the health of his private writing life, stays somewhat whole is enervated by worries over peripherals—spelling, punctuation, length. (99)

All of these statements are, phenomenologically, authentic explanations of real experience about the problems of editing too soon in the process of writing. However, the public perception—and that of large numbers of students and their composition teachers—was that such statements about grammar and editing were not so much a reasonable caution as rather a death sentence, one that included *all* matters of style and rhetoric. Thus even concerns about editing at the end of freewriting, or interest in the consideration of voice and audience in the beginning and middle stages of expressing oneself, often were dashed.

An additional element helped kill grammar and interest in style among students, at least initially. In the 1980s, about the same time that the process message was first beginning to filter into the secondary and elementary American education systems, the whole language movement swept through American elementary schools. (See Calkins and Graves for indications of how the two were combined in pre-college writing.)

The whole language movement declared that students better learned reading and writing in lower grades by earlier, more thorough, and less rule-bound practice. In some ways this emphasis was good: the whole-language and pre-college process movement developed a generation of students who have come to college much more experienced and comfortable with reading and with writing, especially in the latter's expressive forms. At present, both movements have come to an increasing recognition of the need for study of grammar. However, in their early years in actual practice, they often discouraged any pedagogy involving grammar.

At the college level, the process paradigm relegated the teaching of grammar increasingly to remedial writing courses (where, ironically, product methods of teaching grammar—as rote lessons—continue to dominate textbooks, in spite of all the research negating the value such lessons), and to writing centers staffed by "peer tutor" undergraduates or often poorly paid graduate assistants. As a result of these multiple blows from elementary,

secondary, and college systems, instruction in grammar—and, often, in related matters of style—dwindled to such a degree that anecdotes became more frequent of students graduating with a poorer sufficiency of basic mechanical writing skills than they exhibited a few decades earlier.

Curiously, this great inefficiency among students in grammar and style led to calls from students for more teaching of them. In the early 1990s, for example, I began encountering increasing numbers of students in first-year composition courses who wanted grammar and punctuation reviews—unlike most students before them. This interest increased so much that during five years of teaching upper and lower-division composition courses at the University of Minnesota in the late 1990s, I found consistently that even a majority of junior and senior advanced composition students wanted review of grammar and punctuation for at least one class period every two or three weeks.

The Epistemic Turn

Amid this seeming success story for process, the rumblings of a new paradigm developed in the 1980s and swept through university composition programs in the 1990s as a powerful counterforce to the dominance of process: the social-epistemic movement. The 1990s social-epistemic movement was presented by some theorists as *the* paradigm that would supplant process. Social-epistemists pointed out that the most useful observation made by process theory—that writing often happens in steps—is accurate but relatively transparent: that is, process happens, but its existence hardly is central to instruction, especially as increasing numbers of elementary and secondary programs teach it. The more important task of composition, according to social-epistemists, is to help students perceive their cultural limitations and possibilities.

There are several varieties of social-epistemism. Those emphasizing epistemic considerations are interested in how people know and learn. The word epistemic is from Greek words meaning "knowledge" and "to understand." Such theories tend to believe that any part of language never is merely the dictionary definition of itself, but has much broader and subtler meanings and consequences. Thus it is a "sign" rather than a mere dictionary term, a breathing symbol reverberating with the harmonics of its cultural designations, complements, and oppositions. In addition, say such theories, because there are no external sources of ideal truth or reality—and because language never is a perfectly logical system—language signs form people's cultural milieus. Thus it is that a culture's signs determine the reality of the individual: one's perception of their reality, according to such theories, really

is based on the signs she has been taught to believe. For example, a capitalist-, male-, or white-dominated society has its own special signs that support its system and determine its version of reality, even among those who are oppressed by it and even among the signs used by those who are oppressed. Because such theories tend to be leftist, their concern often is to find ways to break free of traditional Western ways of perceiving. For the discipline of style, this often has meant that the traditional Greek canon of rhetoric and concerns of style with it—seemingly a supporting column of traditionally Western, white, gendered, power- or money-centered, competitive society—encounter distrust.

Some epistemists (e.g., Derrida) choose simply to deconstruct the uses of language in the dominant culture, thus attempting to open themselves and their students to other possible perceptions of the culture. Phenomenologically, this is a useful method of discovering hidden meanings in language constructs. However, it begs the question of what is real by defining it a priori: you must believe that language constructs are the only way in which reality is established in order to "tear down reality" purely by deconstructing its language.

Other epistemists choose to challenge students' signs directly: to challenge perceptions of who and what the students are in relation to their own communities and to the larger world (see Bullock and Trimbur). This challenge in the early days of epistemism sometimes was developed by asking students to rethink their basic understandings of key words or to attempt to perceive and write about the reality of people entirely different from them.

Some such challenges led to the introduction of reading materials about other cultures or cultural conditions. Indeed, the 1990s clearly saw an increase in composition classrooms in the use of readings, an activity often eschewed by process instructors, particularly expressivists.

The result in many epistemic writing classrooms was upheaval—for students at least, who found themselves, willing or not, looking at their culture from very different perspectives; and sometimes also for inexperienced instructors, who found themselves suddenly involved in battles with resistant students. These experiments engaged students and sometimes their instructors in challenging dialogues, both internal and external. Ironically, the result phenomenologically may have been, to some degree, a reawakening of interest in the elements of style: as both students and some instructors developed dialogue, they found themselves needing to learn how people speak to each other fairly, respectfully, and successfully. In this way, elements of style such as audience, tone, grammar, and persona reentered some classrooms as an immediate and authentic pedagogical necessity.

However, beneath the experiments, a fact remained. The late 1980s-1990s saw a dramatic turn away from authentic practice as the basis of theory. Process theory had developed its foundational approach as one involving authentic experience first, and the development of theory from it. However, due to a mixture of factors—none the least of which was the call to the composition profession as a whole to become more respectable by basing itself more in pure theory—theorists and editors of top journals in the field began to search for theories applicable to composition.

Theorists such as Kenneth Bruffee, interpreters of Mikhail Bakhtin, and others published influential essays. Social-epistemism well represented the new top-down approach of bringing abstract theory to the classroom. So much so was this the case that Kurt Spellmeyer complained in a 1996 *College English* article aptly titled "After Theory: From Textuality to Attunement with the World," "We are, perhaps, *trapped* in theory.... For those of us no longer charmed by the...pursuit of signs...[w]hat we need is nothing less than a paradigm shift..." (893-4). His solution is a return to what is essentially a phenomenological stance: the alternative, he says, is "ordinary sensuous life, which is...the ground of thought itself...."

Thus our emphasis in pedagogy, Spellmeyer argues, should not be on students' use of language—of "signs"—as it indicates their cultural conditioning. Rather it should be on helping them elucidate authentic thinking and knowing.

Creating Style

This difference—signs as reality versus "sensuous life"—is crucial to understanding one of the most basic authentic realities about style. Authentic thinking—the real-life event of it—is not entirely as epistemic theories suggest. While it is true that words do convey significant cultural meanings, phenomenology clarifies that there also are common universals of meaning that develop from authentic subjective experiences.

More important, perhaps, neither students nor, for that matter, the best of academicians, spend most of their thinking time creating—within their heads—perfect sentences, paragraphs, and mini-essays conveying rich, subtle cultural contexts. People's minute-by-minute thinking is composed largely of partly (or even barely) uttered key words. As Lev Vygotsky argues, "inner speech" in most people is composed of abbreviated and truncated thought structures, not whole sentences, and often not even entire phrases. James Moffett calls these truncations "[f]ragments of generalization and theory...embedded in narrative as single utterances..." (48).

This root form of language in each individual is an important concept, for

it has several interesting consequences concerning style. First, as Ann Ludlow suggests, it validates consideration of sentence combining (and related methods) as a serious science. According to Ludlow, the "kernel sentences in sentence combining come as near to the truncated syntactic forms of inner speech as socialized language allows"; as a result, "combining kernel sentences into longer grammatically correct sentences parallels the process by which writers learn to elaborate on the cryptic structures of inner speech" (11).

Second, it suggests that style is part of the natural process of freewriting. As students express their "single utterances" or other truncated expressions in written form for the first time, they do not just use syntax (and certainly they do not "copy" it or use it as a perfectly formed template from their heads); rather, they *create* syntax. Thus freewriting is not just the development of content; it also is the awakening of style. This concept allows for even more considerations.

For example, can an instructor mediate freewriting with a predetermined primary focus on style, one affecting syntax—e.g., on tone, voice, audience, and persona—just as she can mediate freewriting with a predetermined primary focus on content? Can she bend freewriting to teach development of usage and punctuation just as she might bend it to teach development of thought content? And can an instructor help students "discover" how they style—or the possibilities of styling—as she now helps students discover what they think?

Third, in understanding "inner speech," one also must consider nonverbal meaning. Elbow recently has pointed out, for example, how "it sometimes happens that we understand something well that we can't even explain in speech—much less in writing.

Nonverbal knowing is most obvious in realms like music, art, and dance (mathematics?), but it can occur in any realm. That is, we can know something at a felt, nonverbal level before we find words..." ("High" 6). Nonverbal meaning occurs naturally in the arts, in which there are languages of sound, of visual form, of physical rhythm, and of feeling, languages that exist without even a "single utterance" of inner-verbal speech. Susanne K. Langer a twentieth-century philosopher of symbol and meaning in the arts, argues that research shows "the human mind...tends to operate with symbols far below the level of speech" (144). For example, "music articulates forms which language cannot set forth" (233); that is, "music is...formulation and representation of emotions, moods, [and] mental tensions and resolutions..." (222). A contemporary of Langer's, philosopher Wilbur M. Urban, says, "The poet...does well to speak in figure, to keep to his own symbolic form. For precisely in that symbolic form an aspect of reality is given which cannot be

adequately expressed otherwise" (qtd. in Langer 234).

As in music, poetry, and other art forms, certain elements of style also operate at nonverbal, pre-language (or sub-language) levels in writing communication. Forms, figures, sounds, feelings, even sights exist side by side with the verbal contents, paralleling them, complementing them, or opposing them.

Humans have come to recognize them over the course of millennia—and in particular since the advent of Greek rhetorical pedagogy—as tone, voice, persona, and similar elements. They embody or carry within them messages that communicate, on a level entirely different from that of the actual content, authentic nonverbal experiences. Because such forms exist, it is possible to develop pedagogies that teach them. Such pedagogies may, in fact, sometimes be similar to those used to teach the arts. For example, it is not uncommon to teach students—whether freewriting, organizing, or editing—to pay attention to the song or sound of the words and phrases in their heads. It also is possible to teach them to "sing" when freewriting: to pay as much attention to the tones in their inner voices as they write or revise as they normally would do to the actual content; often this is accomplished through asking students to mimic a type of writing or speaking such as news reports or letter writing. One also can teach them to evaluate (revise/edit) the audience impact of word, phrase, and sentence combinations through the lens of aesthetic impressions, feelings, and emotions. Another method is to teach the impact of specific grammatical usages through the perception of them as forms of song or graphic art: how certain punctuation marks such as paired commas or interrupter phrases create a type of sound or stoppage of sound or a graphic sign unlike anything else.

Community and Style

The social-epistemic movement has, itself, developed stylistic considerations of community. Some of its theorists locate themselves primarily in the social nature of perceiving knowledge: in the reality of authentic experience at its rawest and purest, to determine how writing from, for, and about such experiences develops.

Pedagogies derived from such theories often ask students to look at a variety of cultures, cultural conditions, and the tensions among them, and/or to ask students to develop their own mini-cultures in the classroom—through questioning and small groups—to help students learn firsthand how cultures are established. Such efforts often fit well in a phenomenological viewpoint.

As Husserl says, one of the primary discoveries in a person's authentic, existential exploration of consciousness that she perceives is the existence of other conscious beings—what he calls "monads"—and that a large part of a

person's phenomenological efforts must necessarily involve perceiving and theorizing the resulting "intersubjective world" (91) that involves a "community" and "harmony of...monads" (107-8). Two people—two "monads" or awarenesses"—come to recognize each other not only as objects, but also as subjects, and thus to synthesize a community. The social turn in social-epistemic theory thus is confirmed as phenomenological to the extent that it adheres to descriptions of authentic human experiences in forming relationships, not just abstract, external, theoretical concepts of community imposed from without. Curiously enough, the social turn of theory has helped reaffirm two important elements of rhetoric: argument and audience.

The educational theories of Paulo Freire are a notable case in point. Freire often is cited by radical-liberal reformers in education as a leading proponent in the attempt to deconstruct capitalist society by exposing its naked drive for power (and inappropriate use of language), and to reconstruct a system of real community based on authentic human sharing.

From the viewpoint of authentic rhetoric, however, it is not Freire's particular resistance to capitalism that makes him so worthy of study, but rather the *method* he uses to assert authentic, existential community. That method is to make argument a central part of his pedagogy, and to do so in a particular way (one which is true to his Hegelian philosophical roots). He defines argument as having authentic community meaning when it is part of a system of a dialectic discussion: dialogue. "Dialogue," he says, "as the encounter among men to 'name' the world, is a fundamental precondition for their true humanization" (137). "Antidialogue" is "conquest" (138), "oppressive action," (141), "manipulation" (147), and "cultural invasion" (152). In it, the "dominating I transforms the dominated, conquered *thou* into a mere *it*," whereas the "dialogical *I*...knows that it is precisely the *thou*" as well, constituting both *I* and *thou*, but not an *it*. "Instead, there are [authentic] Subjects who meet to *name* the world in order to transform it" (167) [emphasis his].

Freire cites Martin Buber as the source of his *I-thou* language, an apt appropriation, for Buber—like Freire—is essentially a phenomenologist in his descriptions of how two people interact. For the discipline of style in particular, though, the important comparison is to the ancient emergence of democratic forms of dialogue. However limited Greek democracy was in practice, Western society today lauds it as the dawn of the establishment of a citizenry with equal rights, and it is in the cultural milieu of this dawn that Western culture locates so many important meanings, methods, and values inherent in argument.

Moreover, in Freire's reiterated stress on argument using democratic dialogue, there is a reawakened emphasis on the importance of audience and

even tone. The importance of audience exists implicitly, in fact, in all social-epistemism that invokes a community as the source of authenticity: if you cannot speak to your peers, you cannot (or should not) speak. Even tone is invoked at least indirectly in such calls to democratic behavior. As Freire says, "Dialogue does not impose, does not manipulate, does not domesticate, does not 'sloganize'" (168): the voice of dialogical reason is one of fairness, respect, and thoughtfulness.

Thus social-epistemism that is phenomenological in nature has, however much it may appear a detour from style, brought writing pedagogy full circle, back to the most classical of traditional, democratic discourse concerns. The paradigm that claimed to go far beyond process and to replace it has, instead, helped reawaken interested in matters of style.

Interregnum and Indicators

Whether social-epistemism was cause, effect, or neither, its immediate aftermath has been what might be described as an interregnum: a brief period, starting in the late 1990s, during which the composition world began living without royalty. Neither has power been broken into groups of independent duchies. Rather, there now is a melting pot or marketplace from which new instructors and old can choose, what Kathleen Blake Yancey called "The Plural Commons."

One such booth or corner of the commons is a resurrected interest in style and rhetoric as witnessed in this book and in similar public presentations. Other corners include theories and pedagogies of WAC, computer technologies, critical thinking, "post-process" theories (see Kent), new appreciation of the graphic/visual elements of writing and thinking (e.g., Faigley), fragmented but continuing interest in cognitive studies (kept current primarily by the disciplines of education, reading, ESL, and psychology), examinations of how the field of English professionalizes itself (see Miller and Schell & Stock), et al.

However, as Susan Miller suggests in several of her works, much about the current state of composition and its resulting pedagogy depends not on what is real in the world but rather on how the discipline decides to professionalize—to perceive and teach—it. This "plural commons," this town square, is composition's present stage of its journey, partly because, phenomenologically, the process and the social-epistemic movements never completely reflected the real experiences of real writers and of real students who write. Each paradigm gave to composition several powerful, phenomenologically authentic focuses. However, the time has come to move on. In the current potpourri of new openness and experimentation,

contradictions and tensions in composition have led many instructors to a return to existential fundaments: what do real writers—and real student writers in particular—actually experience in life and in the classroom, and what structures do they use authentically that can be taught in existential ways?

It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that one of the most central authentic experiences in how writers learn how to write is style. The real question then becomes "How can one teach style authentically?" There are a number of phenomenological indications.

One of them suggests an existential method. Ann E. Berthoff recently stated in *CCC*, "C.S. Peirce noted that a phenomenologist must have the tenacity of a bulldog and the observational powers of an artist, but these criteria are widely applicable: in any discipline relentless observation plays an indispensable role" (671). That includes the discipline of being a student learner.

As a result, instructors need to be more than just "close" observers themselves; they also need to assist their students in becoming so. Husserl says that "a first methodological principle" of phenomenological awareness is that "I...must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from 'experiences'...present to me" (13). "In short," he says, "not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me...only a phenomenon of being" (19). This principle provides "an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience" (27) on which human consciousness—and student consciousness—may focus. This new sphere of experience exists "with continuous evidence and...concreteness" (85).

This is Husserl's "bracketing" mentioned earlier in connection with freewriting: bracketing is his method of suspending belief so that consciousness can focus simply on what is. In an experiential classroom—certainly one in which style is important—students are encouraged to suspend their beliefs about writing and focus on what is. As Barbara Couture states in *Toward a Phenomenological Rhetoric*, "All essences or truths are located in subjective experience..." (4).

In the experiential classroom, students learn to respect their subjective experience and that of other writers, student or professional. They also learn phenomenological bracketing, which is one of the great traditional metacognitive skills taught in college: suspension of judgement. More importantly, students in experiential classrooms actually receive new writing experiences on which they can focus their observational powers and academic interest. Authentic learning requires them to experiment and, as they

experience writing differently, to reflect upon and learn from the methods, forms, and effects that they discover.

Another indication of how to teach style existentially is to treat tone and voice in part as forms of nonverbal communication. This is detailed sufficiently above in the section above about the language of inner speech. However, it is worth noting that encouraging students to freewrite in this manner is, especially, amenable to small group interaction, in which students have an automatic audience of peers for instant analysis and adjustment of their voices. Also helpful are methods used by expressivists to teach freewriting and by creative writing instructors using small-group workshop methods.

A third indication of how to teach style existentially is to use it heuristically. *Heuristic* means "to discover or find"; a rhetorical element used heuristically is a tool for building a structure or taking it apart.

Freewriting and deconstruction, for example, are supposed to be heuristic in initial use: they are exploratory methods. In style, one of the most important sets of heuristics, both historically and phenomenology, is the rhetorical modes. The modes fall in and out of popular consideration but never seem to die. This probably is so because they are not some kind of abstract artifice dreamed up by a group of outdated, ancient Greeks (nor are they a plot to torture students); rather, they have fundamental phenomenological authenticity. They gain this authenticity by being what Husserl speaks of as primary "syntheses": "objectivities that are given to consciousness through referential and connective conscious syntheses" ("Pure," par. 13). Syntheses simply are two or more authentic, existential experiences/observations that, placed together, represent a reality that almost all conscious human beings recognize as such. The continuous nature of a reality that one can trust—a reality that is always there when one looks—is itself a form of synthesis.

An example of this is someone who sees numerous moments or snapshots of a room around himself or herself, then synthesizes these moments into a perception of the reality of the room existing over a period of time. In Husserl's phenomenology, there are many such syntheses, both simple and complex. The rhetorical modes are syntheses, some of the most basic and powerful that exist in the sensuous life of consciousness. They are thus among the most basic—and thus most powerful—intellectual tools, more like purified forms of conscious thought and intention than abstractions of it. According to Husserl, for example, "Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as 'association,'...a unity of similarity" (*Cartesian* 112), hence a form of comparison. Contrast thus would be a logical variant. As part of pairing, there is "an analogizing apprehension," hence analogy itself as a form of synthesis. Identification (definition), summary of experience, and other modes

fit Husserl's meaning of modes of consciousness and synthesis. Syntheses are structures of consciousness. Syntheses such as the modes are basic, underlying forms of much of conscious intellectual thought.

For this reason, they may be designated as meta-structures. They form foundations or holistic superstructures on which other, more subtle or complex thought patterns are built.

How does one use these meta-structures as exploratory discourse—that is, heuristically? James Kinneavy identifies exploratory discourse as "dialectical-probable (Aristotle and Aquinas)," "valuative (Morris)," and "questioning-interrogative (Russell)" (p. 65); as an "opinion (Plato)" and a "way of invention (Cicero)"; and as involving "discovery (Bacon..., Descartes)," "proposing (Pierce)," and "inquiry (Dewey)" (p. 98). Even "emotion is not entirely excluded..., e.g. Plato's dialogues" (p. 68). Freire's dialogical form of argument, above, is a good example. Generally, if the purpose of a writing activity is to teach a specific rhetorical mode (as opposed to a content), authentic learning is more likely to come from a three-step process. First, students can learn to apply the mode by exploring a subject of their own (individually or in groups), one deeply meaningful to them; then they can reflect upon their use of the mode (and perhaps their peers' uses of it); third, they can apply the mode academically by exploring (i.e., by questioning or doubting) a course-specific content.

Other elements of style also may be used heuristically. For example, students can use the concept of audience as an exploratory tool in freewriting or revising simply by focusing on writing something that will move, change, or otherwise affect a specific audience. Their heuristic exploration of the facets of audience, tone, voice, persona, and related elements can help them learn not only specific methods of influencing one audience but also the general concept itself of writing for an audience.

A fourth indication of how to teach style authentically hazards the field of grammar. Grammar is a difficult subject concerning phenomenological (or any) writing pedagogy, as real improvement in usage takes years. Only sentence combining has shown serious usefulness in the short term, its gains seem to disappear in the long term, and some research studies dispute even short term gains (Conners). Ideally, improvement in grammar, caused by a variety of writing pedagogies—not just sentence combining—might stay with students if they wrote across the curriculum every term. As it is, many or even most college graduates feel when they begin writing in their professional careers that they are starting from scratch. However, there are indications that grammar instruction is of some help to some students, especially in pre-college developmental-writing courses, through tutoring centers, and in classroom

reviews. To the extent that such instruction helps, it is helpful once again to apply the phenomenological concept of syntheses, especially those designated above as primary syntheses or meta-structures.

A meta-structure in grammatical usage is one that causes, by its proper use, a cascade effect: other uses of grammar and punctuation fall into place more easily if a student uses the primary or meta-structure correctly. One of the best examples of this, perhaps, in developmental and first-year composition courses is the use of a divider between independent clauses: in short, the avoidance of fuses and comma splices (and of fragments). Once students are able to create and divide independent clauses, they become much more easily able to perform smaller functions of usage and punctuation. Thus properly divided independent clauses are meta-structural: knowing how to use them correctly has a cascade effect that leads to better use of smaller structures.

I ran a casual experiment, for example, to study the effect on students' grammar of requiring them to avoid long introductory phrases. I selected two first-year composition classes that appeared approximately equal in all other ways. I taught both classes the same methods of reviewing and changing their freewritten drafts and of how in revising, to relocate long introductory phrases (but not introductory dependent clauses) to the middle or end of sentences. Then, in one class, I required that the sentences of all finished papers have no introductory phrases longer than three words, penalizing papers that did; in the other class, I made no such requirement. Throughout the term in each set of finished papers, a common, relatively steady pattern of difference between the two classes existed in their punctuation and grammatical usage. Students in the class being penalized for long introductory phrases had about a fourth fewer editing errors in their sentences. This included punctuation marks, grammatical usage, and fewer of what might be called complex fragments—the type made accidentally because a student has become confused about syntax. Students' sentences were not necessarily shorter; rather, they simply relocated their longer introductory phrases, as I had taught.

I concluded that students in the class being penalized—in spite of whatever flexibility or variety they had lost because of my requirement—had, on average, learned better control of their sentences. Cautious use of introductory phrases proved to be a metast-ructure, one from which a cascade of improved punctuation and usage occurred.

Elements of editing grammar that lead to changes such as this should not be mistaken as meta-structures of grammar or of its pure grammatical units in themselves, any more than should the way of eating a peach be mistaken for the botanical fruit itself. The meta-structures are not elements of grammar.

Rather, they are elements of experiences of consciousness.

These are just a few of the indications of how to teach style existentially. Many others exist, as described in other essays in this collection. From the point of view of phenomenology, the key to all such instruction is raw experience. Diana Hacker recently has said that "composition teachers have learned over the years the more we are doing, the less our students are doing" (297). However much these words suggest an Elbow-situated, *Writing without Teachers* expressivist point of view, the fact remains that what students <u>do</u>—by themselves and through empathy with and mimicry of their peers and other writers—remains important in an existential teaching of style

And so this recent history of the death and rebirth of style comes full circle. Style is reborn, phoenix like; it is ready to stand once again with brilliant plumage, a respected if hoary equal among peers in the multihued field of composition. Phenomenologically, it is so substantive that it never can fully die in composition studies. It might be forced to continue in a lesser role, but one hopes not.

The process and social-epistemic paradigms offered several important, existentially meaningful gains, in spite of what one hopes was only a temporary diminishment of style; many of these existential gains—along with others in the current field's panoply—can be melded into a pedagogy in which style bears authentic significance for students. Phenomenologically, such instruction is flexible, practical, and interesting. One need look no further than the fundamental conscious, subjective processes of a variety of writers, beginning and experienced, to discover working materials.

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Afterword—What's Next?

The final essay in this collection is "Raw Writing: A Phenomenal Critique of Process and Post-Process Paradigms." It offers an historical review and critique of many of the major theories for teaching composition in the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty first, explaining from the point of view of the phenomenal "writing self" and the raw experience of writing what became immanently useable and what turned into a distraction as the "plural commons" of the new century developed.

Chapter 7

Raw Writing: A Phenomenal
Critique of Process and Post-Process Paradigms

Richard Jewell

(A shorter version of this paper was presented as "A Phenomenological Critique of Process and Post-Process Theories" at the Midwest Modern Language Association (MMLA) Conference, Minneapolis, 2001.)

Start by imagining that at this moment, you are being born. You arrive from the womb mentally new—a philosophical, cultural, and linguistic innocent.

Laid out before you is the horizon of human sensory experience. This field contains physical and auditory sensations, smells, tastes, and an undefined visual field. Though you have no names for any of these sensory experiences—and indeed, no language at all—you come to recognize over the next hours, days, and weeks the repeating forms of your conscious experience: you are aware in some rudimentary fashion of spatial, temporal, and sensory events. You also begin making associations among such events: warmth, food, and pleasure often appear related, as do discomfort and crying.

As months pass, you also learn the difference between memory and reality. Your memories become your first reflections. As you exert increasing control over your immediately surrounding world—your own body and feelings and the spatial objects that move around you—you gradually develop and remember a repertoire of actions. This repertoire also becomes part of your reflections—a preverbal mélange of past sensory impressions mixed with present ones and a sense of purpose or need.

This is how Edmund Husserl asks us to perceive. Husserl was one of the founders of phenomenology, a science of psychological observation first developed in the early twentieth century. His work preceded later phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur.

According to Husserl, "in infancy we had to learn to see physical things, and such modes of consciousness...had to precede all others..." (79). To be in this state is to inhabit the world of the young child, the artist, the insane, or perhaps the mystic: a place with utterly no words or other symbolic representations to interrupt the field of awareness. Husserl asks us to return to this state, to "begin in absolute poverty, with an absolute lack of knowledge" (2), such that "the meditator keeps only himself, qua pure ego of his

cogitationes, as having an absolutely indubitable existence" (3). Husserl calls this an "epoche"—a breaking away from all assumptions—that we can accomplish by a temporary "bracketing"—of them while we examine our own most basic conscious experiences.

Toni Morrison describes this experience in *Song of Solomon* as the main character becomes involved in a woodland coon hunt:

> Under the moon, on the ground, alone, with not even the sound of baying dogs to remind him that he was with other people, his self—the cocoon that was "personality"—gave way.... He was only his breath.... The rest of him had disappeared.... Eyes, ears, nose, taste, touch—and some other sense that he knew he did not have....
>
> The dogs, the men—none was just hollering, just signaling location or pace. The men and the dogs were talking to each other.... All those shrieks, those rapid tumbling barks, the long sustained yells, the tuba sounds, the drumbeat sounds, the low liquid *howm howm*, the reedy whistles, the thin *eeeee's* of a cornet, the *unh unh unh* bass chords. It was...what there was before language. Before things were written down. Language in the time when men and animals did talk to one another, when...a tiger and a man could share the same tree, and each understood the other; when men ran *with* wolves, and not from or after them....
>
> Calvin...whispered to the trees, whispered to the ground, touched them,...pulling meaning through his fingers.... He tried to listen with his fingertips, to hear what, if anything, the earth had to say, and it told him quickly.... (280-82)

A phenomenologist attempts to bring this fundamental awareness to each activity in life. As Barbara Couture states in *Toward a Phenomenological Rhetoric*, "All essences or truths are located in subjective experience..." (4).

Kurt Spellmeyer explains why it this ground of truth to which we should turn in our pedagogy:

> We are, perhaps, *trapped* in theory, and trapped so inextricably that even our most careful efforts to escape keep returning us to the isolation that drove us from theory in the first place.
>
> Theory, in other words, has outlived its own "death".... For those of us no longer charmed by the magic, by the myth, of the pursuit of signs—what other path remains if we want to be more than perpetually "post"? What we need is nothing less than a

paradigm shift:...[t]hat alternative is ordinary sensuous life, which is...the ground of thought itself.... ("After" 893-4)

For all our celebrations of resistance and revolt, no alternative is more revolutionary than our resistance to disembodiment and the pursuit of wholeness in our immediate experience. (910)

What Husserl's foundational phenomenology advocates is that through epoche—breaking away from theory at least temporarily by bracketing it and setting it aside—it is possible to examine subjective, sensuous life and its immediate experience.

Once this break is made, what then? Husserl says that "a *first methodological principle*" is that "I...must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific *that I have not derived from evidence*, from 'experiences'...present to me" (13). "In short," he adds, "not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is", 19). This provides "*an infinite realm of being of a new kind*, as the sphere of a new kind of experience" (27). More precisely, one becomes fundamentally aware of a "unitary *universe*, which...goes on 'appearing' unitarily..., the world-whole...of spatiotemporal endlessness" (37).

The Raw Experience of Writing

Husserl's epoche and bracketing works not only in an initial re-envisioning of one's own consciousness, but also in any daily experience that he or she wishes to see in its full significance: e.g., writing. Writing in all its forms, strong and weak, lengthy and short, deep and shallow, is a raw experience that can be examined phenomenologically.

Experiencing writing—and thinking about it—provides a tangible, pure understanding of our own writing experience. Says Husserl, "Every evidence 'sets up' or 'institutes' for me an *abiding possession*. I can 'always return' to the itself-beheld actuality, in a series of new evidences as restitutions of the first evidence" (60). As Barbara Gleason says in her thorough summary of how Husserl's phenomenology can be applied specifically to writing pedagogy, "The best phenomenological descriptions invoke 'memories,' or re-cognitions of experiences, in a way that allows for fuller understanding and appreciation of these memories as instances of a general type" ("Self-Reflection" 62).

Noticing and explaining our basic experiential structures involves, whether in the central core of our being or in our experience of writing, what phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, who followed Husserl, calls "saying," a

word he retrieved "from the Old Norse word 'saga'" (as quoted in Halden-Sullivan 53). According to Halden-Sullivan, "saga" means "to show: to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call World...." In "saying," Halden-Sullivan argues, writing "practitioners should interrogate their own discipline like philosophers and listen to their world like poets..." (54). She says that "the phenomenologist's role demands a kind of negative capability: that of being immersed in the world's confusions without what Keats might call an irritable grasping after fact, reason, or a presupposed order..., [a stance which is] phenomenological in its emphasis on receptivity and an active, thoughtful acceptance of the world..." (58).

As we continue our consideration of Husserl's raw experience—perceiving our experiences as would a child—we can turn to one of the most dramatic events in the development of writing pedagogy in the 1900s: expressivist writing or, more particularly, freewriting. Freewriting has served at once as a device for freeing the stilted writing of students of earlier decades and as a central tenet of process writing because of freewriting's implication, in its very nature, that more stages—revisions—will follow.

Freewriting, introduced by Ken Macrorie but popularized especially by Peter Elbow, certainly fits Husserl's criteria of paying attention to our raw experience of writing, for it is about as raw as writing can be. Phenomenological understanding of our experiences should be developed, as Husserl says in what we might consider the great phenomenological refrain, "with continuous evidence and...concreteness" (85). Historically, the most important lesson taught us, perhaps, by freewriting—along with related developments such as the whole-language movement and the cultural emphasis since the 1960s on more freedom in oral expression and in reading practice—is that the act of practicing clearly is a better way of learning about writing than little or no practice at all. If this seems overly obvious now, we must remember that many product-paradigm writing teachers in older decades believed that bad writing was worse than no writing at all, and that students who could not write well from inception probably did not belong in academia and should never attempt to write.

However, for almost as long as process has had its expressivist freewriting, it has been criticized for it. Freewriting, the critics have said, is too self-centered an act; it privileges the individual self as the center of the universe, thus keeping individuals not only from perceiving the degree to which they are constructs of a larger (often unjust) universe, but also from interacting with others in communicative learning.

Phenomenological Structures of Writing

Phenomenology avoids this problem of supposed solipsism and self-centeredness by recognizing natural structures in both raw experience and consciousness of it. The next step—after epoche and perceiving our raw experience as raw experience—is, says Husserl, to perceive that our raw experiences are—or have—innate structures. According to Husserl, the "*universal apodictically experienceable structure* of the Ego"—our primary awareness or consciousness—is one such structure (28); "perception, recollection, retention," "differences in clarity and distinctness," "being, possibly or presumably being," and "being past, present, or future" are examples of others (36). These structures are ways of perceiving that all of us experience and that we subsume as intuitive, unquestioned experiences, experiences that lie at the basis of our ability to know, to do, and to interact.

There also are what Husserl calls syntheses. These, like structures, are fundamental and have almost the same degree of certainty in our experience. For example, says Husserl, we see a simple form of synthesis, "if I take the perceiving of [a printer's] die[:] I see in pure reflection that 'this' die is given continuously as an objective unity...of manners of appearing.... These [manners of appearing], in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis..." (39).

Likewise, each experience we have of writing has a unity to it, from the simple and most basic awareness of a flow of a series of events from one instant to the next—"the *fundamental form of synthesis*—namely *identification*,...in the form of the *continuous consciousness of internal time*" (41)—to the more complex unities or syntheses of the different forms of flow, of how and where the flow stops, etc., of "changing sides, perspectives, and so forth" (40). Husserl adds, "Even contradictions, incompatibilities, are products of 'syntheses'[:]...the *whole of conscious life is unified synthetically*" (42).

Mari Haneda and Gordon Wells of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education argue that research of literacy and writing at all levels of education suggests "[w]riting is first and foremost concerned with developing a structure of meaning..." (432). This "structure of meaning" can develop in the writing experience in a number of ways and at varying times. It may generate, for example, through development of details (freewriting, listing, drawing) or in holistic organization (outlining, mapping); in external expression (writing, talking) or internal cogitation (thought, memory, feeling); and in any or all of these methods in interactive group communication. If students are capable of multiple ways of developing meaning, pedagogies should reflect this.

One of the most central and primary structures is phenomenological reflection. Such reflection is—or forms the core of—a new level or area in our thoughts: not just memories of experiences, but the active remembering of

them for understanding and use. We must, says Husserl, separate normal thoughts such as "grasping, perceiving, remembering, predicating..., etc., from the *reflections* [that are] a new level.... Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection do we '*direct'* ourselves to the perceiving itself" (33). We then build a phenomenological area within our minds that is a set of essential concepts developed directly from our raw experiences of writing. Thus from our writing experiences, "reflection makes an object out of what was previously a subjective process" (34).

In simpler, more direct language, the enquiring writer simply must differentiate between the direct experience of writing on the one hand and, on the other, the kind of higher-order thinking that leads to metacognitive reflection about writing. The first area of writing is raw experience; the second is the metacognitions we have about our writing experiences. These metacognitions are the various understandings we develop, either directly from our own experience or indirectly from the experiences of others, that apply to us as writers. These metacognitions may be commonplace and basic—for example, "I write best in a quiet place"—or complex and subtle, such as the advanced writer's simultaneous awareness of subject, tone, organization, and audience as she writes.

Temporal and Spatial Structures in Writing

If there are these two grounds from which to critique writing pedagogies—raw experience and metacognitive structures—then it is possible to hold process writing in high regard. This is so, first, because process theory discovered and applied to pedagogy the raw experience of writing. The acceptance of raw writing in process pedagogy is much truer, more direct, and more whole than in older paradigms, which saw writing as an, intuitive, largely unexplainable product. Second, process demonstrated a structured, metacognitive reflective system for writing: it unfolded the specific structure of temporality in its exposition of the steps of writing. This temporality corresponds exactly to what Husserl calls "the immanent temporal form belonging to the stream of subjective processes" (28). Because this "immanent temporal form"" is, phenomenologically, one of the most basic of our conscious experiences, process writing is confirmed as one of the most basic forms of the experience of writing.

However, basic forms other than process exist. Process does not exist alone.

There is, for example, a sense of space, of three-dimensional existence. As Husserl states, we experience a "unitary *universe*, which...goes on 'appearing' unitarily..., the world-whole...of spatiotemporal endlessness" (37). Spatial

paradigms of the writing experience have been slowly developing from a variety of sources in the past few decades, none the least of which have been the interest in the feminist literary mapping of self and experience by references to the body and natural metaphors of it such as architectural, organic, and natural sites. Examples abound: Kathleen Blake Yancey's recent metaphor for our English profession as a "plural commons," Anne Ruggles Gere's metaphorical repositioning of theories in her collection *Into the Field: Sites of Composition Studies*, Web sites that use visual metaphors to organize teaching and writing (e.g., Nist), discussions of visual literacy as elements of argument (Wysocki, Selfe), et al. Social-epistemic discussions of public and private spheres, geographies, and spaces—of thought, feeling, and action— also are visual metaphors that may translate to composition pedagogy.

The Web is, of course, a powerful spatial tool. Lester Faigley points out that "literacy has <u>always</u> been a material, multimedia construct but we only now are becoming aware of this multidimensionality and materiality because computer technologies have made it possible for many people to produce and publish multimedia presentations" (5). According to Faigley, "Every known culture, past and present, has a language of images" (8).

The visual literacy of the Web (and of most visual/spatial media) also represents a new kinesthesia of space and emotion. According to Craig Stroupe, "Peter Elbow's [expressive writing] metaphor of cooking is decidedly homey and cozy," but Web "surfing and cooking exemplify diametrically opposed cultural desires.... The defining desire on the Web...is the restless [surfer's] thirst for constant novelty, variety, and potential surprise" (616). Phenomenologically, this "post-poststructural" kinesthetic turn is important. Kip Strasma and Paul Resnick argue, for example, that technology "may be one of the most challenging areas" of two-year college English research "because students are learning to communicate in so many different forms today" (108). The Internet as a space-emotion kinesthesia also presents what may be the most typical professional documents now: email and collaboratively developed computer files (both of which also require interactivity—see below).

The spatial parameter of writing became especially evident to me in my writing classes when I taught what I term "intermediate" writers—primarily juniors and seniors in a variety of junior-senior level professional-writing courses for five years at the University of Minnesota. The papers for these upper-division writing courses—case histories, business proposals, scientific reports, medical processes, et al.—were simpler and more rigid in structure than the typical liberal arts thesis paper or analysis. When I provided these intermediate, professionally oriented students nothing more than verbal directions for writing such papers, they struggled almost as much as typical

first-year writing students to organize their papers appropriately. However, when I offered the upper-division students two clear visual clues—one or more sample papers and a visual "map" or diagram of the required sections of their papers—a significant minority of them were able to produce a draft needing little more than editing, and most others needed fewer drafts to accomplish the same end.

I also have been using this method for twenty years in first- and second-year composition courses with similar effects. In recent years I have added, with positive results, a combined spatial and kinesthetic modeling of papers by introducing "tableaus"—physical arrangements of groups of students in spatial patterns mimicking basic organizational structures of papers.

Outlining is another spatial tool that often now is disregarded. Once it was thoroughly taught in elementary and secondary schools and in college research-writing courses. Now process instructors have replaced it with freewriting (or sometimes with conceptual visualizations that use branching or bubble-like images, such as "mind mapping" and "clustering").

Certainly, outlining was encouraged and required too much. However, as a tool that combines spatial and verbal methods, it can be quite useful. As such, process theory never intended its destruction. Elbow, for example—whom Toby Fulwiler introduced at the 2000 CCCC in Minneapolis as "Mr. Freewriting" [though Elbow himself credits Macrorie with introducing the term to him (*Writing* xxviii)]—encourages outlining. "The macro-revising stage," he says, "is where it's helpful to make an outline to go through all these words and thoughts you have.... Once you have a lot of stuff, that's a great time to make an outline" (Interview).

In addition, and more importantly, some students exist who think naturally using outlining rather than freewriting. I have queried students noncommittally about outlining for almost twenty years in composition classes, and I usually find at least one per class who writes best by starting with an outline and then proceeding to a first draft. In the 1980s and early 1990s, when elementary and secondary systems still commonly taught traditional outlining, I often found two or three students per composition class who preferred outlining to freewriting. For years I required these students to try freewriting; once they had, most of them returned to outlining. Even now, I find a student or two each semester who prefers outlining to freewriting. Most of these students find in their raw experiences of writing that outlining works best: it is the way they happen to think. Other structures work best for other students: phenomenologically, each individual will find structures and syntheses in their raw experience that will differ slightly in type and pattern from those of others.

Husserl's phenomenology suggests nothing less than the recognition of a mixture of temporal, spatial, kinesthetic, technological, and cognitive (see below) pedagogies to help students understand their raw writing experiences. Phenomenologically, it is possible to be much more effective by combining a number of phenomenological structures—that is, a number of pedagogical methods.

Genre Structures

Genre theory also makes much sense phenomenologically. Three examples of genre theorists are Joseph Petraglia, David Russell, and Debra Journet. Joseph Petraglia reworks the scientific model in his "new social scientism" by calling for "generation of deeper and more complex understanding of writing and its contexts" and "'thick' description of writing behavior" (55)—in short, phenomenologically, a call for more metacognitive reflection on the real experiences of real writers.

David Russell, another genre theorist, suggests that the solution "does not lie in throwing out the old [process theory] wholesale" but rather in "know[ing] more about...writing processes in many social practices, many systems of activity, many genres" ("Activity" 87). He argues for an "activity" focus that situates each type of writing in its particular world: e.g., one cannot, in this theory, teach or explain a business report except by studying or mimicking its real-life context—the needs, purposes, audiences, and intellectual tools—of the business world ("Rethinking"). This, in turn, is similar to genre theorist

Debra Journet's argument for the "adaptive landscape" (which, in turn, is like Carolyn Miller's label of genre as social action). Journet's adaptive landscape consists of disciplinary genres of writing that are, she says, "socially constructed categories of rhetorical action and response" (96) that "allow disciplinary" and, we might add, professional "communities to do their work" (101) using "very different generic modes of constructing and communicating knowledge" (102).

All of these theories—most of them proposed as additions to or refocused adaptations of process—are phenomenological because—and to the extent that—they involve what writers actually *do*, not just what they are supposed to do, and to the *extent* that they encourage students to develop metacognitive reflections of basic structures of their and others' raw writing experiences.

Genre as a paradigm has gained increasing power. Australian elementary and secondary education experienced a revolt against the process paradigm in the 1980s when many school systems switched to a genre-based system of teaching writing, and in the United States, many middle schools in particular

have modified their (often linear) process-writing methodologies by adding the teaching of genre (Haneda and Wells). In addition, research indicates even young children can develop as genre writers. George Kamberelis of Purdue found, for example, that "kindergarten, first-grade, and second-grade children...develop increasingly differentiated and flexible repertoires of genre forms and functions" when taught to do so (403). Part of the strength of current genre theories exists precisely in their youthful separation from the process paradigm and, as a consequence of this, their experimental quality—hence their more phenomenological, raw-experience writing exposure. Genre teachers are willing to consider a wider range of non-process writing methods: they are less likely to expect rigid adherence to freewriting and multiple drafting, and they are more interested in considerations of traditional and nontraditional outlining and the roles of grammatical usage, style, and audience outside of a temporal framework.

As most genre theorists like to point out, academic writing itself is a genre. By asking the phenomenological, genre-based question "How do writers use different genres in different situations?" it is possible to find that academic writing has its own structured forms like any other genre. In fact, one of the central structures of the genre known as academic writing is, in fact, process writing. Process writing is well suited to academic writing because of the latter's need for discovery and invention. This is, phenomenologically, one of the reasons process has been successful as a theory and pedagogy among writing instructors: the liberal arts/English discipline teaches that the best writing—thoughtful essays and narratives—is structured by the very thoughts the writer is trying to develop. That is, the thesis, the topic sentences, the title, the direction, and the particular arguments may be modified dramatically in each new draft: in this kind of writing, meaning *is* structure or, rather, structure develops from meanings, from discovery.

Phenomenologically, though, it is important to remember not only that there are other genres, but also that other genres need other structures. Few genres are entirely bereft of each other's primary structures. However, genres emphasize differing structures.

For example, as Journet, Russell, and other genre theorists indicate, most students enter professions in which the structure of frequent repetition of the same organizational patterns is required. In such situations, some or all of the temporal steps of process may be unneeded or even an impediment to the job. Journalists must turn out highly organized, efficient, and well styled news reports in a matter of hours, sometimes minutes, occasionally even by one-draft email, telephone dictation, or spontaneous live television news. Creative personnel in advertising, movie, and television story-development teams learn

to deliver "preps"—story lines—spontaneously. Lawyers, business professionals, psychiatric nurses, and many others learn an appropriate organizational scheme, style, tone, and acceptable grammatical usage so well after writing the same type of document dozens of times that they need no process. Even in creative writing, many authors tell of the "found" story or poem, one that seemed to flow fully grown from them, needing little or no revision. In the professional world, good writers who do not develop major revisions probably have developed well a metacognitive awareness of writing strategies, an elaborated complex of thought about their subject, and a collaborative network of knowledge of the subject, most of it based on raw experience.

Once students have developed their writing abilities and become intermediate or advanced student writers majoring in a specific discipline, they often discover the same phenomenological lack of need for revision as do professionals: they know how to operate using frequent repetitions of the same structural pattern. In addition, some students—no matter their age—more easily develop a metacognitive recognition of structures, and they naturally tend to develop fewer drafts while maintaining high levels of depth and breadth. Some students also come to us with greater levels of experience with the structures we do often teach, such as thesis-support or dialectic argument, analysis, and narrative example, and most of us already recognize that their superior experience with the form allows many of them to play with it more, to develop more discovery using it. Phenomenological writing and the exploration of the natural structures of raw writing experience suggests that we can offer students help in discovering genre options, options they likely will discover on their own in their professions without our help if we insist on forcing them to follow a single formula. Genre theory, both as an overarching metacognitive paradigm and as a set of specific practices, thus offers an important structural understanding of our own raw experience of writing and of that of our students.

Rhetorical and Critical Structures

Curiously, the rhetorical conventions (argument, comparison-contrast, description, etc.) and the structures of thought in writing presented by the critical-thinking movement (Elder, Paul) are very much present in phenomenological structures. This may help explain why product, process, and post-process theories seem unable to completely shed themselves of these structural pedagogies but also have difficulty fully incorporating them.

The rhetorical modes consistently remain popular among a minority of composition instructors, especially, perhaps, younger ones, who see in them,

rightfully, basic structures of thinking, writing, doing, and being; and many lower-division writing instructors have found the critical-thinking movement interesting and useful, even if its tenets and categories of thought have not led to any widely popular critical-thinking paradigms for teaching writing. In short, one can develop a comparison-contrast essay, an analysis, an evaluative process, a problem-solving process, etc. within most writing paradigms: as a product, as a process, in resistance to popular culture, as elements of genres, etc. The rhetorical and critical-thinking modes seem to float in a spatial bubble of their own, apart from paradigmatic squabbles, as a testament to their basic and therefore compelling structures.

Husserl considers such modes primal. For example, he says, "Pairing is a *primal form of that passive synthesis* which we designate as '*association,*'...*a unity of similarity*" (112), hence a form of comparison. Contrast would be a variant of this. As part of pairing, there is Husserl's "analogizing apprehension," hence analogy itself as a form of synthesis. Identification (definition), summary of experience, and other rhetorical and critical-thinking modes fit Husserl's meaning of structures of consciousness and of synthesis. The rhetorical and critical-thinking modes remain with us as one of many sets or forms of metacognitive structures that we discover, replicate, and share with others as the structures of our raw writing experience.

Such modes thus take their place among many other metacognitive structures of equal or similar value: visual maps and metaphors for writing, the temporal steps of process, the genres, and many other structures and syntheses such as audience, persona, and style. They all exist as part of the concrete learning experiences that students have as writers observing their own raw writing experiences, and as writers gradually developing their own structural understandings of how they best write. As each student metacognitively develops their own knowledge of structures and syntheses and becomes aware of increasingly more and larger categories, they discover as a writer that their writing seems to follow, make use of, or fall into the pattern of certain consistent principles or structures. In fact, as this new writer becomes more adept at viewing their natural writing experiences, they discover, as Husserl says, that "*any object whatever* (even an immanent one) points to *a structure...that is governed by a rule...*" (53).

Thus a student can build syntheses "infinitely" by what Husserl describes as "an incessant uncovering of horizons" (54)—of possibilities as a writer. This revealing of horizons is the responsibility of both the student writer and the person's instructor.

At the same time, there is a phenomenological reason why many experienced writing instructors turn away from teaching the rhetorical and

critical-thinking modes by themselves. However pure they are as basic structures of thinking and writing, they do not mimic the full breadth and strength of common raw experiences of writing. Though present in most academic and professional writing, they are not the holistic or overall organizing structures of most real writing. Students often find their way to these structures—or are more likely to practice them most—through working on assignments for other disciplines. Like many such abstractions, teaching such thinking structures may be useful on a theoretical level, but only a minority of students may find the lessons transferable to other courses and to their professions.

Thus phenomenologically, while these structures may be important to the metacognitive reflections of some students, they do not appear to be universally so, at least not in the kinds of metacognitive reflective structures students build for themselves that have real, immediate, and permanent usefulness in their writing lives. Like so many other reflective structures, they are useful to some and not to others.

Structural Rigidity of Process Paradigm

In like manner, one of the great weaknesses of the process paradigm structurally is, as many have pointed out, its rigidity. Externally, the rigidity lies in the fact that the process paradigm advertises itself as the the most important structure in writing, within which all other structures must be built. Phenomenologically, not only do students build structures outside of process, but also they use these structures as equals of—and even replacements for— the steps of process. Internally—within the steps, themselves—the problem of rigidity has become worse as the process paradigm has become more successful.

Process was neither rigid nor a simple paradigm at first. It began as an exciting series of experiments in helping students discover structures of writing by practicing them. The experiments began among a few thoughtful practitioners and in a few experimental programs—notably Amherst's.

The countercultural culture of the 1960s provided fertile ground: Elbow, for example, credits countercultural psychologist Carl Rogers' *On Becoming a Person* as one of his sources of inspiration (*Writing* xxix). In the 1960s and '70s, the experiments developed from a set of loosely-related ideas into a cohesive, carefully and thoroughly elaborated theory with expressivist and cognitive roots. In the late 1970s and '80s, process gained two important elements. First was the recognition of its recursive nature (Flower & Hayes, Perl, Sommers). Second was the recognition of the stages of maturation students complete to become good writers. [See Bridwell-Bowles' holistically-scored sorting of

levels of students at the University of Minnesota; and Walvoord and Smith's table "Behavioral Differences Between Skilled and Unskilled Writers," developed from "research by Emig, 1971"), Flower, 1981), Flower and Hayes, 1980), Odell, 1982), Perl, 1980), Pianko, 1979), Sommers, 1980), and Stallard, 1974)" (6).] By the 1990s, process had become the dominant pedagogy in a majority of college and university writing programs and in a large number of middle and high schools. [See histories by Bartholomae, Berlin, Gleason ("Teaching") North, Russell ("American"), Winterowd (*Composition*), and others.]

At the height of this success, process became what can happen to almost any widely accepted theory or model: a paradigm. On the one hand, there remained the rich, flexible theory of it that so far had breathed life into its practice. On the other was a series of more rigid, formulaic adaptations of it as a recipe for teaching. The paradigm of process—which, at its best, should have been a simple but powerful recognition of temporality as one of the important structures of writing—too often became in common practice an oversimplified set of prescriptive, exclusive recipes that made Elbow's metaphor of cooking a rich meal into a MacDonald's take-out approach to fast-food writing. The result was that by the time the rich and elegant theory of process gained ascendancy—as what Gleason calls the "widely acknowledged...intellectual springboard for our modern field of Composition" ("Teaching" par. 7)—the often more rulebound paradigm of process developed a popular and sometimes unfortunate life of its own.

Stories abound, for example, of college instructors, writing programs, and textbooks that break the events of writing into six, eight, fourteen, or even more very specific steps and substeps that are absolutely required of students— sometimes with little or no recognition of the recursive nature of process and the stages of writers and writing abilities (e.g., Couture 30, DeJoy 163, Ewald 122-23, and Russell 80). Such recipes likely are even more common in secondary and elementary writing programs, where larger classrooms, smaller amounts of homework, and lower levels of writing experience are factors (Hillocks). In the early 1990s, for example, a Minnesota middle-school teacher showed me her suburban school's administrative plan for incorporating a process writing system in every class: week after week, students were, as I remember it, to brainstorm on Mondays, freewrite on Tuesdays, revise on Wednesdays, critique in groups on Thursdays, and edit on Fridays. No variations on this would be allowed. Such programs resemble the older product model, in fact, as students still are regarded as blank slates whose minds (and bodies) have approximately the same needs, abilities, and experiences in writing, even if the paradigm has moved to a temporal rigidity,

rather than a spatial one.

It is not the fault of process theory that the paradigm became simplified and often misused. Britton, Elbow, Emig, Flower, Moffett, Macrorie, Shaughnessy, and the many others who theorized process never intended such substitution of a new rigid structure for the older ones.

Emig, for example, as summarized by Walvoord and Smith, argues that good writing is as flexible, powerful, and ever changing as good learning. Both good writing and good learning are "multifaceted," use "self-provided feedback," serve "an analytical and connective function," and are "engaged, committed, and self-rhythmed" (5-6).

However, even the richer, more complex theory of process itself sometimes fails to recognize what students really experience. For example, intermediate and advanced college writers often generate steps or activities in their writing that process theory does not generally recognize. For five years I worked regularly with juniors and seniors—who already had completed first-year composition—in discipline-oriented writing classes at the University of Minnesota. When asked to describe their own successful steps of writing, most students described one or two of these three common but "unexpected" activities: (1) a period of time/place for an unconscious processing of the assignment, (2) the use of specific foods and/or drinks, and (3) the presence of specific background sounds, often music (for a discussion relating to the first and third, see Gere, "Revealing Silence"). It is phenomenological experiences such as these—and the rich possibilities of others—that make process as rigid steps—a limited paragdigm—inadequate by itself.

The Death of Grammar

Rigid and sometimes not-so-rigid adherence to process also has destroyed or damaged other pedagogical methods that historically have worked for some students in the past. Foremost is the teaching of "grammar"—of grammatical usage and style.

"Grammar" once was the royalty of composition, for many decades the primary and often only method of teaching writing. Phenomenologically, it is only right that grammar has been deposed: no single structure of writing experience can represent all of pedagogy, especially grammar. As Elbow said in 1973 in his culturally groundbreaking *Writing without Teachers*, "The habit of compulsive, premature editing...makes writing dead. Your voice is damped out by all the interruptions, changes, and hesitations" (6). Most expressive-writing theorists agreed: the NCTE proclaimed in a 1963 research report that "the teaching of formal grammar has a negligible or, because it usually displaces some instruction and practice in actual composition, even a harmful

effect on the improvement of writing" (Braddock, Lloyd Jones, and Schoer 38). According to Janet Emig in 1971,

> Much of the teaching of composition in American high schools is essentially a neurotic activity. There is little evidence, for example, that the persistent pointing out of specific errors in student themes leads to the elimination of these errors.... Even the student who, because of the health of [their] private writing life, stays somewhat whole is enervated by worries over peripherals—spelling, punctuation, length. (99)

An additional element helped kill grammar. In the 1980s, about the same time that the process message was first beginning to filter into the secondary and elementary American education systems, the whole language movement swept through American elementary schools (see Calkins and Graves for indications of how the two were combined in pre-college writing). The whole language movement declared that students better learned writing and reading in early grades by earlier, more thorough, and less rule-bound practice.

In many ways this emphasis was good. Whole language and the pre-college process movement developed a generation of students who have come to college much more experienced and comfortable with writing, especially in its expressive forms.

However, neither movement in its early years encouraged any pedagogy of grammar. Process relegated the teaching of grammar increasingly to remedial writing courses (where, ironically, product methods of teaching grammar—as rote lessons—continued to dominate textbooks, in spite of all the research negating such lessons), and to writing centers staffed by "peer tutor" undergraduates or poorly paid graduate assistants. At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests students need more instruction in grammar and that they themselves perceive this need. When I first started teaching in the mid-1980s at St. Cloud State University, a school of approximately 15,000 students, I spent little time on grammar review in composition classes, and students did not express a desire for it. However, by the mid-1990s, when I began a full-time position teaching undergraduate composition at the University of Minnesota, students were making more grammatical errors and regularly requesting grammar review in class.

This is not to argue that school systems at all levels have not worked to rectify the problem. The pre-college whole language movement has developed many rich, complex modifications and additions, as has process. Since the advent of process and whole language, colleges and some secondary schools have developed writing centers, more classroom focus on voice and style, and new interest in such applied-writing programs as internships, writing across

the disciplines, paired courses, and service learning.

However, grammar remains underdeveloped and poorly represented. It contains a series of structures that deserve their own place in the raw writing experiences and metacognitive reflections of students.

Methods exist for doing so. One is to incorporate more review of grammar and style in student writing. As many process theorists themselves have pointed out, students best learn grammar and style in connection with their own writing—exactly, as it turns out, what tutors accomplish in writing centers. Many writing instructors are hesitant to do this, however, in their day-to-day experience of teaching writing because they already devote considerable time to correcting student papers. They assume, rightly, that correcting free-written grammar exercises would add considerably to their burden. In addition, instructors often assume—as did the early whole language movement—that students receive practice in grammar automatically by frequent writing of rough drafts, and that writing centers exist to help students correct their mistakes.

However, the problems therein are, first, that writing grammatically without guidance is no better in the process paradigm than was writing without guidance in the product paradigm. Second, instructors always are better situated than are writing centers to deliver primary lessons in the experiences and structures of writing. In addition, the time instructors devote to teaching grammar need be neither burdensome nor lengthy. In a basic writing class, for example, one can offer a brief review and then ask students to write using the lesson. An instructor can examine results as students work (especially on computer screens). In first-year composition, an instructor can review grammar and then ask students to produce their own examples in groups, helping each other and announcing their results for comments from the entire class and the instructor.

Phenomenologically, another method of increasing student proficiency in grammar is to increase reading proficiency. The academic discipline of reading studies clearly instructs us that the reading level of students often correlates with their grammar skills and that intensive reading programs may improve grammar as much or more as good writing programs, alone or in combination with them (Hull).

However, just as unguided writing and grammar practice teach little, so does unguided reading. In addition, simply increasing reading assignments decreases writing time. Phenomenologically, we need a better understanding of how writing and reading interact and better pedagogies or administrative methods of combining the two without sacrificing time for either.

In addition, a very promising field of pedagogy in grammar has been entirely abandoned. "Sentence combining," developed from Noam Chomsky's transformational grammar, was a popular 1970s-80s model for teaching sentence mechanics, one that involved student practice in combining clauses and sentences in differing ways. Sentence combining also is one of the few methods of grammar pedagogy that research supports (Conners, Moffett). However, interest in it quickly died as the process model developed a strong national following among college composition instructors and as social-epistemic theories became popular.

Yet sentence combining remains a promising learning structure in part because of the inner experience of language of most students. Russian experimental psychologist Lev Vygotsky argues that "inner speech" in most people is composed of abbreviated and truncated thought structures, not whole sentences, and often not even entire phrases. James Moffett calls them "[f]ragments of generalization and theory...embedded in narrative as single utterances...(48). According to Ann Ludlow, the "kernel sentences in sentence combining come as near to the truncated syntactic forms of inner speech as socialized language allows"; as a result, "combining kernel sentences into longer grammatically correct sentences parallels the process by which writers learn to elaborate on the cryptic structures of inner speech" (11). In addition, says Ludlow, the practice of sentence combining "allows students to practice elaborating ideas before they are sufficiently conscious of inner speech to tap their own thoughts and put them in writing."

Yet another structure in grammar that the process paradigm has ignored is how style can contribute directly and significantly to the earlier stages of process' steps of writing. Normally in process writing, grammar is a final step. However, the development of a concrete, appropriate, and useful style in its aspect of tone or persona can itself create meaning. This development of tone or persona often precedes editing and sometimes even may be part of freewriting.

For example, some students find a stylistic disruption in their experience of writing when they move from narrative writing, with which they often are comfortable, to news writing, which they initially assume is similar. Such students may need to have their freewriting preceded in class by a demonstration and practice of stylistic differences between the two genres. In addition, students who have first tried to write a news article by using a narrative style often find it necessary to change to a different subject before they can successfully change to an appropriate journalistic tone. In this situation, then style helps determine content—it helps create meaning. Understanding and knowing how to manipulate the style thus is a precursor

to freewriting.

Through a combination of circumstances, then, grammar has died a premature death—as should be evident phenomenologically by the corpse's constant twitching through attempted reanimations in writing centers, basic writing courses, and reviews of grammar undertaken by countless college instructors. Reanimations of the same old deadly, counterproductive rote lessons does us no service, however. Phenomenologically, grammar is a part of our real world of writing: as Elbow says, "Editing is usually necessary if we want to end up with something satisfactory"; "it is usually important to get your final draft to conform to the conventions of SWE [Standard Written English]" (Writing 5).

Phenomenologically, there are ways to do this that actually work. One must go beyond the present simplified paradigm of process and its rejection of grammar by using alternative experiences and metacognitive structures that already exist.

Cognition Ignored

Another set of structures and syntheses increasingly has been ignored as the newer social-epistemic pedagogies have gained favor. Cognitive theory was the supportive system for much of the development of process theory in the 1970s, and we have its studies and ethnographies to thank for many of our understandings of the way students and professionals write. Indeed, based in the actual experiences of writers as it was, cognitive theory was an often accurate and useful guide to patterns of raw experience in writing. The social epistemic movement and its return to an interest in reading and content-oriented discussion in writing classrooms gradually undermined cognitive theory pedagogy.

This is unfortunate, as cognitive theories have continued to advance in other fields of education. Some of the more exciting discoveries about basic experiential structures still may—and should—have an impact on writing pedagogy.

In earlier decades, the cognitive writing movement explored yet another approach to spatial and kinesthetic modeling of the writing experience. At one time, the concept of a split between "right-" and left-brain" hemispheres promised new ways of perceiving learning and the teaching of writing. Ross Winterowd termed the two hemispheres' writing and thinking activities as two modes: the propositional (left-brain) and appositional (right-brain) ("Brain"). Traditional logical and academic thinking and learning, according to the split-brain theory, happens in the areas of the brain associated with, or somewhat more localized in, the average person's left brain; sensory and spatial

perception happens in the areas somewhat more localized in the right side of the brain.

Early discoveries in this regard demonstrated important differences regarding language. As Victoria Fromkin and Robert Rodman wrote in 1983 in their textbook, *An Introduction to Language*, "Injuries to the left hemisphere result in aphasia, but injuries to the right hemisphere result in spatial perception difficulties, problems in pattern recognition, and other cognitive deficits" (365). Additional work suggested using additional methods: e.g., teaching letters to young disabled children by connecting specific sounds with specific touches (Vitale), asking students to perceive spaces rather than lines when copying drawings (Edwards), using iconic right-to-left scanning of writing (Jewell), using a "cross-lateral march" to improve reading comprehension (Vitale), and dividing students into left- and right-brain dominant groups for teaching purposes (Winterowd "Brain").

Cognitive neurologists now know that the regular application of almost any learned skill more often is performed predominantly in the so-called left or "language-centered" sectors of the brain, whether the skill is music, architecture, painting, mathematics, language translation, or writing (Rose). In addition, naming the functions "left" and "right" is somewhat of a misnomer, as differing centers or subsections of the brain take over in delivering typical cognitive tasks. New and overall pattern recognition depends on a variety of spatial and kinesthetic thinking and perception, some of it left- or right-brained and some not, just as does a sense of self and raw experience in general and as a writer. As a result, learning experiences in writing classrooms still can make use of both language- and spatial-oriented hemispheres or node-centers in the brain.

All such methods still have potential or real applications. For example, Edwards' suggestion may help explain why many writing centers recommend that their student clients edit by reading their papers backwards, sentence by sentence, and why writing centers sometimes teach students to notice punctuation as patterns within sentences, rather than as rules of usage.

More recently, the metaphor for how the brain works has become not a division into left and right hemispheres but rather an assignation of activities to various locations or lobes. In addition, the "brain-based learning" movement has taught us that brains continue to grow whenever learning takes place: new connections—new dendrites—reach and spread to other neurons. This means that learning in college involves actual physical growth (Haebig, Jensen, Smilkstein). There also are promising new methods of working with dyslexic writers and, quite possibly, other basic writers with similar problems (Haebig, Jewell). The brain-based learning movement suggests at least that—

as Diana Hestwood and Linda Russell of Minneapolis Community and Technical College suggest—teachers, even if only for purely neurobiological reasons, must "[f]ind out what knowledge...students already have," "provide opportunities for active learning," and "reduce fear" (as qtd. in Smilkstein 13).

Self and Other: The Social-Epistemic Paradigm

We now come to perhaps the most important or at least most pervasive challenge to process in recent years: the social-epistemic paradigm. A seeming shift in composition to this paradigm began gradually in the 1970s and developed in full force in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s and beyond. Corresponding upheavals and disparities in society have helped fuel it, justifiably so in many cases. However, unfortunately, it also has meant the disparagement of other models.

As Peter Elbow comments in the May 2002 *College English*, "People in composition have taken to using rubber gloves for the word 'process'" by making such comments as "Oh, we're *way* beyond the **'**process approach'!" ("Cultures" 535). Susan Miller refers to this present situation as "composition theory's continuing, limiting division of curricula into social-epistemic and expressivist categories" and a "new, content-oriented curriculum in distance courses" with "a productive emphasis on...particular sorts of texts and guided practice writing them" (326).

Social-epistemic theories have made strong entrances into the curricula of many writing programs at universities and public colleges. (Many private colleges' programs, though affected, still use a literature-based approach to the teaching of writing, or at some schools, a WAC initiative.) Such theories have been supported by many sources: not just a public increasing interest in social justice, but also Marxist theory and practice, especially in South America; Paolo Freire; the group dynamics of transactional psychology and creative writing (Gere Writing Groups); and communication theories by hermeneutic and poststructuralist theorists. Language, say many of these theorists, is not only the method by which we define ourselves, each other, and our cultures, but also the manner in which we create them: language creates a culture and, largely, creates the "self" of an individual.

The traditional notion of "self" has, indeed, been turned on its head by some social-epistemic theorists. They say it is a romantic myth, as each self really is no more than a small, local wave in what are larger tides and currents that sweep all waves along in often predictable patterns. The problem with process writing, say these social-epistemic theorists, is that it is too individual, too emotion-centered. The expressivist notion of freewriting excessively romanticizes the self as that old American icon, the rugged individualist; the

cognitive branch of process examines individual selves too much, rather than social institutions; and both branches of process thus ignore the dynamics of how cultural movements and language—other people and others' words— create the individual instances of being.

In secondary and lower-division collegiate writing programs throughout the country—where almost all composition is taught—the net effect of the social-epistemic movement has been an increase in the number of readings assigned—and of discussions of those readings. These readings are an attempt not only to help students perceive different cultures, but also to break free from their own limited culture and the constructs of their limited selves in their writing.

Reading is, in a sense, a compromise. This compromise in the battlefields of composition theory has been reached after decades of watching some of our colleagues engage their students in heated classroom debates and uncomfortable writing exercises designed to break students' cultural images of themselves and society so that they might develop more aware, socially just, literate selves. We also have watched other colleagues, especially young, earnest new college instructors, give first-year students introductions to cultural and epistemic theories and then expect them to write intelligent cultural critiques that agreed in essence with the instructors' own theoretical positions. These experiments in forcing change upon students simply have not worked well. And so, tired and frustrated, many in our discipline gradually have slipped back into a comfortable default setting: let's have students read more, we say; after all, that's what we did when we were in college English courses, and it made us better, more thoughtful, and more aware persons.

There are additional elements mixing into this brew of a return to reading. In part, there has been a recognition, especially in high schools and community colleges, of the important connection between reading and writing—a small but significant heritage from the cognitive branch of process writing and from the increasing use (for a few decades) in secondary and two-year-colleges of entrance and exit exams that determine writing and reading ability.

In addition, using composition as an opportunity to teach and read literature is a comfortable and enjoyable practice. A majority of secondary and lower-division composition instructors were literature majors and prefer to teach literature to lessons in writing. Many composition programs specify that such readings must be nonfiction in order to distinguish the courses from introductory literature, and the analytical tools often differ from what they were thirty years ago, making use now of contemporary argumentative and critical thinking analytical methods rather than on traditional elements of literature or rhetorical modes.

Nonetheless, the readings are a form of literature. And we are returning more to the practice of asking students to analyze this literature, an overall paradigm that can draw perilously close to the older product model.

What saves these activities, according to many instructors, is a continuing reliance on process. In this way, the powerful social-epistemic paradigm, like many new paradigmatic thrusts in composition before it, appears to be succumbing at least in part to absorption by the overworked, overgeneralized, and oversimplified process paradigm. Thus in composition courses in which reading is regularly required, reading becomes just one more step in the process of writing. As such, it seems a logical way to require more experience of students in reading, higher-level analysis, and exposure to cultural diversity.

But is it? Does reading about different values make students change their values? Moreover, does regarding different values automatically create better writers?

The Intersubjectivity of Selves

What does phenomenology have to say about this new social-epistemic view of self? It is important, first, to review, very briefly, the phenomenological basis of writing. After Husserl's epoche—a break from the past and a temporary bracketing of all previous beliefs—it is possible to view the experience of writing itself as a raw experience in its various manners of being sometimes wordless, sometimes with utterances like words, and sometimes full of words. The various experiences of writing that a student has—and that he or she learns from other writers near and far—are innate phenomenological structures and syntheses. These structures and syntheses form the core and body of a new area of thinking within the student: a body of phenomenological reflections that might more commonly be called metacognitive reflections.

Following Husserl's path, the next step is to consider two very important phenomenological structures: a person's own raw-experience self and the selves of others. Husserl says that "the *ego cogito*"—the "I-Knowing"—"[is] the ultimate and apodictically certain basis for judgments, the basis on which any radical philosophy must be grounded" (31). This "transcendental ego philosophically...is...prior in the order of knowledge to all Objective being" (27). As Michael Polanyi says in *Personal Knowledge*, "As human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a center lying within ourselves.... Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity" (as quoted in Murphy 72).

However, this individual self does not stand alone. According to Husserl,

"I experience others as actually existing...not as mere physical things [but] as 'psychophysical" such that there exists "an *intersubjective* world..." (91). This "*community of monads involves a 'harmony of the monads*" which is "not meant, however, as a 'metaphysical' hypothesizing.... On the contrary, it is...the fact of the experiential world..." (107-8). According to Husserl, the "first thing constituted in the form of community...is the *commonness of Nature*, along with that of the *Other's organism and [its] psychophysical Ego*, as paired with *my own psychophysical Ego*" (120).

In the raw experience of writing, then, the first constituting of a writing community is the common experience with the biological mechanisms of writing that students share. From that point, students share and constitute together their writing structures and synthesizes and, as well, their metacognitive reflections about them. This is the phenomenological form of the intersubjectivity of writing: the raw experience of the writing self on the one hand, and on the other the shared writing experiences, structures, and syntheses.

Applying this concept of raw-experience intersubjectivity to social-epistemic paradigms, on the positive side one can clearly see that other people's cultural experiences are important. To the extent that culture and language go hand in hand, a development in each student of the ability to use words with true intersubjectivity—to use language to pierce the veil of their differences, rather than hide behind it—also is valuable. To gain this, a writer needs empathy. As Husserl says of the phenomenological stance, "Here I and my culture are primordial, over against every alien culture. To me and to those who share in my culture, an alien culture is accessible only by a kind of 'experience of someone else,' a kind of 'empathy,' by which we project ourselves into the alien cultural community and its culture" (134-5).

In addition, just as writing, thinking, and talking are phenomenological structures or syntheses, so is, reading. To the extent that reading is a structural part of the experience of writing, it is reasonable to examine reading and writing together phenomenologically as raw experience. Process-writing theorists have connected reading and writing for at least two decades (e.g., Bartholomae and Petrosky; Foster).

Third, the individual phenomenological self is better represented in some social-epistemic paradigms of writing than might initially appear. These paradigms often encourage reflections upon our identities as established by gender, color, social and economic class, sexual identity, and political and intellectual status. Such strategies when applied to teaching composition may seem the antithesis of the practical, cognitive and expressive individuation of writers into separate creative units. However, classroom practices of reflection

upon students' own identities can (re)turn the students to psychological states: resistance (as an attitude), confession, subjectivity, cultural identity (of the self and group), romanticism (as an attitude), and self-discovery. These are, if taught correctly, phenomenological structures and syntheses, and they can become part of students' metacognitive reflections upon their writing. In other words, students can be taught to recognize and use these psychological attitudes—the styles and tones—of resistance, confession, subjectivity, self-discovery, etc. as strategies in writing and critiquing, strategies that represent forms of analysis and psychological genres of academic writing and cultural literacy.

As Rose says, all students "need to be let in on the secret talk, on the shared concepts and catchphrases of Western liberal learning" (*Lives* 194). Some lower-division courses in particular, says Rose, are not taught—but should be—"explicitly and self-consciously as courses on how to think as a chemist or a psychologist or a literary critic" (191).

Psychological attitudes are part of this "secret talk" and "shared concepts" in academia and the professional world. Phenomenologically, a nearly unending horizon of metacognitive structures and syntheses exists for use in writing courses.

Language, Culture, and Reading as Raw Experience

However, there is a two-fold problem when social-epistemic theories assert the primacy of language and of larger social movements in the formation and life of the individual self in composition pedagogy. First, phenomenologically, truth does not flow in one direction only—from cultural determinations of whole societies to the self—rendering most of our students helpless in the grip of their limited cultural milieus. The radicalness of Husserl's phenomenology is that it requires observation of all essential functions of consciousness—including my own momentary writing of this line and your momentary reading of it, of the thinking involved in doing so, and of writing and teaching—as sources of primary truth. "Experience is original consciousness," says Husserl (108), and "I must first explicate "*my own [primordial sphere]*" (151).

This is not just an abstract philosophical recommendation. It is the raw experience of students as they make their own determinations about what is true and good. Each student daily creates his/her own unfolding phenomenological structure of metacognitive reflections.

It is for this very reason—the phenomenological primacy of the aware self—that intersubjectivity can be taught in a number of ways. Advanced students—those capable of high levels of abstraction who easily can absorb

large amounts of cultural data through advanced readings—may be able to de- and reconstruct their selves and thus their writing in culturally enriched writing classrooms. However, the majority of students also can do so by learning to share, analyze, and evaluate each other's cultures or those cultures immediately around them—even if the cultures might of something so immediate as to not immediately capture the notice of us scholar-teachers—for example, the culture of truck drivers vs. bicyclists—for it is the perceived differences and how one writes and thinks about them that are important.

In other words, phenomenologically, people learn more from what is close to them than far away simply because it is present for sensuous examination and because it presents an immediate tension if it is different. There are, in fact, social-theory methodologies that emphasize such experience: reader-response, group-dynamics, and online interactive theories (Anson, Selfe). In addition, it is possible to use theories of resistance in the classroom that invite immediate application by students to their lives. Evan Watkins, for example, argues, "To have any political consequences, work in English needs to forge connections to popular cultures as they exist" in working- and middle-class students' lives— by teaching them intelligent resistance to the forces that they believe control them, rather than by making them feel like pawns of a limited cultural viewpoint (273).

Such theories are valuable precisely because they are so direct, much like the intensive situational writing used by Paolo Freire. In addition, they help account in raw experience for the concept of audience, which never has been comfortably situated by common accord in the process paradigm, even though it is another experiential issue of great importance and is, in fact, a primary experiential motivator of writing behavior—the cause and controlling focus at once—in most professional writing.

The second problem with the assertion of the primacy of language over all else in the formation of meaning is that it privileges reading activities (and listening to intellectual lectures) over other forms of teaching writing. As Spellmeyer says,

> It is easy, of course, and even commonplace nowadays, for us to treat language as another one of Alfred Kroeber's "fake universals" by imagining that words predetermine the self, society, and the world rather than sustain a three-way "conversation" among them. Although we cannot know the world except *in* and *through* language, we are not obliged to conclude, therefore, that we can know nothing except language. In my view, teachers of writing who accept this idea have set off with their predecessors on a flight from history—or rather, from

> our many different histories. Whatever else the everything-is-language argument might do, it gives the teacher a new, totalizing alibi for ignoring social differences. Who needs to listen to students when language is always the speaker? ("Being" 28)

As suggested at the beginning of this essay, many forms of raw experience are nonlinguistic. Among them are other types of signs such as those in visual communications; the signs and symbols of music, the visual arts, dance, and other art forms (Langer); and even day-to-day memories, many of which are in part or in whole memories of image, physical/emotional feeling, touch, taste, and smell. Concerning visual images, for example, Lester Faigley says, "Every known culture, past and present, has a language of images" (8), a fact we ignore:

> Even after a century and a half of saturation with mass-market image technologies, the heritage of alphabetic literacy from the Enlightenment still dominates within the academy and in literacy intstruction in general. The totemization of alphabetic literacy...ha[s] had the attendant effect of treating images as trivial, transitory, and manipulative. Visual thinking remains excluded from the mainstream literacy curriculum in the schools, and it is taught only in specialized courses in college in disciplines such as architecture and art history. (12)

"Literacy" says Faigley, "has *always* been a...multimedia construct but we only now are becoming aware of this multidimensionality...because computer technologies have made it possible for many people to produce and publish multimedia presentations" (5). In addition, emotion, feeling and the body are gaining new representations in pedagogy (Jacobs and Micciche, O'Reilley, Fleckenstein)? These, in turn, relate to new ways of understanding purpose, tone, and style (Russell "Activity")?

One post-process theory, Thomas Kent's "paralogic," offers an interesting bridge between epistemic theories and intensive writing practice in classrooms. Kent's paralogic is a form of knowing that, he claims, is difficult to explain and impossible to apply directly in exercises. Gary Olson defines "paralogic" by quoting Lyotard: "the way of thinking in Zen Buddhism," an "ability to wait for, not to look at, but to wait for—for what, precisely, we don't know" (14). This echoes Jacques Derrida's conception of "good and natural" writing, which is "the divine inscription in the heart and the soul" (17). There is magic to this, a certain amount of *mysterium* or act of the Muses—of contentless metacognition, perhaps—a magic that we perhaps should bring back to the teaching of process to avoid making it a mechanical recipe or

doctrine.

Kent argues that an instructor can create writing situations conducive to paralogical writing by asking students to develop learning communities in which they must work to make real, immediate sense to each other, thus creating when logic and a real connection between writer and audience occurs. The process paradigm is too prescriptive, according to Kent. Phenomenologically, his emphasis on the raw experience of recognizing when real meaning is conveyed to an audience is praiseworthy.

Unfortunately, he makes the experience so mysterious as to virtually rule out the large body of metacognitive structures of writing developed during the previous three decades (if not the previous three eons). He also ignores the needs of students to articulate their own phenomenological corner of their writing selves—their metacognitive reflections of how their own writing works.

More important, much of the social-epistemic movement does not recognize sufficiently a primary ingredient in the raw, day-to-day thinking patterns of most people, including the great majority of composition students. This element is what might be called proto-linguistic: it is composed of abbreviated and truncated thought structures. Its patterns are what Vygotsky calls "inner speech."

Vygotsky found that this inner speech became the common tongue of inner thought after young children's initial development of grammatical speech for socialization. Inner speech, says Vygotsky, is full of ungrammatical speech with individual words abbreviated, joined with others, or used as signals indicating complex thoughts requiring lengthy explication, and sentences similarly abbreviated, with single utterances often virtually unintelligible to others. It is, says Vygotsky, in such a manner that most people think—a method allowing rapid processing of thought into language and vice versa (133-6). As mentioned above, Vygotsky's inner speech is the same as Moffett's "single utterances" that represent "generalization and theory" (48). Certainly, it is true that graduate students in non-technical disciplines require a strong grasp of the rich nuances of symbolic meaning in lengthy intellectual texts.

However, we privilege complex, intellectual readings—or even complex, intellectual interchanges in the classroom—as more valuable than the common raw experiences of most lower-division composition students and most professional writing. To do so denies not only the breadth of real writing in the real world, but also its sometimes rich, complex depth in professional and personal experience and in nonverbal forms of communication.

Because the process paradigm also is appropriating the social-epistemic one by incorporating readings as an additional step in process, more potential problems occur phenomenologically. The first is evident in consideration of the element of time. On the one hand, a limited number of short readings assigned in connection with written responses or research projects not only does not keep students from focusing on writing, but also provides them with more opportunities to write. Even the assignment of a book, relatively short and reasonably accessible, may further the aim of more and better writing.

However, a large amount of reading necessarily must displace writing time. It is a rare school, indeed, that is willing to allow its composition program more required courses or credits when existing ones already are among the few required of every student. This is especially true if the added time is for "reading": perceived as an activity, it is something students do in almost all courses; perceived as a discipline, it not only is devalued even more than composition and perceived as a remedial job, but also is the responsibility of instructors with entirely different training. This may be unfortunate, especially in two-year colleges and many state universities, where a dynamic, college-level reading class taught by trained professionals would be useful to large numbers of entering students and could be added to—and interwoven with—existing writing courses.

Herein lies the second problem with more reading. It does, indeed, help students become better writers. However, to say this is to speak a truism, much like saying, for example, that students who watch more plays turn into better scriptwriters or directors, or students who eat more food become better nutritionists. The process of transference is slow, sometimes nonexistent, unless there is specialized intervention. Students need activities and lessons that teach them the structural methods of college reading—the raw experiences of reading common among academics and other professionals. Ann E. Berthoff calls for teaching students "close reading": helping them learn how to perceive and dismantle the logic and rhetoric of what they read by teaching them the appropriate analytical and evaluative tools in concrete lessons and practice.

Mariolina Salvatori offers another example. First, she states that early process-era arguments against reading in the writing classroom were reasonable reactions to the old product-paradigm pedagogy. Then Salvatori suggests that students can "perform...introspective reading" that "engage[s] texts responsibly and critically" by "mak[ing] *those* texts speak" from their own authorial point of view and by making "readers articulate a reflexive critique" of the textual arguments and their own responding ones (444-6). Salvatori develops an interesting series of exercises and activities that force students to question both their readings and their ways of reading closely, a method

similar to Berthoff's. Both methods are similar in turn to those used by instructors of the rhetorical modes, critical thinking, and genres: students must elucidate structures and syntheses of thinking that exist in readings or in academic or professional discourse and then use these (or similar) patterns to write.

Such methods of teaching reading have the potential to improve students' writing as well. Process theorists would argue that reading is being treated as a process, too, and as such, it is being linked to the writing process. Phenomenology goes a step further: the raw experiences—the mechanisms—of reading must be taught if it truly is to have an immediate beneficial effect on student writing, and these mechanisms must be taught not just by temporal representations, as does process, but also by visual, structural, kinesthetic, and/or other representations.

This is, in fact, precisely how those who specialize in the teaching of reading as a discipline develop their reading pedagogies. Reading as a discipline is more often a cognitive science linked to departments of education than a literary or interpretive function linked to English studies; thus the discipline of reading explains reading to students as a raw experience, a mechanical function, rather than as an intuited a priori. In addition, students must develop a metacognitive recognition of the mechanics of reading strategies, and of such strategies as they apply them to writing strategies. In a classroom already devoted to the raw experience of writing, there is little enough time. Adding large amounts of reading without increasing the credit load—even when the raw experience is taught—will decrease learning about writing. Ideally, of course, credits expand as reading-writing connections develop. In real practice, this rarely happens, and rarely are instructors who are trained in teaching the cognitive science of reading given introductory or basic writing courses with large amounts of reading in them.

As a result, it is too easy for the social-epistemic paradigm to devolve into a simplistic paradigm involving little more than reading and analysis of content—a paradigm with little more to recommend it as a 1950s approach to writing about literature except its use of nonfiction instead of fiction and its recognition of a process.

Writing Paradigms as Reflections of Culture

Another important question that falls within the purview of social-epistemic theories, grounded as they are in interpreting culture and society, is whether the needs of society do not, in and of themselves, determine the paradigm of writing that is popular at a given time. For example, before World War II, few people in the U.S. attended college, and most of our

college-trained writers needed simply to be able to report facts and to summarize planning, whether in business, medical, or journalistic situations. In colleges, simple reports and relatively easy-to-write themes were the most common writing assignments. Few colleges had separate writing courses: the paradigm was that entering college students either had the intelligence to know how to think and write correctly, or they didn't (in which case they often were flunked).

Gradually, however, after World War II, a much larger cohort of students attended college, in part because of the GI bill, in part because of rapidly expanding technology and business, and additionally because of a need for students who could analyze multiple viewpoints—to examine data, discuss it, and reach logical conclusions. The country wanted more writing courses, and colleges responded, either by forming courses based on analysis of literature or use of the rhetorical modes. In either case, writing itself was considered a separate, teachable skill: first a student (usually male) thought; next, he outlined; and finally, he created his product.

Then the 1960s and 1970s submerged us in a sea change. Cultural revolution, encouragement of self-expression and multiple viewpoints and arguments, Whitehead's process philosophy, and even a move to develop more flexibility and creativity in business planning—all of these created a new atmosphere in which the practice of process pedagogy in writing and in other fields grew.

More recently, the national culture, especially among the well educated, increasingly has supported deeper considerations of race, gender, ethnicity, and other issues of social justice, and graduate programs and pedagogy intertwined with such issues have become increasingly popular. If writing theory and pedagogy are expressions of an era, then what kinds of pedagogies will develop in the future? The Web and our brain and body connections to it have caused dramatic changes and will continue to do so, not just in pedagogy but culturally. In addition, what do current cultures lack—what have they left undeveloped—and how might it parallel or mirror similar lacks in writing theory and practice? If resistance is, indeed, of high value, does the truer resistance in a given milieu move beyond the obvious and currently popular theses and antitheses of oppressors and oppressed? Does it, instead, rise dialectically to the unexpected synthesis, the yet unrealized future-culture conditions (or beyond) that will provide the next improved, holistic understanding of how best to live, act, and write (and the next thesis and antithesis)?

These all are phenomenological questions. Phenomenology as the most basic, natural ground of perception, action, and reflection provides a

framework for experiential and metacognitive development of awareness of cultural trends, resistance, and synthesis.

Conclusion: A Phenomenal Marketplace

A phenomenological journey through process and post-process theories and paradigms demonstrates why some writing pedagogies appear to work well. It also highlights the tensions between what some of us may wish to do with our literate, intellectual training and what students want. In addition, phenomenology draws together three great strands: methodologies emphasizing the raw experience of writing activity, pedagogies encouraging reflective metacognition about writing structures, and practices recognizing the intersubjectivity of self and other in writing.

Beyond such theories, our own phenomenological epoche guides us at times in our classrooms: our raw experience of teaching is a series of events by which we often adjust our daily pedagogy. Berthoff says, "C.S. Peirce noted that a phenomenologist [or by implication, a teacher of writing] must have the tenacity of a bulldog and the observational powers of an artist, [requirements] widely applicable: in any discipline relentless observation plays an indispensable role" (671). Pedagogy, like the best writing, should involve seeing each new teaching moment as an intersection of raw experience, reflective knowledge of teaching, and intersubjectivity. When process methods first erupted in the 1970s onto a product-paradigm world, part of process's great power was its applicability not only to students but also to instructors by validating, explicating, and extending their own experiences of writing. And an important element of phenomenology's power is its application not only to student writing, but also to student and instructor learning, and instructor teaching.

In its view from outside the divisions of process and post-process pedagogies, phenomenology finds both strengths and potential limitations. As process and later pedagogies have changed writing instruction, the definition of successful teaching as it relates to student writing also has changed: it is no longer to "prove" which students are intelligent and winnow out those who are not. Neither is it to make literary or rhetorical experts of them. Rather, even as composition has become more grounded in theory, its subject has become clearer: a student body that can, indeed, be taught to write.

Many other structures exist, and there is a mixture of many experiential possibilities. When referring to composition's theories and pedagogies, Kathleen Blake Yancey calls this rich interchange a "plural commons."

Imagine Yancey's agora as a marketplace. You are at the center. To your left is a watchmaker selling process, to your right, a booth of beautiful jewelry

and other crafts from many societies and cultures. Behind you is the call of a magician offering to teach you the mystery of the Muses; further off are sellers of word games. Several large kiosks circle the perimeter with a variety of stalls carrying attractive Web devices and programs. You have money to spend—your own raw experiences of teaching—at all these stands. With your students' writing lives close in mind and heart, you began purchasing.

Elbow may be right that "process is ineluctably in the blood stream of composition" ("Cultures" 535). Its temporality is impossible to ignore. However, phenomenological epoche—a break from adhering to any one or two methods—helps our students find the textures of much more.

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Afterword—What's Next?

This chapter is the last in the collection. However, The Appendix contains six handouts for students that work very well in teaching them several different forms of critical thinking. Best of all, four of the handouts aid students in placing themselves in a scale of three major steps in college writing as explained by several well-known names in the field.

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Appendix

Six Critical Thinking Handouts

Richard Jewell

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These handouts, more often the first three, were presented in earlier forms as follows: "The Cocoon and the Butterfly," Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC), St. Louis, 2012; "Stages of a Writer's Development," Midwest Modern Language Association (MMLA), Minneapolis, 2008; "Stages of Writing in WAC," MMLA, St. Louis, 2011; and "Student Narratives of Navigating Writing: Helping Students Place Themselves on a Scale of Writing Development," Two-Year College Association-Midwest (TYCA-M), Duluth, 2008.

"THE THREE STAGES OF A COLLEGE WRITER":

Handout A: "The Three Stages of a College Writer—Grade Levels"

> *(For all students, week 2 or 3 of term)*

Handout B: "Stages, Competencies, or Discursive Practices of a College Writer"

> *(For faculty use with "The Three Stages" above; for advanced students during the middle or end of term)*

Handout C: "Stages of College Writing in Carroll and in Bloom and Bartholomae"

> *(For faculty use with "the Three Stages" above"; for advanced students during the middle or end of term)*

Handout D: "Thinking Self-Assessment for Reading and Writing in Three Parts"

> *(For all students to use with "The Three Stages" above, beginning, middle, and end of term)*

OTHER HANDOUTS FOR STUDENTS

Handout E: "Stories of Becoming a Writer: How I Learned to Write"

> *(Introductory. For all students, beginning of term)*

Handout F: "Identifying Bloom's Thinking Skills in Your Paper"

> *(Advanced. For all students, middle/end of term)*

Four of these handouts are for direct use with students. The other two are labeled "For faculty" and "For advanced students" as companion guides to "The Three Stages."

I have used all of the "For Students" handouts for years in FYW I and II. The handouts are very successful in helping students identify their own stage of growth in writing, their past, and their future. They also help students understand and apply specific critical-thinking methods—whether taxonomic or reflective—as heuristics to further their thinking skills in writing. Permission hereby is given to download any of these handouts for nonprofit use only, no request required, if you include the handout's copyright notice.

Handout A:
The Three Stages of a College Writer—Grade Levels (A Handout for Students)

(Quotations and paraphrases in the chart below are from David Bartholomae's "Inventing the University" in *Literacy: A Critical Sourcebook*.)

K -13			
1			
2			
3	**The K-12 writer** is in the early stages of learning writing awareness and skills, culminating in being able		
4	to comment on literature and to offer an essay that is "a Lesson on Life" (513) using everyday language (519).		
5			
6			
7			
8			
9	| **A. The beginning college writer** (and successful basic-developmental or high school		
10	| writer) is one who can "hear the 'melody of formal English'" (523) and imagine		
11	| being an "insider" (516) who can use this formal tone someday (521).		
12	| |		
13	**College or University** | | **B. The intermediate college writer** (at end of or after College Comp I) can, in a		
14	| formal academic tone, sustain a logical argument using quality research (521).		
15	| |		
16	| **C. The advanced college writer** (or beginning professional) is		
17+	**Graduate School and/or** | "dramatically conscious of forming" something to say, can take a		
	Professional Work | position against "common" ideas, and can sing the "song" of a		
	▼ discipline's or profession's pattern and style of writing (521).		

The Three Stages of a College Writer—Additional Description
(Quotations in the lists below, unless otherwise marked, are from Lee Ann Carroll's *How College Students Develop as Writers*.)

(A) The beginning college writer (and successful basic-developmental or high school writer) is learning "new 'basic skills'" (Carroll 119) with a "desire to produce writing...'good enough' for success'" and a "growing awareness of different types of writing" (85).

    Successful Types of Writing: self-expression, descriptions, 5-paragraph themes, reports, and journal writing
    Audience: little or no conscious recognition of—or attention to—the concept of "audience"
    Voice/tone/style: informal, informative, or storytelling ("once upon a time....") with sense of immediacy/relevancy
    Method of Writing Arguments: simple arguments, especially in "five-star" (five-paragraph) format using personal anecdotes, along with general/common-knowledge ideas and/or quotations from public/common sources

(B) The intermediate college writer (near the end of or after a 1st 1000-level college composition class) can "accommodate...expectations of...professor readers" (23) and has knowledge of "rewriting" (73) and "writing strategies...related to research, style, audience, organization, and analysis" (74).

    Successful Types of Writing: academic essays using argument, analysis, and/or research writing
    Audience: the academic teacher as audience
    Voice/tone/style: academic, logical, balanced, and persuasive with sense of authority and appropriateness
    Method of Writing Arguments: extended, cohesive argument and/or analysis using academic/professional resources; ability to examine an issue from opposing sides with general fairness and balance

(C) The advanced-college (or beginning-professional) writer can both hear and sing the "song" (Bartholomae 521) of academic and/or professional writing, is "aware of the disciplinary conventions in [the] major" (Carroll 89), and is skilled in producing "texts...intended to do work in the 'real' world" (126).

    Successful Types of Writing: critical arguments, reviews, deep research, logical summaries and analyses, and/or evaluations in one or more specific academic disciplines or professions using discipline-specific sources for support
    Audience: an academic or professional group as the readers
    Voice/tone/style: logical, fair, and thoughtful with conscious use of the writing patterns of a discipline or profession (e.g., a business proposal, a science report, a play review) and a sense of balanced presentation of multiple viewpoints
    Method of Writing Arguments: a research or professional paper with support of a specific subject using accurate, convincing, reliable resources; a unique viewpoint; and logical consideration of valuable alternatives

Handout B: Stages, Competencies, or Discursive Practices of College Writers (Faculty/Adv. Students)

All of the stages represent, in one sense, a taxonomic, temporal order of competencies or discursive practices. To help with identification of the difference between K-12 and college writing, the K-12 writer is first described. Note: Citations marked "DB" are from David Bartholomae's "Inventing the University"; "LAC" is from Lee Ann Carroll's *How College Students Develop as Writers*; "LF" is from Linda Flower's "Writer-Based Prose"; and "Recall," "Comprehension," "Application," "Analysis," "Synthesis," and "Evaluation" are Benjamin Bloom's. All others references are from *What Is "College-Level" Writing?* edited by Patrick Sullivan and Howard Tinberg.

(A) The K-12 writer is in the early stages of learning writing awareness and skills, culminating in being able to offer an often single-draft "Lesson on Life" (DB 513) with "the articulation of the commonplace" (519); is "formulaic…to conform" (Mosley 58-9) and attempts grammatical correctness (65); and is "good enough" with "Academic Virtues" (L. Bloom 72).

    Types of Writing (Genres): primarily responses to literature: reports, use of elements, sometimes opinion responses or reviews; also some nonfiction prose of several kinds aimed at high school culture, thought, and feelings

    Audience: none. Writer-centric or "writer based" prose: idiosyncratic, sensory, emotional, or lacking in transitional thought (LF)

    Critical Reading: can find and discuss the quality or level of "Recall," "Comprehension," and "Application" (Bloom's lowest three Thinking Skills) in peer writing

(B) The beginning college writer (and successful basic-developmental or high school writer before or at the beginning of a 1st 1000-level college composition course): This person can "hear the 'melody of formal English'" (DB 523). He or she is learning "new 'basic skills'" (LAC 119) with a "desire to produce writing...'good enough' for success'" and a "growing awareness of different types of writing" in college culture (85), but the student may not be able, yet, to earn passing grades in discipline-based papers (White).

    Grade Level: typical, 12-13. General range, 9-14 (with 13-16 representing undergraduate college)

    Types of Writing (Genres): expressive, descriptive, 5-paragraph theme, report, and journal writing

    Audience: has little or no conscious recognition of, or attention to, the concept of "audience"—is "writer based" (LF)

    Voice/Tone/Style: informal, informative, or storytelling ("once upon a time . . . .") with a clear sense of subject's immediacy and/or relevancy. Tends toward "passionate assertion" OR "patient inquiry" (Gentile 323 from Academic Senate of Cal. Comm. Coll.).

    Process: (1) writing, (2) adding quotations, and (3) minor editing

    Method of Persuasion: simple arguments, especially in narrative or "five-star" (five-paragraph) format using personal anecdotes—along with general/common-knowledge ideas and quotations—for support

    Critical Reading: can also find and discuss (in addition to Bloom's lowest three Thinking Skills) the quality or level of "Analysis" in common cultural texts such as news, blogs, magazines, and visual texts by looking for objectivity, bias, and general persuasive organization and technique

(C) The intermediate college writer (near the end of or after a 1st 1000-level college composition class): This writer can offer "an 'objective analysis or a close' reading" using "the voice of the community" (DB 519-21). She can "accommodate... expectations of...professor readers" (LAC 23) and has knowledge of "rewriting" (73) and "writing strategies...related to research, style, audience, organization, and analysis" (74) and can earn passing grades on lower-division undergrad. papers.

    Grade Level: typical, 13-14. General range, 11-15

    Types of Writing (Genres): academic essays using argument, analysis, and/or research writing

    Audience: understands the expectations of the academic teacher as audience. Is "reader based" (LF) toward one or many teachers

    Voice/Tone/Style: academic, logical, balanced, and persuasive in speech considered authoritative and appropriate for the audience and setting. Starts to mix "passionate assertion" OR "patient inquiry" (Gentile above).

    Process: (1) research and drafting, (2) large-scale reorganization, and (3) consistent editing

    Method of Persuasion: extended, cohesive thesis and/or analysis using academic/professional resources; ability to examine and interrogate an issue from opposing sides with general fairness and balance

    Critical Reading: can discuss the quality or level of both "Analysis" and "Synthesis" (Bloom) in common cultural texts using a "close reading" (Berthoff), and in academic/professional texts using a general reading

(D) The advanced-college or beginning-professional writer: This person can "define a position...against 'common' discourse" and both hear and sing the "song" of a discipline's or profession's style of writing (DB 521). She is "aware of the disciplinary conventions in [her] major" (LAC 89), is skilled in producing "texts...intended to do work in the 'real' world" (126), and is able to earn passing or higher grades on papers in upper-division undergraduate and graduate courses.

    Grade Level: typical, 16-17. general range, 13-17+ (graduate school/beginning professional work)

    Types of Writing (Genres): critical argument, review, deep research, logical summaries and analyses, and/or evaluations and recommendations in one or more specific academic disciplines or professions

    Audience: empathizes with an academic or professional group as the readers. Is "reader based" (LF) for an identifiable group

    Voice/Tone/Style: logical, fair, balanced, and consciously using the "song"—the conventions—of one or more specific disciplines or professions. Able to fully "honor the dance between passionate assertion and patient inquiry" (Gentile above)

    Process: (1) drafting, research, and redrafting; (2) recursive revision/organization; and (3) critical editing

    Method of Persuasion: research and support of an analytical viewpoint, thesis, interpretation, or recommendation using accurate, convincing, reliable resources, unique ideas or conclusions, and detailed consideration—and logical rejection—of valid alternatives

    Critical Reading: can discuss the quality of "Analysis," "Synthesis," and "Evaluation" (Bloom's three highest Thinking Skills) in both common and academic/professional texts with a "close reading" using one or more disciplines'/professions' viewpoints

Handout C:
Stages of College Writer in Carroll and in Bloom and Bartholomae (For Faculty/Adv. Students)

Lee Ann Carroll's *How College Students Develop as Writers*

Richard Jewell *(29 Nov. '08, 16 May 2023)*

According to Lee Ann Carroll in *How College Students Develop as Writers*, the following descriptions apply to the four stages of advanced, intermediate, and beginning stages of college writing, and advanced high school writing:

- **Advanced college/graduate/professional writers**: "students...aware of the disciplinary conventions in their major...fields" (89) who have "spent…time in the academic 'subcommunities' of their major disciplines" in "interpreting relevant sources, applying concepts from a discipline, developing evidence,…and organizing all…within a single coherent text" (90)—often using "'hands-on' experiences and internships" (105) and "apprenticeships" (106)—producing "texts…intended to do work in the 'real' world" (126)

- **Intermediate college writers**: "English I" students with a "growing rhetorical sophistication" and "metacognitive awareness" (78); ability to "accommodate the often unarticulated expectations of...professor readers" and "imitate disciplinary discourse" (23); and knowledge of "rewriting" (73) and "writing strategies...related to research, style, audience, organization, and analysis" (74).

- **Beginning college writers**: new college students learning "new 'basic skills'" (119) with a "perception of…conventions of 'college writing,'...desire to produce writing...'good enough' for success,…fear of losing own beliefs and voices,...growing awareness of different types of writing...(85), and, often, resistance to a "critical stance," to reading "'abstruse essays,'" and to "'forming and supporting interpretations of...surprisingly complex issues'" (67)

- **Advanced "high school" writers**: "students who "have mastered a 'one-size-fits-all' five-paragraph essay" (65) that is "supported by general, often personal, reasons and examples" (119)

Table: Thinking and Writing Taxonomies in Bloom's Traditional "Taxonomy of Thinking Skills"

The following are taxonomic lists of thinking and writing that are roughly comparable to Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills (on the left). I certainly do not intend it to be strictly accurate: for example, I could just as easily have represented Bloom's six Thinking Skills as occurring in each single stage of the writing process in a recursive process. However, the following lists may be useful for consideration of writing and thinking patterns. *(7 Nov. '11)*

Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills	Three mental activities and their questions	Related thinking skills	Rhetorical skills	Writing process (rhetorical intent/need)	Metacognitive dialogic/textual (socially constructive) questions
recall comprehension application	Seeing: What do you observe?	Observation, intuition, sensation	Description, summary, narration, directions	Expressing, freewriting, thinking (purpose)	What are your/ the text's viewpoints and those of others?
analysis synthesis	Determining patterns: What are new parts and wholes?	Deduction, induction, oppositions, similarities	Classification, analysis, comp./contrast, definition, cause-effect	Macro-organizing/ revising (audience)	How do these viewpoints contrast, compare, operate, and/or interact?
evaluation	Judging: What are evaluations of the possible proof sets?	Negotiation, balance, resolution	Argument, pros/cons, dialectic/ dialogue	Macro- & micro-organizing/ revising, editing (style)	What are compromises and higher resolutions, and why?

Handout C, p. 2: Comparison of Bloom's "Taxonomy of Thinking Skills" and Bartholomae's "Awareness of the Codes"

Richard Jewell

A. Benjamin Bloom's Taxonomy of Thinking Skills:

Evaluation
Synthesis
Analysis
Application
Comprehension
Recall

B. David Bartholomae's "awareness of the codes...within a discourse" (521)

(Please note that for better or worse, placement of Bartholomae's elements in a list divided by specific years of high school and college is my own invention. I also have taken the liberty of attaching typical high school and college levels.)

- **Graduate/professional writer**, who "can both define a position of privilege...against 'common' discourse, and...work self-consciously, critically, against not only the 'common' code but his own" (521)
- **Advanced college writer**, who is "consistently and dramatically conscious of herself forming something to say" (521)
- **Intermediate college writer** performing "an 'objective' analysis or a 'close' reading" (519)
- **Beginning college writer,** who, as "Shaughnessy says,...can hear the 'melody of formal English'" (523)
- **Advanced high school writer** imagining "the privilege of being [an] 'insider'" (516) who can begin to "establish authority" (523) using "the voice of the [academic or technical] community" (521)
- **Beginning high school writer** offering "a Lesson on Life" (513) with "the articulation of the commonplace" (519)

C. Notes about Bartholomae's "awareness of the codes":

1. Note that Bartholomae calls them "awareness of the codes," not stages of writing. Thus they are similar to Bloom's Taxonomy, which describes the awareness of "thinking."
2. Though I have arranged Bartholomae's stages, they clearly imply a hierarchical taxonomy.
3. The steps probably are recursive in new writing situations.
4. While approximate h.s.-college levels are attached, any individual may be far above—or below—his or her peers' levels, depending on a wide variety of factors.
5. It is possible to see the movement from bottom to top as a parallel movement in the inner self to the external social even more so in Bartholomae's stages than in Bloom's. Bartholomae portrays this movement of self to other as a very important trait of maturing as a writer: the discovery of an audience and the learning of its voice, tone, and concerns.
6. Bartholomae's steps, like Bloom's, also imply the stages of becoming a critical reader.

D. Traits in Bloom's Taxonomy That Also Exist in Bartholomae's Stages:

(1) They form a hierarchical taxonomy.
(2) They also show, from bottom to top, a movement from internal self to outward reality.
(3) They also are writing skills. (See also "Appendix 1.")
(4) Both taxonomies largely reflect good reading practices.
(5) Both tend to be recursive.

Handout D:

THINKING SELF-ASSESSMENT FOR YOUR READING AND WRITING IN THREE PARTS

by Pamela Whitfield, English and Equine Sciences Depts., Rochester Community and Technical College, and Richard Jewell

[Note: This assessment may seem simple and easy, but repeated use of it shows that it not only creates surprisingly strong engagement among students but also is attractive especially to some of the brightest students. Pamela Whitfield was one of three "Educator of the Year" 2010 recipients in the two-year colleges of the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (MinnState, formerly MnSCU) system, one of the largest such systems in the U.S.A.]

Week 1: Self-Awareness

Prompt for Students:

How do you see yourself as a reader and writer? What experiences, positive or negative, have you had? What things have you read or written and how have they affected you?

Purpose:

This is an in-class writing. As your teacher, I use it as a diagnostic to encourage you to see yourselves as readers and writers. I also save this writing and hand it back in the last two weeks of class, as you are reflecting on the semester and drafting your final synthesis letters.

Midterm: Self-Analysis (see Jewell's scale, next handout)

Prompt:

1. Where do you see yourself on Jewell's scale of development, "The Three Stages of the College Writer"? Why?
2. How does your college reading/writing/thinking compare to what you did in high school?
3. What are your major strengths, accomplishments, or proud moments in English class this semester? How do you plan to use or transfer those into your other classes in college?

Purpose:

You should think of this as a personal statement. Aim for 3 paragraphs minimum. In our class, you will do this as a timed writing in a computer lab, partly because, as your teacher, I think it is helpful for you to practice timed writing, and partly because doing it this way will encourage you to take it more seriously. You have been given Jewell's scale, along with the above prompt, the week before you write to prepare.

Last Week: Self-Reflection and Sense of Achievement

Prompt:

This is a "Dear Pam" letter to the teacher. Before you write me, reflect on the work you've done in this class. Think about how you read, wrote, and thought before this semester, and what you've learned about yourself as a reader, writer, and thinker. What have you improved? What do you still want to work on or get better at? Has this class changed your ideas or thinking, or reinforced what you already believed?

Please date the top, address it to me, and put your name at the bottom, in a typical letter format. You have two weeks to write this letter and give it to me.

Purpose:

As your teacher, I want it to be the last thing you hand in for the semester. This is where you get to toot your own horn and feel a sense of accomplishment. It's a credit/no credit item. I want your honesty.

Handout E:
Five Stories of Becoming a Writer—How I Learned to Write
Richard Jewell

From Ch. A1 of www.*WritingforCollege*.org. © 2002 by R. Jewell.

The author of this handout was a freelance writer with over 100 publications of his articles, stories, and photos. He then became a teacher of writing, literature, and the humanities for 37 years, and wrote two free OER (Online Educational Resources) textbooks. In retirement, he writes and publishes a newsletter every other month for over 2000 English professors, and authors online books about meditation. This article recalls five turning points in his growth as a beginning and advanced writer.

How do you become a writer? Do you want to be a freelancer for money someday? Publish stories? Or just write well in the professional field of your choice so that you can advance further? Here are several of my most important events as a developing wordsmith. They range from writing when I was a child about a chicken, to developing college papers and, later, working as a professional freelancer and then a professor communicating to my colleagues in my academic fields.

Charlie the Chicken (Writing for Pleasure)

My first memorable experience with writing came when I was in kindergarten and we were assigned to make a book. "Wow!" I thought, in whatever passes for the thinking of a kindergartener. "How can I write a whole book?" So, I asked the nearest expert, Mom, and she explained to me that all I had to do was choose some pictures, paste them onto some sheets, and staple them together. And then I could write some words to go with each picture. She'd help. I figured I could handle that.

Still, it seemed such a big challenge, and the feeling I remember having while working on that project was a tongue-between-teeth kind of thing--effort and concentration. I loved my next door neighbor's baby chicks (we lived in the country but only had cattle and pigs), and so I asked if I could make a story about a baby chick. "What do you want to call him?" my mom asked. "Charlie," I said. So we hunted for pictures in farm magazines, cut, and pasted. I dictated lengthy, intelligent sentences to my mom like "This is Charlie" and Charlie is a chick," and she wrote them down. Then I copied them in my own block-letter handwriting under the pictures.

By the time I was done, I was stunned at what I (with a little help from the expert, Mom) had accomplished. I became convinced that I could be a writer if I wanted. I got a big star on the assignment and the praise of my kindergarten teacher. The feeling that I can be a writer has stuck with me.

The Temple of Dr. Doom (Writing for An Audience)

However, I almost lost it as a budding academic writer when I met my dreaded nemesis in my first-year college English class, Literature I. Let's call him Dr. Doom. Dr. Doom mostly lectured on how to

interpret our literature readings. When he did encourage discussion, he would finish it not only by telling people why they were wrong, but also by doing so in such a way that it made each speaker sound rather stupid. The man not only had no real social graces but also seemed a bit cruel—determined to depress everyone, himself included, because of we students' seeming incompetence. I had no idea what he wanted, and he offered no clues. This should have been a clue in itself that I might need more help than I was getting, but I didn't notice it.

Instead, when he assigned us our first of four graded papers, I determined to work harder than most and turn in an impressive intellectual commentary. We were applying a reading from Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychology, to one of Shakespeare's greatest plays, *Hamlet*, and I not only read both carefully but also spent twenty-nine hours working on it. Most other people, I learned (by asking around), spent an average of fifteen hours on the assignment. Little did I understand, then, that spending a lot of time was not sufficient if I did not know, in the first place, just what the teacher wanted.

To make a long story short, when I received my first paper back, there were almost no marks on it except at the end. There, he had given me a big D-. And he wrote a short sentence: "This is bullshit."

I was so taken aback that I had no idea what to do or say. After class, I walked up to him and asked him, trying to hide the tremble in my voice, "What does this mean?" I couldn't even say the word "bullshit" to him out loud, for I had been brought up in a small country school where one never, ever used such words in writing, let alone aloud, to a teacher. Did I also mention that he was a minister and wore a clergyman's collar to class every day?

Instead of speaking, I showed him what he wrote. He waved his hand in the air. "It's obvious you didn't read the material," he said.

"I read it," I said. "I read all of it, some of it twice."

"Well, he said, "you didn't read it carefully."

I had no idea what to say. So I simply walked away. What was wrong with my material? Today, I still have that old paper, and whenever I look at it now, many years later, I understand exactly what I did wrong. First, I had written my paper in what today we might call "freewriting" or spontaneous writing, with as many ideas and reflections packed into it as possible: in other words, I didn't organize it carefully around a few major ideas. Second, I did not support my ideas with a number of quotations (and paraphrases) from the materials we were reading: in a paper without quotes, he couldn't tell whether I had read the material and he couldn't see how my logic worked as I made my points. Third, I had made the mistake of not using his own theory of literature. He had a very specific theory, and I never had been taught that theory in high school.

Unfortunately, I had no idea at the time what I had done wrong. Before the second graded paper was due, I looked at the papers of several people who had received B's on the first paper (I could find no one who had received an A). Then I tried to write papers that were more like theirs. I managed to get my grade up to a C on this second paper. And I still didn't know what he wanted.

Then all the English teachers in the department handed out a set of five sample A level papers to us. Dr. Doom told us all that he wouldn't have handed out these sample papers at all if he weren't required to do so: he didn't believe in sample papers, and these weren't very good samples, he said. In fact, he only liked two of the five. I didn't care how many he liked or didn't like; I was mightily relieved, for here were two clear examples of what he expected. I personally didn't like either of the samples very much at

all; however, the two of them gave me a road map to follow in writing papers for him.

It worked. On the third graded paper, I worked hard to offer a central idea like the samples did, organize what I was writing into a distinct pattern that I now understand is a particular type of literary analysis (an *explicacion de texte* or explication of text), and use plenty of quotations and paraphrases. My grade on this third paper was a B. Dr. Doom seemed reluctant to give me the B, but he grumpily--in his comments--allowed that I had performed most of the intellectual functions that he wanted.

So, my grade for the course hung in the balance as I started my fourth paper. I knew that if I could just get an A on the final paper, I would receive a B for the entire course. If not, I would receive a C (and another D- on this final paper might give me a D for the course). So I worked very, very hard to give him exactly the kind of paper he wanted. I examined the two sample papers even more carefully and discovered that in my previous papers, I had been too general and broad, so in my fourth paper I chose what I felt was the most important one-half page of the entire novel we had read, and I critiqued it in great detail, showing how it was an example of everything else that happened in the novel. I organized my paper very well, analyzing step by step, and used lots of quotations.

In the end, I received an A- on this final paper. At first, however, Dr. Doom lost my paper and was convinced I had never turned it in. Three days later he found it, and my grade for the semester was secure.

Of course, Dr. Doom made a lot of mistakes that good modern teachers do not. He didn't really teach writing, but rather expected us to automatically understand how to write. He also expected us to think exactly like he did. And he expected that he did not have to teach us how to understand literature using his method: either we knew how or we didn't. He was a very tough teacher, but that was okay because some of my best teachers have been tough. Unfortunately, he also was cold and, arguably, cruel and impatient if he didn't like you (as he seemed not to like me).

However, **no matter how bad or good he was,** I learned a great lesson from having to work with him: audience. He was my audience, he wanted a certain kind of writing, and that was the kind of writing I needed to give him in order to do well. I wish he could have taught this lesson to me; instead, I had to learn it the hard way, on my own, in spite of him.

However, it is one of the most important lessons to learn in writing: audience. I have returned to it time and again over the years, and I still do: in writing for other instructors, in writing for popular magazines and scholarly journals, in writing for other teachers, and even in writing personal letters to friends and loved ones. You don't need to lose your own identity, but you do need to **write using words and patterns that your audience understands.** It's a little like learning a foreign language, or even learning to talk like a chemist, a football coach, a dance instructor, or a business person. Each academic discipline and each profession has its own language for talking, and each--when papers must be written--has its own words and patterns for how these papers need to be written so that they make sense to everyone in that discipline or business. **Audience** is one of the most important considerations to make in any writing task.

I learned this lesson the hard way in my second semester of college. I could write a very good *explicacion de texte* by the time I was finished with Dr. Doom's class. I couldn't write other types of college papers. However, at least I knew, then, that each teacher would expect something different, and it was my job to find out just what he or she wanted. In a way, each time we enter a class in which there is a

paper (or a speech, laboratory experiment, or other activity) to be completed, we make a contract with that instructor to learn how he or she wants us to write or communicate. This is true whether the instructor is good or bad at explaining it to us. It is our job to reach out and learn to "speak as she speaks," whether she helps or not.

Ideally, when we are a student, our expectations of our own academic learning must be higher than they are of our instructor's ability to teach. If we just happen to also be blessed with an instructor who teaches well, that is all the better. However, the responsibility for learning always is ours. We must make the first effort, no matter what, reaching out to learn whatever is in the instructor's head. As a student, I like to be able to shake hands with an instructor after a course, as a sign of my respect for what I have learned. And I may have to work hard to learn anything from an instructor if she is not a very good teacher. However, she almost always does have something for me to learn, and if I work hard, ask a lot of questions, and get help when I need it, I usually can give that handshake of respect.

The Light Dawns (Learning to Organize)

This next story is about what most people in college need to learn in order to to move from being a beginning to an intermediate college writer. Your first-year college writing classes are supposed to help you accomplish this. Here's how I did it.

As I mentioned above, I didn't really learn much about how to write from my Literature I teacher in my first year of college. I was still really a beginning college writer. The experience that changed me from a beginning to an intermediate writer happened in the last half of my second year of college. I was taking my third course in a row from Mr. Golding, a boyish-looking guy in his thirties who acted very formal in and out of the classroom. The class was Literature III. However formal his behavior was, he really opened our eyes about literature.

Mr. Golding often started our class hour by reading to us. Our books included some of the finest in literature, from Greek plays by Euripides and Aristophanes to contemporary works by T.S. Eliot, Lawrence Durrell, and others. Mr. Golding read in a richly modulated low-tenor voice, inflecting words for both drama and meaning. When he was reading, he looked at each of us in turn, his eyes shining with the steel of confident revelation and worlds springing from his words. I could have listened for hours, but he gave us ten minutes here, fifteen there. Then he would lecture a bit, and finally he would turn us toward discussion. At first during discussion times we felt unsure, unsafe, wondering if our sophomoric attempts at judging this great literature before this great teacher would lead him to rain down scorn on us. However, the bravest (or most foolhardy) of us led the way. Mr. Golding listened, nodded, and simply asked if anyone would like to agree or disagree. Soon, under his fair and tolerant gaze, all were eager to hear each other's arguments and lend our own.

We had three papers to write for him. You have to understand something about learning how to write when I was in school: whether it was junior high, high school, or college, most teachers figured that either you could write well or you couldn't. Few of them actually bothered trying to teach writing. "Writing" in those days meant "grammar." I had lots of grammar lessons throughout elementary, junior high, and high school. That was "writing lessons," and though I learned a lot about grammar, I didn't

really learn how to write much more than a correct sentence from it.

When it came to Mr. Golding, I very badly wanted to write well, partly because I admired him so much and wanted to show him I was really learning, and partly because I did not want to look stupid to him. My first paper was not bad, a "B" effort, if I remember, which helped me relax somewhat. Apparently others did not fare as well, for I recall him trying to coach us to do better on the second paper. "It's not that hard," he told us, in those or similar words. He held up his fingers, one by one. "First you have an introduction in which you describe your thesis. Then you have several sections in which you detail it. Use quotations so I know what you mean. Then provide a conclusion. Don't write it all at once," he said. "Take your time." He looked off in the distance. "When I write," he said, "I spend a little time at it, then lay it down. The next day, I do some more, and so forth, each day, until I am done. Sometimes I have to rewrite parts of it."

He made it sound so simple. The part about having a thesis with several points sounded familiar, and I was relieved that he didn't want the much more difficult explication of text, a complicated form of literary analysis I had learned (the hard way--on my own--without any help from our rather difficult, unfriendly teacher) the year before.

Most important, Mr. Golding's casual mention of his own, personal writing process was a revelation to me. I was surprised that he didn't sit down and create a paper miraculously in an afternoon--I could visualize him drinking fine wine and eating chocolates as he did so. I was equally surprised that he actually took several days or more to write thoughtfully, section by section. And "sometimes I have to rewrite parts" amazed me. I had been struggling toward just such a realization in my own writing of college papers: I needed to take more time, and I usually needed to rewrite. I had thought this might mean I was mediocre at best: perhaps only dull, plodding people could not write a masterful paper in one sitting. That a literary scholar of his caliber needed several periods for writing--and actually had to revise--confirmed in me that this method of writing was useful, acceptable, even praised.

From that day on, I developed what I now think of as my "intermediate" stage of development as a writer: working with a plan that included several important steps in my writing, just as Mr. Golding had revealed. My plan certainly worked on Mr. Golding: he gave my last two papers in his class "A's."

The next year, I decided to major in philosophy. Talk about writing papers! I was constantly writing, and as I did so, I perfected my version of Mr. Golding's system.

I usually started my papers on a Monday or Tuesday, allowing about two to three hours per afternoon in which to write and research. I would do this during the weekdays--or for two sets of weekdays if the paper was a larger one. Then, on Friday, before going out for the night, I would lay out all the pieces and parts of my handwritten papers (this was before computers) on the floor of my one-room apartment. I would walk over and between them gingerly when I came home so that they were there all night. If I was stuck, I often would do the same thing on Saturday night. Two or three times a day, I would find myself looking at them and wondering about the order I wanted to use for the different thoughts and ideas. I would then experimentally--and briefly--shuffle the papers into a new order, sometimes using scissors to cut sheets into half or quarter sheets with ideas I wanted to place in a different location on the floor.

I can remember a number of times when, upon hearing a knock on my door, I would take a great leap over my papers, simultaneously yelling "Wait!" and landing against the door to keep it from

opening. The problem was that when people would open my door, the wind would come in behind them and blow away my carefully crafted order. This upset both my girlfriend and a couple of close friends until I eventually learned to start locking my door whenever my floor was in "paper mode."

Finally, on Sunday, I would get serious, make a few final adjustments to the order, if necessary, and then pick up the papers and write my introduction. I always wrote my introduction last because, by the time I was done with everything else, I finally knew exactly what I was trying to say. Then I would revise the papers in their new order, making connecting transitions, sentences, and paragraphs. I would then edit and, finally, type it.

And I got A's. Throughout that year and my next--my junior and senior years--I got A's on papers in almost all my classes. I have continued to use this pattern throughout my adulthood for any type of writing assignment that is new or the conclusion of which I am unsure until I am done writing, whether for freelance magazine writing, professional proposal writing, or for papers for graduate schools, conference presentations, and academic journals.

It wasn't until I returned to graduate school again, fifteen years after Mr. Golding's lessons, that I discovered a whole new method of writing had sprung forth in colleges across the country. This method is called "process writing." And it is pretty much what Mr. Golding helped me figure out on my own: writing often is best done in a series of times and steps with revision not only okay but normal. These lessons now are taught throughout the country in colleges, high schools, and even in some middle and elementary schools.

The Joyful Dread of a Phone Call from my Editor

(The Value of Thorough Revision)

I have many stories, but one more is among the most important. It occurred several years after I was done with school, in my job. It was (and still is) an experience that mixed joy with pain, and it really helped me very much as a writer. I was a freelance writer for six years after college, and during that time I rose from selling articles and stories for just a few dollars to selling them for quite a bit. One of the editors who helped me the most along the way was a guy I'll call "Harvey." I first came into contact with Harvey when I sent his magazine an idea for an article, he sent a note back asking to see the it. I then wrote the article and sent it to him.

Now the way these things normally work, at least when you're starting out as a writer and have sent in a manuscript, is that the magazine editor then will do one of three things: (1) accept it, (2) reject it, or (3) ask for a revision before deciding. Usually at the lower levels, where you might get anything from $2 to $200 for an article, you interact with the editors completely by mail or email.

Now Harvey's magazine was one that paid more than this, and to my surprise, Harvey called me. I was stunned, having never talked with an editor by phone. He told me cheerfully that he was interested in buying my article, but if so, I would have to be willing to revise it. Even then, if he didn't like the revision, he would retain the right to reject the article. Then he asked me very nicely if I was interested in revising for him. I held back the urge to shout "Yes"--for I had never written for a magazine that paid so well--and, my voice sounding calm, I allowed that I would be glad to revise. He then said, "Do you have a pen? I'd like to give you a few notes about what I'd like changed."

"A few notes." He tlake for another fifteen or twenty minutes in rapid-fire English, and I took two dense pages of notes on what to change. I thought I was going to die with all that he expected. Then he said, "Oh, and by the way, I need you to cut the length by one third." Inside, my heart sank--how could I delete 33% of an article I already felt was jam packed with everything I wanted to say? He finished by saying, "I also made a few notes on the manuscript you sent me. I'll put it in the mail right now. Good luck, and I'll look forward to seeing your revision. Is three weeks time enough?"

By the time I got off the phone, my heart lay beating slowly, painfully, somewhere about six feet under my shoes. Several days later, the manuscript revised, and it was filled with about three times as many penned notes for revision than any paper I had received back from a teacher in school.

However, I also recognized that he was giving my paper more attention than even my best professors had given me in my highest-level graduate school seminars. This was, I knew, a tremendous learning opportunity. I knew that if I could succeed in revising this manuscript, then I had a chance to move a big step up in selling articles, and he probably would take more from me. During the next two weeks I spent every spare minute I had trying to do exactly what he asked me to do.

I started with what I felt was one of the hardest parts of all: deleting one third of my words. I cut paragraphs, read, cut sentences, read more, and cut words. When I was done, I had only cut about half as much as I needed to. I read more and began cutting severely: I started tossing anything that was not absolutely necessary. Wherever one word would work as well as two, I used just one word. Even if a story or a phrase was really excellent, if it in any way repeated what I already had said, I got rid of it. And I was amazed at the result. I thought my paper would become choppy and lose a lot of its interesting phrases and thoughts. Instead, it became a powerful, streamlined statement of what I wanted to say, with immediately relevant and always interesting thoughts, quotations, and stories. In short, it was one of the best articles I ever had written.

After that, all of Harvey's other suggestions were easy. They took a large amount of time, and I was very short on sleep for the next two weeks. However, I worked with a kind of joy in my heart, for I knew that even if Harvey would not take the final result, I had learned a powerful lesson as a writer, and the rest was just icing on the cake. His other suggestions, though minor and numerous, were in many cases helpful, too, as it turned out. I learned how to better polish my paper because of his many suggestions.

I sent the manuscript back to him, both dreading and and looking forward to his response. A week later, I received another call from him. "Hi, Richard!" he greeted me. "About this manuscript you sent me, do you have a pen? I have a few more revisions to make." My heart dropping once again, in despair I took more notes. When he was done five minutes later, I asked, "Does this mean you probably won't publish my article?" "What?" he asked? "Well of course we'll publish it. It's very good. All it needs is these few final changes. You did a great job with it."

I was almost too exhausted and nervous to thank him, but thank him I did, as heartily as I could. And that was the beginning of a good, strong editor-writer relationship with Harvey that lasted over a year, until he moved on to another magazine that did not use freelance writers. Every time I would send him a new article, he would call me and give me voluminous notes on changes to make, and he always added that I should cut the size of the article by one third. One day, at the end of such a call, I remember commenting, "Harvey, you forgot to tell me something."

"What?" he asked. "I did? What's that?"

"Cut the article by one third."

"What do you mean? It's just fine as it is. Don't cut it!"

On that day, I felt I had reached a milestone. I was consistently writing strong, lively articles in which every phrase and every word counted. In fact, the very last article I wrote for Harvey was so good that when he told me he was leaving the magazine, I decided to try to sell it elsewhere. And I did, for about twice what Harvey's old magazine paid. His work with me helped me move up another significant step, and I always will be grateful to him. He taught me how to revise and edit like a professional.

Organize a Story!?

Here's one more true tale about organizing. Donald Ross was of my two great mentors at the University of Minnesota over my years of first teaching there, then working with him on forming a yearly state academic conference. He used to drop an occasional bomb in his comments about my writing emails to others. The two that I most remember are "Don't repeat yourself," and "Don't use the same word twice."

This irked me, as I had a habit of doing both of them in order to emphasize ideas. So, I looked at some scholarly articles in top professional journals, a few articles in big-name national magazines, and even some emails from a few of my English colleagues who were nationally famous in their fields. To my astonishment, they did neither. And it made their writing sound so much more authoritative. I should have known my mentor would be right: his own work was well known in his academic disciplines throughout the country. I tried his advice and was impressed by the authoritative ring it gave even my simplest communications.

When I turned to writing fiction again, I remembered not only these two pieces of advice, but also a host of others: "Use all five senses and 5 W's for each scene," "have a story within a story," "use active verbs," "start and end each chapter with a problem," and more. I checked out some of our top American prizewinning authors, and they certainly managed all of these skills.

Whoever thought you had to organize a story? Isn't storytelling supposed to be this wonderful spontaneous flow of feeling, image, and sound? But in earlier years, I had been writing to express myself. Now I was writing stories for others. I realized I needed to take storytelling much more seriously.

I started applying each of these facets of writing to my fiction writing. I had to apply them in layers. After the first-draft excitement, I developed a second draft by reading what I'd written and taking notes on what I could add—being an editor of my own work, so to speak. Then, for a third draft, I used my notes and also specifically made sure each scene had every single one of its elements, each page was free of repetition (I spent a lot of time looking up new words), and each story or chapter had its proper beginning and end. After a few more revisions for editing and some help from one or two friends who served as readers, I would be done. The final product was so much better than the stories I had written when I was younger. My new tales burst with a richness of geographical place, excitement, a smoother reading experience, and a deeper sound of truth.

My mentor's casual comments set off a new wave in me of discovering how to be a more interesting writer for others. This continues even today for me as a new road I am taking as an author. And it is applicable to even the shortest, simplest article you might write in a professional newsletter: you can capture your readers' attention with storytelling, even if it is a short, true anecdote, by adding the additional elements of creative style.

Conclusion--Getting Ahead with Writing

These are five of my most important stories about learning how to write well. The first, "Charlie the Chicken," shows my first encounter with really writing something that was exciting and meaningful to me. This can happen to anyone at any age. The second, "The Temple of Dr. Doom," shows how in spite of my poor teacher, I learned how to write to satisfy his needs and expectations. This story shows the great importance of learning to write for your audience, whether that audience is an instructor, a loved one, or a boss.

The third story, "The Light Dawns," shows how I discovered a basic method of putting papers together that works well for me--the steps of my own, personal process of writing--something each of us needs to discover for himself or herself. The fourth, "The Joyful Dread," describes how I seized an opportunity to become a much better writer when an editor pushed me almost beyond what I could tolerate; and this story also illustrates how important it is to do thorough, complete, thoughtful revising and editing so that everything counts in our papers and the stories and ideas in them leap out to the readers with importance and relevance.

The fifth story exemplifies how listening to the advice of others about writing never should end. You always can take what you are doing to new heights.

I have been writing for quite a while, now, and I have had many dozens of my articles and essays published. I also have had a couple of handfuls of my stories, poems, and photography appear in print. In recent years, I have had a number of academic essays published in scholarly journals and magazines, or I have presented them at conferences. And now I write a newsletter every two months that goes to over 2000 English professors.

If you think I like to write, you're absolutely correct. I would have continued to be a professional writer if I hadn't learned that I loved teaching more. However, that is beside the point. Here's what's important: writing is necessary—most professionals must spend 50-80% of their time in writing-related tasks. Writing well often is one of the keys to success and advancement. And the great majority of people who need to learn how to write well will go through experiences similar to mine.

So, I wish you luck with your own versions of chickens, Dr. Dooms, dawning lights, joyful dreads, and creative anecdotes. If you accept and meet their challenges, rather than avoid them, you can become an ever-better writer, too.

Handout F: Identifying Bloom's Thinking Skills in Your Paper

Directions: Please use this higher-thinking skills survey on your final paper. It is based on a famous pattern called "Bloom's Taxonomy." Which of these eleven types of critical and creative thinking have you used? Follow these three steps:

(1) *Read the types of thinking in "1"-"11" below*. Figure out what each type of thinking means. You likely are using many.

(2) *Revise your paper.* If you aren't using at least seven of these types of thinking, revise your paper so you are. (Be sure you are using at least **seven** of the eleven types of thinking at least once in your final draft.)

(3) *Use the three right-hand columns.* Then write the numbers of the pages where you use these eleven types of thinking. (In this third step, you only need to fill in one column for each type of thinking. For example, for "**1.**" you might go to the "**Sometimes**" column and write "pp. 1 and 3 (twice)." However, you must write at least one page number for **seven** of the eleven types of thinking, "**1.**"-"**11.**")   © 2011 by R. Jewell. Copies may be made for academic purposes without permission if you show this copyright notice.

How often? → ↓ **Which of these eleven types of thinking do you use in your paper?** (You must identify – by p. # – at least seven of these eleven.)	**A Little –** once or twice in the paper. Page #s:	**Sometimes –** 3 or more times in ppr. Page #s:	**Regularly –** min. of every 1-2 pp. in ppr. Page #s:
Recall, Comprehension, and Application (First three stages of thinking in Bloom's original "Taxonomy of Thinking Skills")**:**			
1. Do you provide backgrounds, summaries, or definitions of main ideas or subjects? (You may use historical, cultural, social, intellectual, statistical, graphed, or other explanations/summaries of ideas/subjects.)			
2. Do you use thorough, consistent logic to prove your viewpoints? [You may use "induction" (use specific facts to create a general idea) or "deduction" (use a general idea to predict specific results).] E.g., offer clear, logical steps for a cause, effect, or conclusion.			
3. Do you clarify the difference between fact vs. opinion in main ideas? (You may use fact vs. hypothesis, known/expected vs. unknown/unexpected, common knowledge vs. possibilities, etc.) E.g., differentiate the facts and the opinions supporting an idea.			
4. Do you clarify differences between causal vs. correlational or parallel relationships? (You may use cause-and-effect to explain one, and simple connection or parallelism to explain the other.) E.g., describe cause/effect, connection, or accident in two ideas'/subjects' relationship.			
5. Do you consistently relate or connect your points? (You may use comparison, connection, or similarity, or show how they function or occur similarly.) E.g., use transition words well to connect ideas.			
Analysis and Synthesis (Fourth and fifth stages of thinking in Bloom's "Taxonomy of Thinking Skills")**:**			
6. Do you show clearly how ideas may be opposite or different? (You may use contrast, dissimilarity, limits, opposition, or other difference.) E.g., use transition words well to show/explain differences between ideas.			
7. Do you explain important exceptions or alternatives to your ideas? (You may use realistic exceptions/alternatives, or unrealistic ones that some may mistakenly assume are true.) E.g., show a good or bad way of believing or acting that some people use (and explain whether it works).			
8. Do you synthesize or suggest original, unique, or unusual ideas? (You may offer completely new, little known, unusual, or revised ideas.) E.g., show a new possible result at the end of the paper or a body section.			
9. Do you use supporting proofs for your ideas? (For proofs you may use physical fact, sufficient circumstantial evidence, deductive probabilities, inductive possibilities, and/or experiences.) E.g., use quotations, charts, or personal experiences to prove an idea may be true.			
Evaluation (Final, sixth stage of thinking in Bloom's "Taxonomy of Thinking Skills")**:**			
10. Do you evaluate differences of opinion about ideas? (You may offer offer +'s and –'s; explain competing alternatives; or use phrases like "the other side of," "on the other hand," "it may be possible," etc.) E.g., show the thinking of two opposing sides.			
11. Do you evaluate your own thinking or conclusions? (You may state the +'s and –'s, quality or lack of it, or good and bad points of your own thinking or results. E.g., evaluate your thinking/conclusions and/or offer differing possibilities or outcomes at the end of the paper or each section.			

About the Author

Richard Jewell has worked with metacognitive and critical thinking since his studies of metaphysics, existentialism, and phenomenology for his B.A. with honors in philosophy, and his M.A. in Theology with a book-length thesis on experiential existentialism. He has published and presented several works nationally on critical thinking. He also has researched several philosophical and theological traditions in Eastern religions that are related to Husserl's phenomenology of the aware self.

Richard has applied the practices in this collection for thirty-six years in his college and university classrooms in lower- and upper-division composition, and at the University of Minnesota in required upper-division writing courses for Engineering, Health Sciences, Humanities, Sciences, and Social Sciences majors. His lessons and handouts for students always have included a variety of reflective critical-thinking and metacognitive practices that helped them develop their writer identities and heuristic tools.

Richard retired in 2019 as a Writing, Literature, and Humanities professor in the English and Humanities Departments of Inver Hills College in MinnState (Minnesota State Colleges and Universities). He continues to run MnWE--the Minnesota Writing & English annual conference and newsletter, which he founded with Donald Ross of the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities. He has received a variety of student awards for his teaching.